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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
Management 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
HEALTHCARE GOVERNANCE, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
OF HOSPITALS IN GHANA 
Patience Aseweh Abor 
It is argued that healthcare governance should play an important role in the 
overall functioning and effective performance of hospitals. However, the 
literature is devoid of how healthcare governance influences the performance 
of hospitals in Africa and other developing countries. This study examines the 
effects of hospital boards and ownership structure on the performance of 
hospitals in Ghana.  The study specifically examines the characteristics of 
hospital boards, ascertains whether the presence of a hospital board and 
ownership structure affect hospital performance, evaluates the effects of 
hospital board characteristics and ownership structure on hospital 
performance,  and also investigates the interaction effects of hospital board 
characteristics and ownership on performance.  Based on a  sample of 132 
hospitals, the study produces a number of results. First, the study indicates 
that 69% of the hospitals have a board in place. The results also show that all 
the mission hospitals have a board in place. Half of the public hospitals and 
80%  of the private hospitals also have a board. The hospitals with a board 
exhibit varying board characteristics. Using regression models, the results 
show that hospitals with  a board demonstrate lower  occupancy, higher 
discharge and deliver better quality healthcare. In terms of the effect of board 
characteristics on performance, smaller boards are associated with better 
health service quality and lower occupancy. Hospitals with greater proportion 
of outside board members assist management to be cost efficient and improve 
on their operations leading to higher discharge. The results also show that 
hospitals with greater representation of medical staff on the board perform 
better in terms of occupancy but are less cost efficient. Hospitals with CEO 
duality perform better in terms of efficiency. However, hospitals with separate 
positions for the CEO and chair perform better in terms of discharge and 
service quality. Additionally, the evidence suggests that boards  with higher 
female representation deliver better quality of healthcare, resulting in higher 
discharge  rate. Also, frequency of board meetings is associated with lower 
occupancy, higher discharge and improved health service quality. The results 
also show that mission-based and private hospitals perform better than public 
hospitals. Further, the results of the interaction effects suggest that mission-
based and private hospitals with effective board governance exhibit better 
performance than public hospitals. This study makes a number of new and 
meaningful contributions to the extant literature  and the findings support 
managerialism, stakeholder and resource dependency theories. The findings 
also  have important implications for effective and efficient governance and 
management of hospitals.  
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Background to the Study 
Governance has become an increasingly important phenomenon in recent 
years primarily due to the number of corporate scandals, which have resulted 
in a decline in shareholder value, a reduction in investor confidence and, in 
some cases, significant bankruptcies (Klapper  and  Love,  2004).  Good 
governance is essential in promoting and ensuring fairness, accountability 
and transparency within organizations  (Murphy and O’Donohoe, 2006). 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the governance processes of 
healthcare systems and this is mainly as a result of the increasing consumer 
pressure and regulatory changes. These developments are expected to have 
implications for the management and performance of hospitals.  Therefore, 
the growing call for more accountability and better performance by hospital 
boards, given their formal and legal responsibility to maintain organizational 
viability and effectiveness (see  Delbecq and Gill, 1988; Shortell,  1989; 
Orlikoff, 2005), is certainly in the right direction. These hospital boards are 
expected to adopt a more critical role in strategy formulation, environmental 
adaptation, and internal control of hospital management (Weng et al., 2011; 
Büchner, 2012). This increased interest is in recognition of the fact that 
effective governance system can lead to improved performance.  
 
Healthcare governance has been conceived of as a shared process of top-level 
organizational leadership,  policymaking  and decision-making. The hospital 
board is a central factor in healthcare governance as it holds the legal 
responsibility for establishing objectives, and reviewing management’s 
performance to ensure that the health facility is well run. Although the 
hospital board has the ultimate accountability, the CEO, senior management 
1 
 and clinical leaders are involved in top-level functions (Bader, 1993; 
Alexander et al., 2009). Most hospitals have their own governing board and a 
professional team of executive managers. Together, they constitute the axis 
of hospital governance, which entails directing the entire  functioning and 
effective performance of a hospital, by defining the hospital’s mission, setting 
its objectives, supporting and monitoring their realization at the operational 
level (Flynn, 2002; Eeckloo et al., 2004). Efficient governance of hospitals 
requires responsible and effective use of funds, professional management 
and competent governing structures (Ditzel et al., 2006).  
 
One important pillar of hospital governance is overseeing the operations of 
the organization and the board, and the  fundamental fiduciary duty of 
hospital governing boards is to ensure the organization’s fidelity to its core 
mission (Alexander and Lee, 2006). Hospital boards who have an 
unprecedented need for sound governance structures, policies and processes 
and well-understood accountabilities also have the responsibility of ensuring 
quality care, efficiency, responsive service, ready access, fairness, and the 
motivation of health service providers (Quigley and Scott, 2004). It is 
important to note that healthcare institutions, whether public or private, for-
profit, or not-for-profit, part of a system or independent, must have the public 
trust to survive and achieve their individual missions. The process or act of 
governance is typically distinguished from that of management or 
supervision. Governance involves both the setting of organizational goals and 
the development of strategies for their achievement, using the traditional 
structure of a board of trustees, and/or governors or directors, to which the 
top administrative officer of the organization usually reports (Wisler, 1986; 
Fennell and Alexander, 1989; Smith et al., 2012). Governance in a hospital 
setting has added complexity as it concerns not only economic and financial 
dimensions, but also incorporates societal ones (Eeckloo et al., 2004). In 
addition, the challenges facing hospitals in today’s environment is forcing the 
contemplation of the meaning of ‘good governance’ and how it should be 
implemented.  
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In recent times, hospital boards have come under greater scrutiny and are 
being held accountable for the performance of the hospitals. These hospital 
boards and managers are challenged to reflect on what good governance 
means and how they can implement it in their own organization. This is due 
to several major developments in healthcare and healthcare policy (Eeckloo et 
al.,  2004).  Therefore,  the relationship between board effectiveness and 
hospital performance is critical for leaders in healthcare. This present study 
takes a look at how hospital boards and ownership structure affect the 
performance of hospitals. The focus of hospitals is crucial given their 
important role and prominent position they assume within the healthcare 
system of most countries.  
 
1.2  Statement of Research Problem  
The capacity of any government to provide a good standard of healthcare is 
considered as one of the most important elements contributing to a country’s 
standard of living, and hospitals play a major role in the delivery of 
healthcare. However, in recent times, healthcare institutions seem to be 
confronted with major challenges, including crisis in health service delivery, 
difficulty in dealing with the pressures and numerous paradoxes by 
healthcare organizations (Troyer et al., 2004). The need to improve quality of 
care and patient safety, in the midst of declining revenues and rising 
expenses,  increasing  service demand due to capacity strained, a rising 
uninsured population, an aging population using more healthcare resources, 
and more competition between hospitals and physicians, to name a few, 
make the issues of healthcare diverse and complex (Savage, et al., 1997). The 
intensity of these issues raises greater concern than ever before and 
contributes to a loss of public and other stakeholder trust in healthcare 
institutions (Health Research and Educational Trust, 2007). Storey and 
Buchanan (2008) argue that  progress in healthcare compared with certain 
other sectors is slow and mistakes continue to occur. The governing board of 
3 
 a healthcare organization is ultimately accountable for maintaining the 
public’s trust. Hospital boards, management, and clinical leadership are 
expected to communicate a clear sense of urgency for change, to strengthen 
the connection between hospitals and their communities as suggested by 
Suchman (1995). This is necessary to ensure the success of the organization 
and to address the challenge of transforming healthcare to overcome the 
numerous obstacles confronting hospitals and healthcare systems today. It is 
the responsibility of the board to ensure a higher standard of performance 
and accountability by engaging in practices that foster exceptional 
governance (Health Research and Educational Trust, 2007). This is because 
there is increasing recent evidence that suggests good governance is linked 
to performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Kumar and Zattoni, 2013), 
though  previous  studies  have suggested otherwise  (see  Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; Singh and Davidson, 2003). 
 
Despite the numerous challenges facing the healthcare sector,  few studies 
exist on the effect of healthcare governance on hospital performance. The 
few studies that exist have also mainly focused on a small number of 
developed countries (see Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Molinari et al., 1993; 
Molinari  et al., 1995; McDonagh, 2006; Culica and Prezio, 2009). 
However, political and administrative reforms in many developing countries 
directly shape what is to be referred to as good governance or best practice. 
Hence,  using findings from such studies (in developed countries)  may 
suggest imposing a false one-best-way model on all countries (Andrews, 
2010).  Thus,  there is a gap in knowledge with regards to how healthcare 
governance  might  influence  the  performance of hospitals from the 
perspective of developing countries, and Africa in particular. There are several 
issues confronting the health system of developing African countries, 
including shortage of appropriately trained and motivated health workers, 
poor commodity security and supply systems, weak operational health 
systems, marginalization of African traditional medicine in national health 
systems, and inadequate community involvement and empowerment. Other 
4 
 problems include paucity and inadequate use of available evidence and 
information to guide action, including the use of ICT, effective co-ordination 
with other sectors and harmony with partners not yet attained, lack of optimal 
inter-sectoral action and coordination, among others (Africa Health Strategy: 
2007–2015 Index). Also, hospitals in some developed countries like the US 
are mostly based on managed care contracts, multi-hospital system and are 
run on corporate  lines and therefore, their measures of performance are 
mainly based on profitability (Molinari et al., 1995; Goes and Park 1997). This 
is often not the case in most countries,  especially in Africa, where 
performance is looked at in terms of quality of care, occupancy, discharge, 
and efficiency.  
 
This study focuses on one important African country, Ghana, as it provides an 
interesting setting to investigate the issue of healthcare governance and 
performance of hospitals. The provision of quality healthcare in Ghana has 
received a lot of support and  attention from both governmental and non-
governmental agencies, resulting in Ghana’s health sector being seen as one 
of the best performing health sectors in the West African sub-region (Abekah-
Nkrumah  et al.,  2009). However, there are still agitations within Ghana 
concerning the performance of the sector considering the massive inflow of 
resources into the sector. For instance, Bruno et al. (2010) suggest that the 
effectiveness of human resource management policies and strategies is rather 
weak, resulting in a number of weaknesses that limit their potential to inform 
decisions of policymakers or health service managers. Another performance 
area  of concern is the  slow rate of maternal mortality reduction of 3.3% 
compared to 5.5% annual rate required to attain the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) 5 target of 185/100 000 by 2015 (World Bank, 1993). Also, it is 
suggested that 36% of health spending is wasted due to inefficiencies and 
poor investment (see WHO, 2012). Various media reports on the numerous 
challenges facing the health sector in Ghana make it important to find out 
how accountable leadership has been in the governance and management of 
5 
 the Country’s hospitals
1. As the media offers important insights into public 
thinking  (Davies  and Shields,  1999),  it can be argued that these media 
anecdotes and reports re-emphasize  both the importance and urgency 
needed in tackling the challenges of governance in the healthcare sector in 
Ghana.  
 
In addition to this, the performance of health facilities has rather been 
observed as being unbalanced (Abekah-Nkrumah et al., 2009). It is possible 
that the performance issue at the health facility level is partly due to a 
governance challenge, hence the need for this study. This study examines the 
effect of healthcare governance and ownership structure on the performance 
of hospitals in Ghana. The study is an important area worth investigating, 
considering that healthcare governance and ownership structures and for that 
matter performance measures of hospitals in developed countries may differ 
from those of developing countries like Ghana. 
 
This study contributes to the extant literature in a number of respects. First, 
this study adds to the advancement of the healthcare governance research 
agenda by looking at the issue of hospital governance and performance from 
the perspective of an African country. Previous studies have tended to focus 
on developed countries with different governance systems (see Shortell and 
LoGerfo, 1981; Alexander et al, 1995; Molinari et al, 1995; Gu et al, 2010). 
Second, this study examines the characteristics of hospital boards across 
various ownership forms. This facilitates easy comparison of the 
characteristics of boards of the various forms of hospitals, which is ignored in 
prior studies. Third, the present study focuses on both hospitals with boards 
1 The 30
th April 2013 edition of the Chronicle newspaper indicates that members of staff of the Korle 
Bu Teaching Hospital extort monies from patients before attending to them. In February 23, 2012, 
the media reported agitations by some board members of Korle Bu Teaching Hospital, resulting in 
the dissolution of the board. In August 2012, the board the hospital was said to have failed in its 
core business, which is delivering on quality clinical services to the Hospital’s patients  (August, 
2012; joyonline.com). On 29
th March 2012, Junior doctors at the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital 
expressed loss of confidence in the board due to incidence of corrupt practices in the Hospital and 
therefore called for its immediate dissolution and dismissal of the management.  
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                                                 and those without boards in order to ascertain whether or not the presence of 
a hospital board affects performance. Prior studies focused on only hospitals 
with boards by just looking at the effects of board characteristics on hospital 
performance. Fourth, this current study includes ownership structure as a 
determinant of hospital performance and also shows how different ownership 
structures together with the effects of the characteristics of hospital boards 
on performance. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first 
study that considers the effects of characteristics  of hospital boards  on 
performance depending on the different ownership forms. Fifth, this current 
study considers non-profit measures of performance, considering the fact 
that hospitals in developing countries are not purely profit making as pertains 
in some developed countries. The study also considers hospital performance 
from both the viewpoints  of the patients’ and healthcare providers. Prior 
studies have ignored patients’ view of performance. Therefore, it is important 
to appreciate how patients think of the performance of hospitals based on 
their governance structure.  
 
1.3  Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to examine the effects of healthcare 
governance and ownership structure on the performance of hospitals in 
Ghana. The specific objectives of the study are to: 
i.  examine the characteristics of hospital boards in Ghana 
ii.  ascertain whether or not the presence of hospital board affects 
hospital performance 
iii.  evaluate the effect of hospital board characteristics on the 
performance of hospitals  
iv.  examine the effect of hospital ownership structure on hospital 
performance; 
v.  investigate the interaction effects of hospital board characteristics and 
ownership on performance. 
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1.4  Research Questions 
Following the objectives of the study, a number of research questions are 
formulated. The following research questions are therefore raised: 
•  What are the characteristics of hospitals boards in Ghana? 
•  Does the presence of hospital board affect hospital performance in the 
case of Ghana? 
•  Do the characteristics of hospital boards affect hospital performance? 
•  What is the effect of ownership structure on hospital performance? 
•  What are the interaction effects of hospital board characteristics and 
ownership on performance? 
 
1.5  Organization of the Study 
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two critically 
discusses previous literature on the subject matter. The chapter provides a 
review of the concepts of healthcare governance, and clinical governance, and 
the principles of good organizational governance as applied in hospitals. It 
then discusses the hospital ownership and governance models, the 
importance of healthcare governing boards, and healthcare governance and 
healthcare quality. The chapter also reviews literature on the effects of 
hospital board characteristics and hospital ownership structure on 
performance.  
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 Chapter three provides an overview of the healthcare system in Ghana. It 
provides a review of the history of the healthcare system, the structure and 
governance of the healthcare system, and the healthcare financing and 
resource utilization. The chapter then discusses targeted health programs, 
health infrastructure, indigenous healthcare system, health sector reforms, 
and health information technology. 
 
Chapter four includes discussion of the governance theories and the 
hypotheses development. This chapter discusses the governance theories and 
the hypotheses development. It also provides a framework for analyzing the 
effects of hospital governance and ownership structure on performance. The 
chapter provides a conceptual framework, which shows how the relevant 
theoretical considerations with justification explain hospital governance. The 
chapter then explains how the hypotheses are developed to guide the 
empirical investigations.  
 
Chapter five explains how the theoretical framework is related to the findings 
and the methodology and methods adopted in the study. This chapter covers 
the philosophical paradigm and justification, type of study carried out, the 
population and data source for the study, the data used in the study and the 
sampling procedure. It also discusses issues of validity and reliability of the 
data, the method used in analyzing the data, and the ethical issues.  
 
Chapter six presents and discusses the results on the characteristics of 
hospital boards in Ghana. The analysis on the characteristics of hospital 
boards is based on the summary descriptive statistics. The chapter also 
includes the correlation and variance inflation factor analysis to ascertain the 
degree of multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables.  
 
9 
 Chapter seven also discusses the results on the effects of hospital board 
governance and ownership structure on the performance of hospitals in 
Ghana. First, the chapter includes a discussion on whether or not the 
presence of a hospital board affects performance. Second, the chapter 
discusses the results on the effects of hospital board characteristics on 
performance. Third, the chapter includes discussion of the results on the 
interaction effects of hospital board characteristics and ownership forms on 
performance. 
 
Chapter eight summarizes the main findings and provides conclusions, 
limitations and areas of further research based on the findings. This chapter 
also mentions the main contributions of the study and provides relevant 
policy recommendations based on the findings and in line with the specific 
objectives of the research.  
   
The next chapter provides a critical analysis of existing literature on 
healthcare governance and performance.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This first section gives an introduction of the chapter. Chapter two critically 
examines the literature on governance and hospital performance. The chapter 
is organized in seven sections. The next section discusses the concepts of 
healthcare governance, and clinical governance. The third section discusses 
the principles of good organizational governance as applied in hospitals. The 
fourth  section covers hospital ownership and governance models and also 
discusses the importance of hospital boards. Section five  of the literature 
review  chapter discusses healthcare governance and healthcare quality. It 
specifically looks at healthcare quality and the role of hospital boards in 
delivering healthcare quality. The sixth section of this chapter discusses the 
existing literature on the effects of hospital board characteristics, including 
board size, board composition, board participation by medical staff, board 
leadership structure, board diversity, and frequency of board meetings on 
performance. The  section also discusses the literature on the relationship 
11 
 between hospital ownership structure and performance. The summary of the 
key issues discussed in the literature review is provided in the final section.  
 
2.2  Healthcare Governance 
Healthcare governance is regarded as the process of steering the overall 
functioning and effective performance of a hospital by defining the hospital’s 
mission, setting its objectives, supporting and monitoring their realization at 
the operational level (Flynn, 2002). It includes the responsibility and 
accountability for the overall operation of the health facility. More specifically, 
healthcare governance has been conceived of as a shared process of top-level 
organizational leadership, policy making and decision-making of the board, 
CEO, senior management and clinical leaders. It is an interdependent 
partnership of leaders and though the hospital board has the ultimate 
accountability, the CEO, senior management and clinical leaders are involved 
in top-level functions (Bader, 1993;  Bennington, 2010;  Alexander  et al., 
2003). Bader (1993) suggests the need of having all perspectives in the 
hospital involved in order to make governance in a hospital setting work 
effectively.  
 
According to Eeckloo et al. (2004), most hospitals have their own governing 
boards and a professional team of executive managers and together they 
constitute the ‘axis of hospital governance’; they argue that the purpose of 
the healthcare governance is to enable a more integrated approach of 
supporting and supervising all hospital activities, including clinical 
performance. Flynn (2002) and Eeckloo et al.  (2004) consider healthcare 
governance as the process of steering the overall functioning and effective 
performance of a hospital by defining [its] mission, setting objectives 
and…[having them realized] at the operational level. This supports the 
position of Taylor (2000) that one of the key elements needed in order to 
achieve excellence in hospital governance is having a clear mission and an 
achievement-orientated culture in which to realize it. However, there are 
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 continued reports of poor performance, sometimes with tragic consequences 
that cause widespread public concern (Davies and Shields, 1999). 
 
One main focus of healthcare or hospital governance is the supervision of the 
clinical performance of the hospital, which involves the delivery of quality 
healthcare. The process of ensuring the provision of quality healthcare is 
explained by what is known as clinical governance, which is seen as an 
important element of healthcare governance. This study also considers health 
service quality as one of the measures of hospital performance. Therefore, 
the concept of clinical governance as  a key  component of healthcare 
governance is relevant within the context of this current study. 
2.2.1    Clinical Governance 
The international debates about the quality of care now include consideration 
of safety and how to minimize error. The concept of clinical governance has 
emerged as one strategy for increasing vigilance and spreading responsibility 
for outcomes. Clinical governance is seen as an important aspect of the 
healthcare governance system, which has emerged as a result of the 
complexity of nature of the setting and the service provided within the 
hospital (Phillips et al., 2010; McSherry and Pearce, 2011). The term clinical 
governance was first used by World Health Organization (WHO) in 1983 as a 
way of summarizing the main elements of the provision of quality healthcare. 
Its evolution was rather slow and was only introduced on a formalized basis 
by some countries in the latter years of the 1990’s (Murphy and O’Donohoe, 
2006). Vanu Som (2004) defines clinical governance as a governance system 
for healthcare organizations that promotes an integrated approach towards 
management of inputs, structures and processes to improve…clinical quality.  
She suggests that the main aim of clinical governance is said to accomplish 
continuous quality improvement in a healthcare setting and is designed to 
consolidate fragmented approaches to quality improvement. 
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 The concept of clinical governance is considered a framework used to 
improve the quality of provided healthcare service (Vanu Som, 2004; 
Nutbeam, 2011). In the view of Donaldson and Gray (1998), it is a framework 
through which the NHS organizations are accountable for continuing to 
improve the quality of the service and safeguarding high standards of care by 
creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care would flourish. 
Clinical governance, according to Freedman (2002), is also seen as a whole 
system of cultural change, which provides the means of developing 
organizational capability to deliver sustainable, accountable, patient-focused 
and quality assured healthcare. He suggests that it provides the umbrella 
under which  all aspects of quality can be gathered and continuously 
monitored. Freedman (2002) endorsed this by emphasising that its 
introduction on a formalised basis means that hospitals now have to report 
on issues of quality rather than only financial accountability as was previously 
practiced. Clinical governance attempts to improve the quality of healthcare 
provided by the integration of the financial, performance and clinical quality 
aspects of a hospital. The important role played by clinicians has also been 
recognized in delivering quality in the hospital (Murphy and O’Donohoe, 
2006).    
 
World Health Organization (2008) outlines four main dimensions of clinical 
governance including professional performance, resource allocation, risk 
management and patient satisfaction.  However, subsequently,  many other 
elements have been incorporated as the concept has been rolled out into 
hospitals. The elements include patient involvement in service delivery, 
staffing and staff management, continuous professional development, clinical 
effectiveness, education and training, using available information, and clear 
lines of accountability and responsibility for clinical care.  Based on these 
varied dimensions,  clinical governance can be viewed as a mechanism to 
facilitate multi-disciplinary teams all working toward the same goal –  the 
continuous improvement of the quality of healthcare. It is hoped that these 
cooperative working practices will have a positive influence on both the 
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 behaviour of medical professionals and in turn the delivery of care (Vanu 
Som, 2004; Murphy and O’Donohoe, 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Healthcare Governance, Hospital Board and Clinical 
Governance  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  Source: constructed by author 
   
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship among healthcare governance, hospital 
board governance and clinical governance. Healthcare governance deals with 
the process of steering the overall functioning and effective performance of a 
hospital by defining the hospital’s mission, setting its objectives, supporting 
Healthcare Governance 
Hospital Board  Clinical Governance 
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 and monitoring their realization at the operational level. The hospital board is 
an important feature of the healthcare governance system, which holds the 
legal responsibility for establishing objectives, and reviewing management 
performance to effective and efficient running of the hospital. Clinical 
governance is also as an important aspect of the healthcare governance 
system  and  aims at accomplishing continuous quality improvement in a 
healthcare setting and is designed to consolidate fragmented approaches to 
quality improvement. The hospital board is responsible for ensuring clinical 
governance among other equally important oversight roles it plays. That is, it 
ensures that the hospital delivers best quality of care and patients are not 
harmed.  
 
In order to understand the relevance of healthcare governance, the various 
principles underlining the concept of healthcare governance must be 
understood. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3  Principles of Good Hospital Governance  
It is important to consider the principles of good governance within the 
context of hospitals. According to Taylor (2000), every management guru and 
leader may have their own typology of good governance principles grounded 
in observation-based theory. He, however, suggests that these principles 
could be combined based on classical and current literature into nine 
principles of ‘good governance’ by applying them in a hospital setting. Ditzel 
et al.  (2006) also applied these nine principles of good governance to 
healthcare management. Ditzel et al.  (2006) suggest that given the 
importance of  the governance function in managing hospitals, it may be 
timely for policy-makers and citizens alike of countries experiencing health 
sector change to first consider to what extent their current models of hospital 
governance meet the specified ‘good governance’ criteria, and second to 
address the implications of ‘good governance’ for their respective country's 
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 healthcare environments. The study first provides a review of the principles of 
good governance as applied to hospitals.  
 
The principles of good governance proposed by Taylor (2000) include 
knowing what governance is, achievement of strategic ends, board-CEO 
relationship, unity of direction, unity of command, unity of 
accountability/responsibility, ownership needs, self-improvement, and 
understanding  the cost of governance. These governance principles are 
summarized in Table 2.1 and discussed in turn. 
 
 
2.3.1  Knowing What Governance Is 
Knowing what governance is constitutes another good governance principle. 
Bohen (1995) defines governance as the responsibility and accountability for 
the overall operation of an organization. Every type of board is mandated with 
the responsibility of playing an oversight role in the organization in which it 
presides, as well as obliged with the accountability towards the owners and 
stakeholders of that organization. This sometimes includes having formal 
mission statements and clearly defined performance objectives, codes of 
conduct and procedures spelling out exactly what are  required for the 
governance function (Ditzel  et al., 2006). In most developed nations like 
Canada, boards govern hospitals, whilst the management of these hospitals is 
delegated to Chief Executive Officers. The board is charged with the 
responsibility of developing corporate plans and policies, motivating and 
measuring the performance of organizations against the targeted plans and 
policies, and serving as advocates of the owners of the hospital (Taylor, 
2000). However, implementation of the set policies and plans is the duty of 
the CEO. Hospital boards also have a duty of  forming five strategic 
relationships in order to pave the way for effective governance and 
performance. These relationships include:  board-CEO relationship, board-
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 medical staff relationship, board-community relationship, board-
mission/goals/values relationship, and relationship amongst board members 
(Taylor, 2000). 
 
According to Bader (1993), governance is a shared process of top-level 
organizational leadership, policy making, and decision-making. The CEO, and 
senior management, as well as clinical leaders, are all involved in top-level 
function, but the board has the ultimate accountability. Thus, governance is 
not the prerogative of just board members, but an interdependent 
partnership of leaders. 
 
 
2.3.2  Achievement of Strategic Ends 
There has been increased demand on all health service providing facilities, 
from both social and economic circles, to provide the ‘right’ services at the 
right place, within the right time, and at an affordable cost in order to ensure 
effectiveness in the health sector. It is therefore incumbent on all hospital 
governing boards to set strategic ends (encompassing service and financial 
performance objectives), and ensure that these are attained and measured. 
All organizational activities must therefore be synchronized with regards to 
the values/goals of the organization (Davies, 1999; Taylor, 2000; Ditzel, el, 
2006). According to Weber (1947), large organizations must have a plan to 
deal effectively with the diverse behaviours of the individuals in order to 
accomplish its goals and objectives. He suggests that every individual within 
such organizations must occupy a specified position that comes with specific 
tasks to perform, which he referred to as bureaucracy.  
 
Apart from bureaucracy, strategic planning is another means by which 
governance can ensure the achievement of strategic ends. Studies have 
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 shown that a strong relationship does exist between strategic planning and 
organizational effectiveness (see Bradshaw et al., 1992, Carver, 1990a). 
Higher organizational performance could be a result of better strategic 
planning. Carver (1990a) argues that if governance is about overseeing an 
organization’s achievement of its  strategic goals, then the CEO must be 
accountable to the board for the achievement of those strategic goals. This is 
possible if only the board clearly indicates  what it hopes to achieve in 
measurable terms, in a strategic plan. According to Taylor (2000), this 
strategic planning is, however, quite often influenced by the organization’s 
mission, vision, values, ownership, and community needs. 
 
 
 
2.3.3  Board-CEO Relationship 
The effectiveness and high performance of an organization largely depends 
on the mutual trust and confidence throughout the organization, and 
particularly between the board and the CEO (Likert, 1961; Gillies, 1992). 
Carver (1990a) asserts that the relationship between the board and the CEO is 
the single most important relationship in an organization and this 
relationship is mostly easily misconstrued and tagged with dire political 
consequences. According to Carver (1990a), governance is not responsibility 
of the board alone and it is also not the sole responsibility of the CEO. But 
rather, it is a solemn partnership, a leadership team, which is to be preserved 
by each member having a devoted loyalty to the greater entity that they 
govern. Board members and the CEO are said to be equals and colleagues, 
but it is conflict of interest to have the CEO sit as a voting member of the 
board, let alone function as the chair of the board (Carver, 1990a; Gillies, 
1992). 
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 The board has the mandate to hire, evaluate, and fire the CEO. Carver (1990a) 
states that monitoring the CEO is as important as hiring him or her in the first 
place. The board also has the responsibility of providing a connection 
between the hospital and its moral ownership, monitoring the performance of 
the CEO, managing the board-medical staff relationship, the board 
community relationship, and intra-board relationships (Ditzel et al, 2006). 
The CEO is in charge of all parts of the organization put together as a whole, 
enabling the board to govern by dealing with the whole, and the CEO alone 
on personal levels (Mintzberg, 1987). The CEO should inform the board to 
seek its approval whenever he/she finds it expedient to deviate from board 
policy. Therefore, the board is responsible for articulating the organization’s 
mission, vision, values, goals, and plans, and the CEO is responsible for the 
implementation and achievements of the ends on time and within budget 
(Pointer, 1995). However, organizational and executive performance 
objectives should be determined by both the board and the CEO, ensuring 
that these objectives are realistic, measurable, doable, and not conflicting one 
with the other (Harvey, 1978). The board has the right to expect performance, 
honesty and straightforwardness, from its CEO and the CEO has the right to 
expect one voice from the board and be accountable to one board, all in 
unison regardless of the differences within and around it (Carver, 1990a). 
 
2.3.4  Unity of Direction  
This principle is derived from classical management principles and it is 
interlinked with two other principles;  unity of command, and unity of 
accountability and responsibility. Together, these principles are concerned 
with the organization and mechanistic functioning  of boards. The unity of 
direction,  unity of command, and unity of accountability and responsibility 
principles relate to the scalar principle of organizational design meaning that 
the chain of command should flow in a straight line from the top to the 
bottom of the organization (i.e., from the board's CEO down through the 
various staff levels in the hospital, and that people in positions of power 
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 within the organization should be accountable for their actions and directly 
responsible to their superiors) (Ditzel et al., 2006). 
 
According to Fayol (1949), one of the principles of management that explains 
the role of governance, describe unity of direction as the phenomenon in 
which an organization has one board of governors, one CEO, one strategic 
plan, mission or vision at any one time. He posits that anything more would 
be a recipe for double standards, chaos, waste and eventually, 
ineffectiveness. It is important for all aspects of the organization’s 
governance system to function in unison to ensure the achievement of 
strategic goals. It is argued that the creation of governance partnership of the 
hospital board and the CEO is necessary in pursuing a common mission or 
vision. There should not in any way be ambiguity in direction so as to ensure 
the effectiveness of a CEO/organization. Hence, a high level of strategic 
alignment is necessary for any organization to be strategically successful. 
Specifically, alignment among the organizations mission, vision, values, 
goals, strategy, structure, culture, leadership style, resource deployment and 
investment, incentive system, skills sets, and performance measures (Rumelt, 
1974; Hambrick, 1987; Shortell and O’brien, 1994). According to Bader 
(1996), this strategic alignment is usually under the prerogative of the CEO 
under the stewardship of the board.  
 
Some researchers (see Juran, 1989; Mintzberg, 1989; Arrington et al., 1995) 
hold the view that successful change management needed to redirect 
hospitals, health agencies, and health systems into the next millennium 
requires the partnership of board and CEO with a common vision of the 
future, commonly-held knowledge of the primary commitments of the 
organization and basically know what they intend creating, why and how. 
 
2.3.5  Unity of Command 
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 The principle of unity of command is also part of the ‘scalar principle’ and it 
requires that decision-making authority or the chain of command should flow 
in a straight line from the top to the bottom of the organization. That is from 
the board to the CEO down through the various staff levels in the hospital 
(Ditzel et al., 2006). Every employee including the CEO should receive orders 
from only one superior. A deviation from this order can bring about 
confusion, threaten stability, breed irresponsibility and if not checked, wreak 
havoc (Fayol, 1949; Mintzberg, 1979; Anderson, 1984). Fayol (1949) observed 
that a body with two heads is in the social world a monster just as it is in the 
animal world, and has difficulty surviving.  
 
Gillies (1992) argues that when a CEO is made to report to more than one 
board, for instance, he becomes more powerful than these boards). Simon 
(1946) concludes that it is physically impossible for a person to obey two 
contradictory commands. Whenever there is no unity in command, the 
relationship between board and CEO is tremendously affected. Thus, split of 
authority can lead to disorderliness in any organization (March and Simon, 
1958; Taylor, 2000). 
2.3.6   Unity of Accountability/Responsibility   
In organizational theory, the principle of responsibility states that, first 
subordinates are responsible for their performance directly to their 
superiors/supervisors, and second, that supervisors are directly responsible 
for the performance of those they supervise (Anderson, 1984). People in 
positions of power within the organization should be accountable for their 
actions and directly responsible to their superiors (Ditzel, 2006). Within an 
organization, authority should always correspond with responsibility (Fayol, 
1949). Whenever this does not happen,  decisions are delayed or not even 
made at all. Hence, it can be detrimental for an organization if the CEO’s 
authority (given him/her by the board) does not match his/her 
responsibilities. This normally happens when there is no trust between the 
board and the CEO. Authority is, therefore, a derivative of responsibility. 
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For organizations like the hospital, four aspects of accountability are 
paramount and these are political accountability, commercial accountability, 
clinical accountability, and community accountability. Political accountability 
deals with the hospital’s achievement of all externally imposed mandates 
within the boundaries set. Commercial accountability is the net value created 
within the services provided by the hospital. Clinical accountability connotes 
patient outcomes and satisfaction. Community accountability is the hospital’s 
role in improving the health status of its community (Taylor, 2000). The 
governance structure and culture of the hospital should enable the 
achievement of the various forms of accountabilities (Alexander et al., 1995; 
Gamm, 1996; Griffith, 1996). Any other thing other than single line 
accountability is not just ineffective in the current challenging environment, 
but also incompatible with the demands facing healthcare facilities and 
hospitals. Multiple accountability  is said to result in ambiguity, conflicts, 
confusion, alienation, and withdrawal, which health managers do not need 
even the least of (Davis and Lawrence, 1978; Joyce, 1986; Rakich et al., 1992; 
Taylor, 2000). 
2.3.7  Ownership Needs 
This principle deals with the fact that a hospital’s board is ultimately 
accountable to the organization’s owners (Taylor, 2000). Unlike military, 
government-owned, or church-owned hospitals, corporations  (consisting of 
board members)  own publicly listed hospitals  themselves and other non-
board members. According to Drucker (1990) and Bader (1991), in these 
corporation  owned hospitals, the board is usually accountable to the 
hospital’s mission and values, which is not the case with denominational-
owned or government-owned hospitals. However, Bohen (1995) explains that 
the governing board’s role as a voice of ownership is most often overlooked 
in non-government/non-denominational owned hospitals. In the case of non-
profit boards, Taylor et al. (1996) suggest that the network is governance not 
management, survival not routine, and finding out what really matter. In 
order to ascertain ‘what really matters’, the boards and its CEO are expected 
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 to identify who the organization’s key stakeholders are and they appreciate 
the need to also understand the constituents they serve (Taylor, 2000). 
According to Taylor (2000), governors and CEOs must communicate in a 
strategic manner with their owners and communities in order to satisfy the 
current demands of governance. 
 
Carver (1990) suggests that governing boards of hospitals or any 
organization are guardians of the organization’s mission, and values, which 
distinctively set denominational hospitals apart from one another. Rodat 
(1996) argues that for these hospitals to be seen differently, they must 
practice and live their distinct mission and values. According to Carver 
(1990a) and Duncan et al. (1995), it is possible to achieve this if governors 
and CEOs really act as stewards and are particularly dedicated to their core 
mission and values. Clearly, testing an organization’s activity against its 
mission is the standard check of organizational direction (Carver, 1990a; 
Taylor, 2000). It stands to reason that the board’s dedication to achieving the 
organization’s mission ultimately translates to meeting the needs of the 
owners of the organization.  
2.3.8  Self-Improvement 
This principle is strongly based on the premise that hospitals and health 
systems are not just economic, but also social entities (Saltman, 1997; Ditzel 
et al., 2006). According to Taylor (2000), there is the need for continuous 
improvement as an organizational philosophy to permeate all aspects of the 
hospital from the top to bottom of the organizational ladder, in order to 
ensure total quality management. Thus, hospital board members should be 
selected based on their knowledge in business management, financial 
analysis and strategic planning; as having a fully representative board defeats 
the whole purpose of governance. Such a board will not focus on the strategic 
issues, but may be interested in promoting their own interests (Delbecq and 
Gill, 1988; Taylor, 2000). Taylor (2000) explains that hospital boards are the 
obvious starting points for continuous self-improvement. 
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Carver (1990a) and Rovner (1996) suggest that board meetings should not be 
held regularly as it has the potential of getting the board into operational 
details, which are not supposed to be their business. Senior management 
tends to focus on preparing for board meetings as opposed to implementing 
board policies and decision. Frequent board meetings also put too much 
workload on other staff and also increase the cost of board business (Taylor, 
2000). 
 
2.3.9  Understanding the Cost of Governance 
This principle deals with issues such as the  payment of board members, 
direct costs of meetings, staff supporting board activities, and costs 
associated with errors made by boards (Ditxel et al., 2006). Carver (1990b) 
explains that apart from being governance centres, most boards are also 
regarded  as cost centres. Taylor (2000) identified five basic cost of 
governance, including board members’  personal opportunity cost, direct 
expenses on board meetings, cost of staff supporting activities, cost 
associated with errors made by the board, and costs of  ineffectively 
structured governance-management-organization relationship. All these costs 
will either be minimized or avoided by an effective governing body. 
 
Most governing boards will impose opportunity cost on its members and for 
the ineffective and inefficient board that meets unnecessarily, and 
accomplishes little, a huge cost is still imposed on its governors and is very 
wasteful of their time. Almost every hospital board function incurs material 
expenses; for photocopying, couriers, tea/coffee, and so on. These costs are 
increasingly significant if the hospital has a large board with other 
committees and sub-committees that meet frequently. Staff time spent on 
board activities is the single largest, on-going cost of governance, as much of 
the time of senior management of the hospital is spent preparing for board 
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 questions, writing reports, and doing follow ups on board activities, amongst 
others. Errors are bound to be made by boards as no board is perfect. 
However, these errors cost money, and as much as possible should be 
minimized by the board by  ensuring that their actions are consistent with 
their mission, vision, and policies. The board should also ask questions on 
strategic issues to ensure that only competent people are elected as directors, 
as well as focus  on outcomes, not means (Carver, 1990a; Taylor, 2000). 
Anderson (1984) argues that whenever the governance principles, especially 
any combination of three unity principles are violated, it leads to huge cost to 
the organization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Principles of Good Governance  
Principles   Application  
Knowing what 
governance is 
CEO is responsible to board for implementing its policy plans 
and strategic directions. Board is responsible for developing 
corporate policies and plans; monitoring and measuring 
organizational performance against those policies and plans; 
and acting as a voice of the ownership of the hospital. Board's 
governance responsibilities are to provide a linkage between the 
hospital and its moral ownership; monitor the performance of 
the CEO; and develop an explicit statement of values for the 
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 hospital. 
 
Achievement of 
strategic ends 
 
To be effective by providing the right service, at the right place, 
at the right time, and at an affordable cost. Hospital governance 
structures must be such that performance objectives can be set, 
measured and accomplished 
 
Board-CEO 
relationship 
Relationship is typified by a high level of mutual confidence and 
trust throughout the organization and particularly between the 
board  of directors and CEO. Governance viewed as a solemn 
partnership between board and CEO. Board members and the 
CEO are equals; they are colleagues. Organizations should be 
conceived of as a number of concentric circles with clients in 
the outermost circle and the CEO in the inner circle. 
   
Unity of direction 
 
The CEO and board should function as a common body to 
pursue a common end. There should be only one board of 
governors, one CEO, one strategic plan, mission or vision, at 
any one time. 
 
Unity of command 
 
 
Orders should be received from one superior only. Decision- 
making authority should flow in a straight line from the top to 
the bottom of the organization. 
 
Unity of 
accountability and 
responsibility 
Authority is a derivative of responsibility. Every employee, 
including the CEO, must be held accountable for the exercise of 
authority in executing his/her responsibilities. 
27 
  
 
 
Ownership needs. 
 
A hospital board’s  ultimate accountability is to the 
organization’s ownership. 
 
Self-improvement 
and quality 
management 
 
Continuous improvement should be part of an organizational 
philosophy and should permeate all hospital management and 
governance practice. 
 
Understanding the 
cost of governance 
 
These include board member's personal opportunity costs, 
direct board meeting expenses, the costs of staff supporting 
board activities, the costs associated with errors made by 
boards, and the costs of ineffectively structured governance-
management-organization relationships. 
Source: Ditzel et al. (2006), page 7. 
 
 
2.4  Hospital Ownership and Governance Models 
Hospital boards are ultimately accountable to the organization’s ownership. 
With respect to church-owned and government-owned or military, there is, in 
fact, a particular owner. Many other hospitals owned by a number of 
shareholders have their own boards and the owners may be board members 
or non-board members. The board’s responsibility of hospitals owned by 
shareholders other than a denomination or government is mainly to the 
hospital’s mission and values (Drucker, 1990, Bader, 1991; Taylor, 2000).  It 
is important to understand the various models of healthcare governing board 
and the general importance of the healthcare governing boards. 
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2.4.1    Models of Healthcare Governing Board 
The major ownership types include for-profit, non-profit, and public 
ownership. The non-profit hospitals are normally owned by religious groups 
and non-governmental  organizations. Both non-profit and public hospitals 
have non-profit making motives. For-profit ownership entails shareholders 
who expect a return on their investment. Therefore, for-profit hospitals are 
expected to reward their shareholders in the form of dividends by generating 
short-  term and long-term profits. Non-profit hospitals, though  they  need 
short-term surpluses to finance their operations (Chang and Tushman, 1990), 
are mainly responsibility to their communities to provide necessary quality 
services rather than generate long-term profits. The existing literature 
suggests that not-for-profit firms have different objective function other than 
profit maximization. The objective function may include issues regarding 
maximizing quality, quantity and/or prestige, helping to fulfill demand for 
local public goods or meet the needs in the community; or maximizing the 
well-being of specific important constituencies, such as the medical staff or 
consumers (Newhouse, 1970; Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Weisbrod, 1988; 
Frank and Salkever, 1991; Ben-Ner and Gui, 1993; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 
1998).  Consequently, whereas for-profit and non-profit  hospitals both 
attempt to generate short-term profit margins, for-profit hospitals’ financial 
responsibility to shareholders is likely to result in higher long-term 
profitability than hospitals in the non-profit sector. Certainly, for-profit chains 
would be expected to show higher operating margins because of the financial 
interests of their stakeholders than non-profit hospitals. 
 
Gregg (2001) also argues that together with a clear ownership structure, non-
profit healthcare institutions also lack the principle of maximization of profit. 
However, in corporations, profitability and share value constitute the most 
important criterion to assess decisions. Eeckloo et al. (2004) suggest that in 
hospitals, the objectives are less unequivocal and often contradictory. The 
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 main objective is of course to provide qualitative specialized care. But next to 
this, hospitals must also pay attention to the accessibility of this care and the 
financial equilibrium of the hospital’s exploitation. 
 
The ownership type of the hospital has implications for the form of 
governance system adopted by the hospital. In a for-profit context, a well-
defined relationship between ownership and control is the predominant aim 
of any model of corporate governance. This relationship is generally referred 
to as the ‘accountability’ of management and board of directors towards 
shareholders. Governance of non-profit hospitals starts from a totally 
different situation: since there are no real owners, the emphasis has shifted 
from the shareholders to the stakeholders. As healthcare is a social good, 
each group of stakeholders merits recognition of its interests, and not merely 
because of its contribution to the added value of other groups (Eeckloo et al., 
2004). 
 
The governance forms of not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals can be looked 
at along the philanthropic and corporate models of governance. The 
philanthropic  board model is typically associated especially with  non-profit 
organizations. The corporate model on the other hand is associated with the 
commercial sector and therefore can be found in for-profit hospitals (Johnson, 
1986). Some healthcare experts have argued that the philanthropic model, 
with its emphasis on asset preservation and constituent representation, has 
worked well and thus needs only minor modifications to become adaptive to 
the current environmental conditions facing hospitals (Umbdenstock et al., 
1990; Griffith, 1988). Others, however, have broadly questioned the capacity 
of the traditional, voluntary board model to meet the new strategic challenges 
posed by a competitive healthcare environment (Barrett and Windham, 1984; 
Delbecq and Gill, 1988; Shortell, 1989; Weiner and Alexander, 1993a). 
Alexander et al. (1988) explained the main differences between philanthropic 
and corporate boards with respect to board size, heterogeneity, inside 
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 directors, CEO participation on board, CEO accountability to board, limit to 
consecutive terms, board compensation, and strategic activity. These 
differences are presented in Table 2.2 and discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs.   
 
Table 2.2: Governing Board Types 
Philanthropic Model   Corporate Model 
Large board size  Small board size 
Wide range of perspectives and  
Backgrounds 
Narrow, more focused range of 
perspectives and backgrounds 
Less corporate representation  
on board 
Greater corporate representation 
on board 
Less physician representation  
on board 
Greater physician representation 
on board 
Numerous participants in new board 
member selection 
Few participants in new board member 
selection 
Constituent/community representation 
criteria for new board member selection 
Skills/expertise criteria for new board 
member selection 
Less management influence in new 
board member selection 
Active management participation on 
Board 
Little management participation 
on board 
Greater management influence in new 
board member selection 
No limit to consecutive terms for   Limit to consecutive terms for board 
31 
 board Members  Members 
No compensation for board service 
 
Compensation provided for board 
Service 
Emphasis on asset preservation  Emphasis on strategic activity 
Large number of standing committees  Small number of standing committees 
Less active strategic committees  More active strategic committees 
Source: Adapted from Alexander et al. (1988), page 317  and Weiner and          
Alexander (1993a), page 328. 
 
Board size is the number of board members on the board. Philanthropic 
boards are often depicted by a large number of members and they tend to 
represent a wide range of interest (Pfeffer, 1972). Historically, the major role 
of hospital trustees has been to maintain or enhance the legitimacy and 
prestige of the institution within the community, as well as to attract 
resources to the hospital from the surrounding environment (Alexander et al., 
1988). Corporate boards on the other hand are usually smaller in size and 
tend to focus as a function of the narrower constituencies to which the 
organization is responsible (Zald, 1969; Mace, 1971; Ewell, 1987). Gu . (2010) 
suggest that hospital governance models are changing, shifting from a large, 
largely philanthropic model to a smaller ‘corporate’ model. 
 
Heterogeneity of the board is considered in terms of age, gender, racial or 
ethnic background, area of residence, and occupation of the board members. 
The range of perspectives and backgrounds on philanthropic boards  are 
much broader than corporate boards in the sense that they tend to influence 
a wide range of constituencies and stakeholders. Corporate boards, however, 
tend to focus on fewer shareholders (Pfeffer, 1973, 1972; Johnson, 1986). It 
stands to then reason that philanthropic boards are more likely to have 
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 members with diverse characteristics in terms of age, gender, racial or ethnic 
background, area of residence, and occupation than corporate boards. The 
more business-like orientation of corporate boards is particularly likely to be 
reflected in greater occupational homogeneity (Alexander et al., 1988). 
 
Inside directors are management members who are on the board. 
Philanthropic boards are normally made up of fewer inside directors because 
of their emphasis on environmental linkages and community relations 
(Deegan, 1982; Morlock and Alexander, 1986). Corporate boards often 
comprise of a large number of inside directors since they have knowledge of 
the internal working of the organization. Greater insider representation on 
the board is also seen as a form of reward to a manager, and to achieve 
greater correspondence between organizational operations and policymaking 
(Juran, 1966; Mace, 1971).  
 
CEOs tend to play a very significant role on corporate boards than they do on 
philanthropic boards. This is mainly because CEOs of philanthropic 
organizations mostly share power with other professional and management 
groups, thus diluting their influence on the boards (Zuckerman et al., 1979; 
Alexander and Morlock, 1985). CEOs of corporate organizations have 
traditionally held more power vis-a-vis the boards and the businesses because 
of their ultimate authority over all aspects of running the organization 
(Mizruchi, 1983). Strong executive influence on the board is considered 
important in improving the linkage between policymaking and operations, 
lessening conflict between management and board members, and facilitating 
selection of directors whose views are consistent with the philosophy of the 
organization (Johnson, 1986; Alexander et al., 1988). 
 
Corporate boards tend to make a clearer distinction between policymaking 
and operations of the organization than their philanthropic board 
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 counterparts do (Vance, 1968; Mace, 1976). It is more likely to see its role to 
include formulation of institutional policy and strategic decision-making, with 
delegation of responsibility and authority to the CEO for daily operations. This 
distinction of the board’s strategic role and the CEO’s operational 
responsibilities improves the board’s monitoring of the CEO’s activities and 
hospital performance. Routine, formal CEO evaluations by the board are seen 
as an important method of monitoring and improving CEO performance, as 
well as indirectly establishing stronger linkages between operations and 
policymaking (Ewell, 1972; Alexander and Morlock, 1985; Alexander et al., 
1988). 
 
Term of the board is how long board members are allowed to serve on the 
board. In the corporate board model, there are often limitations placed on the 
number of consecutive terms board members may serve, to keep the board 
from becoming too conservative and stale (Pfeffer, 1973; Johnson, 1986; 
Kovner, 1978). On the other hand, philanthropic boards tend to be  self-
perpetuating bodies. This means, board members of philanthropic boards 
may serve on the board indefinitely or in other cases are allowed to select 
their successors (Ewell, 1982; Alexander et al., 1988). 
 
In terms of board compensation, philanthropic boards have traditionally 
avoided compensating board members. This is mainly due to the voluntary 
nature of board service (Johnson, 1986). Corporate boards, on the other hand 
normally pay board fees to their members for board service. Although 
corporate board members are only rarely fully compensated for the value of 
their time, it is considered that even a token gesture in this regard 
strengthens the bond between the corporate board member and the 
organization (Rehm and Alexander, 1986; Ewell, 1982; Alexander  et al., 
1988). 
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 With respect to board strategic activity, philanthropic board members are 
likely to view themselves as trustees concerned with preserving the assets of 
the organization and fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities. In the corporate 
board model, board members often focus on establishing overall policy 
direction of the organization (Prybil and Starkweather, 1976; Kaufman, 1979; 
Ritvo, 1980). Alexander et al.  (1988) argue that, in the current healthcare 
climate, for instance, corporate boards are more likely to be concerned with 
the hospital’s competitive position. 
 
2.4.2    Importance of Hospital Boards  
Hospital boards are an important element of healthcare governance and they 
play a crucial role in the healthcare delivery system. They are accountable for 
the overall performance of their healthcare organizations and also contribute 
in shaping the hospital or health facility they represent, thus impacting the 
healthcare system at large. 
 
There are different views in the literature regarding the roles of governing 
boards. One early study found that board members perceived their roles as 
fundraising, establishing operating procedures, enlisting the support of 
others, budgeting and fiscal control, and balancing the organization with 
differing viewpoints (Fenn 1971). Widmer (1993) argues that some boards act 
mainly as policy makers, focusing on establishing mission and a strategic 
direction for the hospital. Others assume the role of boundary spanners, 
focusing on building and maintaining relations with key external 
constituencies and fundraising; while still others devote much of their time 
and attention to overseeing the performance of the hospital and its 
management team Green and Griesinger (1996) suggest that governing 
boards had 10 major areas of responsibilities: mission and policy, strategic 
planning, program evaluation, board selection and tenure, board 
development, selection and evaluation of executive director, resource 
mobilization, financial management, community interaction, and the 
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 resolution of disputes. Roberts and Connors (1998) stated that the main 
responsibilities of governing boards of non-profit  healthcare delivery 
organizations encompass five basic elements: (a) setting the direction; (b) 
assuring effective management; (c) enhancing the assets; (d) achieving quality 
goals; and (e) acting as stakeholders on behalf of the communities served. 
Hevesi and Millstein (2001) found that the most important responsibilities 
identified by board members were strategic planning, financial oversight, 
fundraising, operational oversight, and community relations. Alexander et al. 
(2003) noted that the act of governance involves the process of formulating 
the organization mission and vision, setting and monitoring the goals, and 
developing strategies.  
 
Jaklevic (2003) reported the results of the a governance survey, which 
indicated the following top five factors that were rated by participating 
trustees as very important to effective governance: (a) board endorsement of 
additional education for trustees (92%); (b) conducting a formal CEO 
performance review (91%); (c) board composition of mostly outside 
independent directors (81%); (d) chairman of the board is an outside director 
(80%); and (e) regular board and trustee performance evaluation (76%). 
According to Adams (2005), overall, the literature pointed to 13 attributes of 
effective boards. Effective boards have dedicated trustees, an effective 
chairman, and an organized and disciplined operation. They use their power 
as a group, engage in strategic planning, and monitor ethical performance. 
Effective healthcare boards formulate specific financial policies, make 
decisions regarding quality of care, and educate their trustees. These 
successful boards also implement a governance information system, crisis 
prevention and management procedures, self-assessments, and regular audits 
(Adams, 2005). 
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 After discussing the various governance models and the importance of 
hospitals boards, it is necessary to look at how the healthcare governance 
affects the delivery of healthcare quality. 
 
2.5  Healthcare Governance and Healthcare Quality 
Service quality in healthcare has been identified as a major issue in the 
healthcare systems in both developed and developing countries. The issue of 
quality in health is currently dominating policy agenda mainly because it is 
seen as a means of achieving better health outcomes for patients (O’Connor 
et al., 1994; Dagger and Sweeney, 2006). The problem of healthcare quality is 
even more acute in developing countries with high population growth rates 
compared with existing healthcare services. Most people in developing 
countries have limited access to quality healthcare. Obviously, high 
population growth rate places additional demands on the health sector in 
providing the best quality of care for the people. The quality of healthcare has 
traditionally been measured using objective criteria, such as mortality and 
morbidity. Although these indicators are essential in assessing clinical quality, 
softer and more subjective assessments are often overlooked. In reality, the 
healthcare sector has been slow in moving beyond a supply-side approach to 
quality assessment. However, as the industry structure changes, the role 
patients play in defining what quality means has become a critical competitive 
consideration (Donabedian, 1992; Jun et al., 1998). Patient satisfaction, their 
perception of quality of care and the efficiency of healthcare institutions are 
very crucial in taking critical decisions in the healthcare sector (Gilbert et al., 
1992). 
 
The need for improvements in healthcare at the hospital level has led to a 
move for the more active involvement of boards and management teams in 
the review of quality and safety measures. Interest in the role of governance 
in improving quality and safety has also grown among governments 
increasingly preoccupied by the growing amount of public resources 
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 dedicated to the healthcare sector, a phenomenon that has prompted them to 
require greater accountability on the part of healthcare providers and 
healthcare  organizations. Indeed, these hospital boards are under greater 
scrutiny than ever before when it comes to quality oversight, and recent 
trends have pushed hospital boards to engage in quality improvement 
(Clough and Nash, 2007; Braitwaite and Travaglia, 2008; Jiang et al., 2008; 
Pomey et al., 2008). The essence of engaging boards in improving care is 
based on the idea that an active board, in partnership with executive 
leadership, can provide the will and set system-level expectations and 
accountability for high performance and elimination of harm in order to 
dramatically and continuously improve the quality of care (Conway, 2008; 
Baker et al., 2010). Certainly, hospital boards have the ultimate responsibility 
of ensuring improvement in the quality of healthcare provided by the hospital 
(Kroch et al., 2006). 
 
2.5.1  Healthcare Quality 
Health service or healthcare quality has traditionally been looked at in terms 
of measures of structure, process and outcome (Campbell et al., 2000; 
Parchman  et al., 2002). Structure considers the accessibility and relative 
quality of the many components of healthcare, whilst process considers the 
appropriateness of care, location and timing. However, assessment has often 
focused on the perspectives of healthcare providers, such as cost, length of 
stay and patient mortality. Little attention has been paid to assessing quality 
from patients’ perspective of healthcare. Patient-reported measures of 
healthcare quality really aim at including the patient’s perspective across a 
range of  quality concerns in the assessment process (Groves and Wagner, 
2005). 
 
The Institute of Medicine (2001) provides a framework for measuring 
healthcare quality and they indicate that healthcare should be:  
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 •  safe – avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to 
help them;  
•  effective – providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who 
could benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely 
to benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse, respectively);  
•  patient-centered – providing care that is respectful of and responsive to 
individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that 
patient values guide all clinical decisions; 
•  timely – reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those 
who receive and those who give care;  
•  efficient  –  avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, 
ideas, and energy; and  
•  equitable  –  providing care that does not vary in quality because of 
personal characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, 
and socio-economic status. 
 
A number of other conceptual frameworks for evaluating the quality of care 
have been provided with respect to service quality in healthcare. Patients’ 
perspective of quality may include their desired health outcome (Mitchell and 
Lang, 2004; Swan and Boruch, 2004), their relationship with healthcare 
providers, the qualifications and performance of healthcare providers, and 
access to and choice of healthcare (Campbell et al., 2002; Hibbard, 2003). 
 
According to Grönroos (1982), quality can be looked at in service firms in 
terms of technical quality (“what” service is provided) and functional quality 
(“how” the service is provided). The customers perceive what he/she receives 
as the outcome of the process in which the resources are used (i.e., the 
technical or outcome quality of the process). But he/she may also, and often 
more importantly, perceive how the process itself functions (i.e., the 
functional or process quality dimension). For some services, the “what” (or 
technical quality) ight be difficult to evaluate. For example, in healthcare the 
39 
 service providers’ technical competence, as well as the immediate results 
from treatments, may be difficult for a patient (a customer) to evaluate. 
Lacking an ability to assess technical quality, consumers rely on other 
measures of quality attributes associated with the process (the “how”) of 
healthcare delivery. For healthcare service, consumers would likely rely on 
attributes such as reliability and empathy to assess quality (Kang and James, 
2004). 
 
Grönroos  (1982) also stressed the importance of corporate image as a 
relevant component in the perceived service quality model, so that the 
dynamic aspect of the service perception process was considered as well. The 
issue here is that customers bring their earlier experiences and overall 
perceptions of a service firm to each encounter because customers often have 
continuous contacts with the same service firm (Grönroos, 2001).  He argues 
that a favourable and well-known image is an asset for any firm because 
image has an impact on customer perceptions of the communication and 
operations of the firm in many respects. If a service provider has a positive 
image in the minds of customers, minor mistakes will be forgiven. However, if 
mistakes occur more frequently, the image of the service firm will be 
damaged. If a provider’s image is negative, the impact of any mistake will 
often be magnified in the consumer’s mind. In a word, image can be viewed 
as a filter in terms of a consumer’s perception of quality (Kang and James, 
2004). 
 
Donabedian (1966; 1980; 1992) also considered two types of quality in the 
management of healthcare and these are technical and interpersonal 
processes. This framework defines technical care as the application of 
medical science and technology to healthcare, while interpersonal care 
represents the management of the interaction that occurs between the service 
provider and consumer. Within this conceptualization, a third element, the 
amenities of care, also contributes to healthcare quality. The amenities of 
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 care describe the intimate features of the environment in which care is 
provided. Brook and Williams (1975) suggested a conceptualization similar to 
that proposed by Donabedian (1966, 1980, and 1992) in which technical care 
reflects how well diagnostic and therapeutic processes are applied and 
interactive care concerns the interactive behavior between the service 
provider and patient. Ware et al.  (1978) and Ware et al. (1983) also 
recognized the interaction between a healthcare provider and a patient, the 
technical quality of care, and the environment as important dimensions of 
patient satisfaction. They also supported the inclusion of a fourth dimension 
reflecting the administrative aspects of service provision (Dagger et al., 2007) 
 
Similarly, McDougall and Levesque (1994) put forward a model of service 
quality, comprising the three underlying dimensions of outcome, process, 
and environment and a fourth dimension, enabling, which reflects factors that 
make the service experience easier for the customer. Rust and Oliver (1994) 
also proposed a three-component model in which the overall perception of 
service quality is based on a customer’s evaluation of three dimensions of the 
service encounter: (1) the customer-employee interaction, (i.e., functional or 
process quality), (2) the service environment, and (3) the outcome (i.e., 
technical quality). While research supports the contention that the service 
environment affects service quality perceptions (Bitner, 1992; Spangenberg et 
al., 1996), it is conceptually difficult to distinguish the notion of service 
environment from the concept of functional quality that has been suggested 
in the literature. For example, Brady and Cronin (2001) proposed three 
factors comprising the service environment.  These are ambient conditions, 
facility design, and social factors. The definition offered by Brady and Cronin 
(2001) suggests, however, that the service environments are elements of the 
service delivery process. Kang and James (2004) suggest that, in the interest 
of parsimony, it seems best to include elements of the service environment as 
components of the functional dimension. Service quality comprises the 
dimensions of interpersonal quality, outcome quality, and environmental 
quality (Brady and Cronin, 2001; Kang and James, 2004). 
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Clearly, these models suggest that service quality perceptions comprise four 
important dimensions, namely, functional or interpersonal quality, technical 
quality, environmental quality, and administrative quality. As well as 
providing a foundation for the development of health service quality scale, 
the merging of these dimensions with SERVQUAL has most recently seen the 
SERVQUAL dimensions positioned as descriptors of these overarching 
dimensions (Brady and Cronin, 2001; Dagger et al., 2007). 
 
The SERVQUAL scale was developed based on a marketing perspective with 
the support of the Marketing Science Institute (Parasuraman et al., 1988). Its 
objective was to provide an instrument for measuring service quality that 
would be applicable across a broad range of services with minor 
modifications in the scale. SERVQUAL provides a foundation for a growing 
body of research that pertains to the creation of quality among service 
industries. The developers of the SERVQUAL model suggest that, while each 
service industry is unique in some aspects, there are five dimensions of 
service quality that can be applied generally to service firms. These 
dimensions are: (1) tangibles - physical facilities, equipment, and appearance 
of personnel; (2) reliability -  ability to perform the promised service 
dependably and accurately; (3) responsiveness - willingness to help customers 
and provide prompt service; (4) assurance -  knowledge and courtesy of 
employees and their ability to inspire trust and confidence; and (5) empathy - 
caring, the individualized attention the firm provides its customers 
(Parasuraman et al., 1988; Babakus and Mangold, 1992). The SERVQUAL deals 
more with functional quality as opposed to technical quality.  
 
Most of the service sectors consider that quality is explained by perception 
and expectation and that there is a relationship between the perception of the 
consumers on the quality of the services and their satisfaction (Cronin and 
Taylor, 1994; McAlexander et al., 1994). It has been suggested that patient 
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 satisfaction is a major quality outcome in itself and the extent to which 
healthcare users are satisfied with their local providers may be a key factor 
underpinning their health behaviour and healthcare utilization (Hadorn, 1991; 
Derose  et al., 2001; Rakin et al.,  2002). Service quality perceptions are 
generally defined as a consumer’s impression about an entity’s overall 
excellence or superiority (Bitner and Hubbert, 1994; Boulding et al., 1993; 
Cronin and Taylor, 1992; Parasuraman et al., 1985, 1988). This impression is 
often described in terms of the difference between consumers’ expectations 
of service and the performance of actual service. These studies usually use 
the SERVQUAL scale to measure service quality or consumers’ overall 
satisfaction. According to this scale, quality defines a gap between 
expectations (E) and perception of performance (P) and if the performance 
exceeds expectations, the consumer will attain more satisfaction (Kopalle and 
Lehman, 2001). These expectations are based on one’s own and others’ 
experiences. 
 
Previous studies have used the SERVQUAL model in the context of healthcare 
services. Wisniewski and Wisniewski (2005) and Rohini and Mahadevappa 
(2006) supported the original 5-factor structure. Headley and Miller (1993) 
identified 6 dimensions in a primary care clinic, Lytle and Mokwa (1992) 
found 7 dimensions among patients of a healthcare fertility clinic, and 
Reidenbach and Sandifer-Smallwood (1990) extracted a 7-factor solution in an 
emergency room setting. Also, Carman (1990) recognized 9 dimensions in a 
multi encounter hospital setting, and Licata et al. (1995) identified 12 factors 
in a healthcare setting when using the original SERVQUAL scale (Dagger et al., 
2007). 
 
2.5.2  The Role of Hospital Boards in Healthcare Quality 
Hospital boards are expected to respond to clinical, operational and 
regulatory issues associated with quality of care. According to the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement (2008), the hospital board’s mission is to ensure 
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 that the best possible care is delivered and that patients are not harmed. 
Reinertsen (2003) also suggests that board members (and members of a 
quality committee) have a key role in the process of ensuring alignment of 
those activities with the goals and mission of the organization. There are a 
number of important policy issues, which are critical to the operation of 
healthcare organizations and hospital boards are required to pay attention 
and provide oversight. This oversight obligation is based upon the application 
of the fiduciary duty healthcare board members owe the organization. The 
board members are supposed to provide duty of care and duty of obedience 
to the organization’s purpose and mission (Callender et al., 2007).  
 
Callender et al. (2007) explain that the duty of care, in most cases, requires 
directors to act (1) in ‘good faith’, (2) with the care, an ordinarily prudent 
person would exercise in like circumstances, and (3) in a manner that they 
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation. The ‘good 
faith’  analysis normally focuses upon whether the matter or transaction at 
hand involves any improper financial benefit to an individual and/or whether 
any intent exists to take advantage of the corporation. The ‘prudent person’ 
analysis focuses upon whether directors conducted the appropriate level of 
due diligence to allow them to render an informed decision. In other words, 
directors are expected to be aware of what is going on around them in the 
organization and must in appropriate circumstances make such reasonable 
inquiry as would an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances. 
The final criterion focuses on whether directors act in a manner that they 
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
 
Hospital boards’ obligations with respect to quality of care may arise in two 
distinct contexts: the Decision-Making Function and the Oversight Function. 
The Decision-Making Function is the application of duty of care principles as 
to a specific decision or a particular board action, and the Oversight Function 
is the application of duty of care principles with respect to the general activity 
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 of the board in overseeing the operations of the corporation (i.e., acting in 
good faith to assure that a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists). Board members’ obligations with respect to supervising medical staff 
credentialing decisions arise within the context of the decision-making 
(Callender et al., 2007). 
 
In terms of the duty of obedience to corporate purpose, hospital boards are 
required to further the purposes of the organization as set forth in its articles 
of incorporation or bylaws. Typical articles of incorporation of a non-profit 
healthcare provider might describe its principal purpose as the promotion of 
health through the provision of inpatient and outpatient hospital and 
healthcare services to residents in the community. Given that the board is 
responsible for reasonably inquiring whether there are practices in place to 
address the quality of patient care, it is fair to state that the concept of 
quality of care is inseparable from, and is essentially subsumed by, the 
mission of the organization. The various provisions of the law dealing with 
the relationship to the medical staff also provide a link to the duty of 
obedience to corporate purpose. These include, for example, traditional 
provisions that confirm the responsibility of the board for (a) the conduct of 
the hospital as an institution, (b) ensuring that the medical staff is 
accountable to the governing board for the quality of care provided to 
patients, and (c) the maintenance of standards of professional care within the 
facility and requiring that the medical staff function competently. The ‘duty of 
obedience’ concept with respect to assuring compliance with law also might 
be considered to incorporate a duty to assure compliance with laws and 
accreditation principles that require the governing board to assume ultimate 
responsibility for organizational performance, which includes the quality of 
the provider’s medical care (Callender et al., 2007). 
 
Lister (2006) suggests that the board has a key role in establishing policies 
and guidelines that help to drive the quality transformation process. The 
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 board plays a role in defining priorities for the executive team and medical 
staff leaders (Spath, 1998) and has to integrate financial, strategic and quality 
planning (Bader,  2007). The board also has a role in nurturing the 
organization’s commitment to a continuous improvement agenda (Spath, 
1998) and has to translate their values into effective oversight (Keroak, 2007). 
In order to be effective, the board must commit itself to the process and 
translate that commitment into identifying strategic priorities and monitoring 
plans that actively engage all staff (Stanton, 2006). The board has to ensure 
that the clinical and organizational initiatives in place to enhance quality and 
safety are ongoing processes and involve long-term effort to improve services 
and healthcare outcomes (Braithwaite, 2008) and move the quality agenda 
forward (Becker 2006; Pomey et al., 2008). Sandrick (2007) contends that, 
overall, the board should serve  as the driving force behind all quality and 
safety efforts in the organization.  
 
 
The board can communicate its commitment to quality improvement through 
membership on various staff committees. The board must also ensure that 
medical staff is involved in  quality improvement (Weiner and Alexander, 
1993b; Weiner et al., 1997; Pomey et al., 2008). The board needs to invest in 
processes that promote the legitimacy of a safety and quality culture and it 
tends to depend on close connections with key stakeholders within the 
organization: managers, physician leaders in quality improvement processes, 
and other professionals (Lister, 2006; Weiner et al., 1997). Leape (2005) 
recommends four important areas boards should consider in ensuring quality 
and these are: implementation of health system information; wide diffusion of 
proven and safe practices; spread of training on teamwork and safety and 
quality; and full disclosure to patients following injury. 
 
Baker  et al.  (2010) argue that the capacity of board and board quality 
committees to function effectively and to move appropriately between 
fiduciary, strategic and generative modes relies on trust as well as skills. 
Boards, senior leadership and medical staff need to develop an understanding 
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 of each other’s role and create strong collaborative relationships for achieving 
the organization’s goals. One important approach for improving the role of 
healthcare boards’ in quality is creating new structures and processes. They 
conclude in their paper that in adopting a greater focus on quality and patient 
safety, board members need to develop knowledge and judgment concerning 
the factors influencing quality and safety of care, without losing sight of their 
responsibilities to focus on the strategic organizational issues.  A more co-
operative approach on governance does not exclude the importance of a clear 
accountability framework and relationships between senior leadership and 
boards. But it underlines the need to go beyond monitoring and control to 
focus also on how boards can help organizations to develop the internal 
capacity for continuous improvement. 
 
The next section provides a review of the empirical literature on how hospital 
boards and ownership structure are related to performance.  
 
2.6  Healthcare Governance, Ownership and Performance 
The extant literature suggests that hospital board characteristics and 
ownership structure affect the performance of hospitals. It is expected that 
structuring effective board governance tend to influence performance. The 
effectiveness of the board may depend on how the board is structured in 
terms of its characteristics. Therefore, each of these board characteristics as 
well as the ownership structure may have varying effects on performance. 
Previous studies (see Young et al., 1992; Molinari et al., 1995; Alexander et 
al., 1995; Eeckloo et al., 2004; Prybil, 2006; Gu et al., 2010; Büchner, 2012) 
have shown that the performance of the hospital is affected by its hospital 
board characteristics and these include board size, board composition, board 
participation by medical staff, board leadership structure or CEO duality, 
board diversity, and frequency of board meetings. Others (see Barros, 2003; 
Weng  et al.,  2011)  have also established that ownership structure has an 
effect on hospital performance. Some control variables, hospital size, hospital 
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 age and location of the hospital are also discussed as important determinants 
of hospital performance.  
 
2.6.1  Board Size 
Board size is said to be associated with a wide range of expertise on the 
board and the breath of participation in decision-making (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). It is a common notion that larger boards by reason of the increased 
range of expertise they have  in  terms of stakeholder representation can 
enhance corporate reputation and image, and are better for organizational 
performance because decision-making is much easier.  Additionally, larger 
boards are associated with higher managerial monitoring,  which makes  it 
difficult for a powerful CEO to dominate, thereby improving efficiency and 
performance for shareholders by ensuring conformance to corporate 
regulations and norms (see Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). This assertion is 
firmly supported by the stakeholder and institutional theories, which seem to 
suggest a positive association between larger boards and effective decision-
making (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In the view of Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993), the major advantage of large boards is the greater 
collective information that the board possesses about factors affecting the 
value of firms. Haleblian and Finkelstein further explain that a board with 
many directors has a large amount of information that enriches the 
performance of the outsiders’ monitoring and advisory function. Young et al. 
(1992) also suggest that to the extent that the structure of the governing 
board is not appropriate for the information-processing requirements of the 
organization’s strategy, financial performance will be affected negatively. 
They gave the example that a hospital with a large and diverse board is 
expected to perform better than a hospital with a relatively small and 
occupationally homogeneous board. de Andrés-Alonso et al. (2009) note that 
the greater the volume of resources that an organization manages (income), 
the larger the size of the board and that monitoring a large entity requires a 
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 greater number of trustees and a breadth of knowledge that compensates for 
the costs of coordination and free-rider problems that a large board incurs. 
 
There is, however, a contrary position that smaller boards are more efficient 
than larger boards. According to Kovner (1990), few board members may lead 
to more commitment of each board member and more timely decision-
making process. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards tend to 
reduce effectiveness, thereby making it easier for the CEO to control. They 
further explain that when a board has more than ten members, it becomes 
more difficult for all of them to express their ideas and opinions. Jensen 
(1993) also suggests that keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance and that when boards get beyond seven or eight people, they 
are less likely to function effectively. He argues that the major problem with 
large boards is the associated coordination costs  and free-rider problems. 
The assertion is supported by the agency theory, which suggests that when a 
board size increases, control and monitoring capabilities are impeded. It then 
becomes difficult to co-ordinate activities within a firm and this often creates 
problems. Accountability by directors is thereby increased with smaller 
boards (see Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Kosnik, 1990). According to Bader 
(1991), boards are able to function better when they are a workable size, 
usually numbering up to 15 members. Any number above or below this 
number renders the board ineffective. 
 
In the case of board size, the healthcare literature suggests seven as the ideal 
size for a corporate-model board (Delbecq and Gill, 1988; Shortell, 1988). 
Delbecq and Gill (1988) examined governance structures of thirteen (13) 
medical centres in the US as reported by healthcare leaders. The findings of 
their study indicated that healthcare leaders believe that large boards are not 
ideal for the purpose of developing timely and strategic policies. In the 
opinion of the healthcare leaders, larger hospital boards are too cumbersome 
to allow for rapid deliberation and ability to arrive at a final decision in a 
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 timely fashion. Also, larger boards are engaged in tangential dialogue not 
focused on strategy critical to the future of the organization. Bader (1991) 
also suggests that in health systems with several boards, the system works 
best with lean governing boards having the average of seven to ten members. 
According to Bader (1991), the  smaller the individual boards are within a 
system, the higher the probability that they will remain focused on the system 
and their role in it rather than organization-specific issues. Kaufman et al. 
(1979) examined whether the size and occupational configuration of hospital 
governing boards were related to the institutions’ efficiency and quality of 
care and found that larger boards were associated with higher costs. Smaller 
number of governing boards within a health system would ensure that boards 
focus more on their role within the system rather than specific roles with a 
particular organization. In another study, Gu et al. (2010) found that higher 
performing hospitals tended to have smaller boards. Using a regression 
model, Büchner (2012) surveyed 1,400 German hospitals and examined how 
board characteristics affect their financial performance. She found that board 
size has a negative impact on performance and suggests that board size 
should not exceed a critical threshold, because a large board might delay 
decisions.  
   
Stakeholder  and resource dependency theories tend to explain board size. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that the interests of all these stakeholders are 
treated as if they have intrinsic value to the organization and that no one set 
of  interests will dominate over another (Murphy and O’Donohoe, 2006; 
Jamali, 2008). The organization’s stakeholders may include workers, 
suppliers, clients, owners, and society who tend to have an interest in the 
operation of the organization (see Simmons 2004).  Stakeholder theory 
suggests that a good representation of all the stakeholder groups on boards 
is necessary for effective governance of the organization (Christopher, 2010). 
Hospitals are likely to have a  board with representations from several 
stakeholder groups (Eeckloo, et al., 2004).  Resource dependency theory also 
explains relevance of board members in terms of the expertise they bring to 
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 bear  in ensuring effective governance of the organization and access to 
resources. The theory suggests the need for a well-diversified board, since 
each board member is expected to bring their expertise and experience that 
could benefit management in the form of quality advice. Hospitals tend to 
have board members from diverse background and expertise (see Pfeffer, 
1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
2.6.2  Board Composition 
Board composition is considered as the proportion of outside directors on the 
board and is related to the level of independence of the board. Having greater 
proportion of outside directors on a board  could be considered to be a 
management innovation as one of other mechanisms to mitigate agency costs 
between management and shareholders (see Chizema and Kim, 2010). One 
aspect of good governance discussed in expert forums was the selection 
criteria used when appointing new board members. Greater importance was 
given to the composition of the board and increased expertise in hospital 
business (Culica and Prezio, 2009). Boards, in the past tended to represent 
shareholders (in the case of for-profit organizations) or the community (in the 
case of not-for-profit organizations). In recent time, however, there has been 
a change in focus from shareholders to stakeholders. This change is 
significant in that it depicts an extension of the board’s role to include 
greater involvement with the organization’s ‘insiders’ (Starkweather, 1988). In 
the case of hospitals, these insiders include the CEO and other medical 
personnel. Therefore, hospital boards will typically be made up of inside 
directors, such as the hospital CEO, and outside directors who bring in a 
variety of expertise to serve on the board.  
 
Inside directors are said to be more familiar with the organizations’ activities 
and can act as monitors to top management, especially if there is a course to 
perceive that an opportunity could advance into positions held by executives 
who do not have the requisite competence. Jermias (2007) found that board 
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 independence has a negative effect on the relationship between innovative 
efforts and performance. His results are consistent with the managerialism 
theory, which proposes that inside directors are in a better position than 
outside directors to motivate managers to undertake profitable projects 
because they have superior access to firms’ specific information. Delbecq and 
Gill (1988) and Molinari et al. (1993) maintain that a high proportion of 
directors with business-related occupations provided boards with up-to-date 
operational information and financial and strategic expertise. 
 
However, Fama (1980) argues that outside directors may play the role of 
professional  referees  to ensure that competition among insiders triggers 
actions consistent with shareholder value maximization. From a theoretical 
stance, the appointment of outside directors is a way of improving legitimacy 
by serving as a sign of congruence between corporate practices and societal 
expectations. Thus, the presence of independent directors can help by 
improving efficiency, and thereby reduce  agency problems between 
executives and owners, as well as advance the interests of other stakeholders 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Supporting this position, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) explain that external board members have a particular incentive to 
monitor the behaviour of management on behalf of shareholder because of 
their reputation, and also because the value of their human capital is seen to 
be dependent on their acumen as decision control specialists. Jensen (1993) 
adds that a high proportion of outside directors provide a better forum for 
decision-making and that board monitoring quality will be stronger with more 
external or non-executive directors, but will decrease with the presence of 
many executive directors on the board. Generally, the board is considered to 
be more independent when there is greater percentage of outside directors. 
Having more external or non-executive directors increases the independence 
of the board (Yermack, 1996; John and Senbet, 1998).  
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 Some studies point to the important role of outside directors in monitoring 
and advising and these have the tendency of enhancing performance (Byrd 
and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994). Dalton et al. (1999) suggest that 
the independence of directors is an essential requirement for board 
effectiveness. Gautam and Goodstein (1996) are also of the view that insiders 
cannot adequately monitor top management's performance, and therefore 
there is the need to include outside directors to monitor the performance of 
the CEO and other managers (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). According to 
Ibrahim et al. (2007), inside directors work for the CEO – who is likely to chair 
the board – on a daily basis and would be more prone to conform to the 
CEO’s wishes. They depend directly on the CEO for their career 
advancements, and will thus be reluctant to oppose and challenge strategic 
proposals of the CEO. In support of this position, Conger et al. (2001) found 
that limiting the proportion of inside directors on the board is an important 
board power factor that leads to more effective governance. They reported 
that directors on boards with 10% or less inside directors rated their 
performance as more effective on both their success in developing external 
relationships for their organizations and on their internal strategic roles than 
did directors on boards with a higher percentage of insiders. However, others 
like Forsberg (1989) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found no relationship 
between the proportion of outside directors and various performance 
measures. 
  
Having external board members is supported by the stakeholder and resource 
dependency theories. According to the stakeholder theory, the composition of 
the board should consider representatives of all interested parties in order to 
ensure consensus among stakeholders  (Christopher, 2010).  The resource 
dependence theory prescribes for greater involvement of external directors 
who can provide quality advice and con access to resource to facilitate the 
smooth running of the organization and therefore enhance overall 
performance (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Middleton, 1987). 
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 2.6.3  Board Participation by Medical Staff 
The inside board members in a hospital will typically include the CEO, as well 
as medical staff members. The CEO is placed on the board to provide 
administrative information concerning the hospital, while the medical staff 
members keep the board informed about the hospital's service and delivery 
issues (Medical Leadership Forum, 1992). Managerialism and resource 
dependency theory both provide likely explanations of why hospitals benefit 
from involving inside or outside physicians in their governance. In addition to 
their operational knowledge of the hospital, medical staff can refer their 
private practice patients to the hospital, thereby serving as patient referral 
links. Alternatively, outside physician board members help to keep hospital 
boards informed concerning patient care issues and practices. Together, both 
theories provide reasonable explanations underlying the enhanced hospital 
performance of boards with inside or outside physician participation (Molinari 
et al., 1995). Alexander et al. (1995), suggest that physician participation in 
governance is not only desirable, but essential and that physician 
participation in governance may serve to reduce potential conflict between 
the goals of the system and those of the medical groups and may align the 
interests of the organization and affiliated physicians. According to Young et 
al.  (1992), having medical staff being represented on the board enables 
members gain necessary information about the internal efficiency of the 
hospital. Gardner (1992) argues that medical personnel, such as nurses have 
a special role to play on hospital governing boards by keeping the board 
focused on the well-being of patients. She explains that quality assurance is 
one area of significance where those with a healthcare background can make 
a big difference to the board. Gautam and Goodstein (1996) support this 
position by arguing that medical personnel who serve on hospital boards 
place their greatest emphasis on patient care and technological 
breakthroughs.  
 
In their study of 131 hospitals, Shortell and LoGerfo (1981) found that 
medical staff board participation improves hospital quality outcomes, such as 
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 surgical mortality rates. This view is supported by Ibrahim et al. (2007) who 
argue that directors whose occupational background is in healthcare are less 
interested in the organization’s strategic direction but are more concerned 
with the immediate need to deliver quality services. Goes and Zhan (1995) 
also found physician board involvement to be the most effective method for 
improving hospital performance. Molinari et al.  (1993) examined the 
participation by the CEO and medical staff among acute care in California 
hospitals. They found that medical staff board participation has a significantly 
greater influence on hospital performance than CEO board participation. 
Additionally among hospital boards with medical staff participation, boards 
that granted voting privileges to medical staff were considered to be more 
effective than those boards with non-voting medical participation. Both 
findings are consistent with the managerialist perspective because the 
medical staff members’ knowledge regarding the clinical aspects of the 
hospital, as well as their ability to influence the board's decision-making 
through their voting privileges, is likely to lead to clinically and fiscally sound 
board decisions. Consequently, boards with participation by the medical staff 
are expected to be more effective than those without medical staff 
participation and, among boards with medical staff participation, those with 
voting medical staff participation will be more effective than those with 
nonvoting medical staff participation. Molinari et al.  (1993) again suggest 
that given physician interests  in state-of-the-art diagnostic and therapeutic 
technologies, it is plausible that medical staff board participation may result 
in imprudent capital investments that impair the fiscal viability of the 
hospital. In another study, Molinari et al. (1995) found significantly positive 
impact of physician (inside or outside) board participation on hospital 
operating margin. Their findings suggest that, physician involvement in 
hospital governance significantly benefits the hospital. Prybil (2006) also 
found that high performing hospitals had a greater proportion of medical 
staff voting members. This study showed that medical staff representation on 
the board was the most strongly identified characteristic associated with 
overall board performance. This position is supported by a recent study by Gu 
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 et al. (2010) who found that higher performing hospitals tended to exhibit 
greater percentage of physician directors.  
 
Kovner (1990), however, argue that the information provided may be biased 
to varying degrees and that  a physician’s vision for the hospital may be 
viewed through his or her own professional perspective, rather than from a 
broader overall perspective of service provision. In their study, Ibrahim et al. 
(2000) found that compared to those with a healthcare background, directors 
who did not have such a background were more concerned with economic 
and legal issues. 
 
Managerialism theory suggest the need for hospital boards include the CEO 
and inside medical staff members who are expected to provide administrative 
information concerning the hospital and also keep the board well informed 
about issues regarding the hospital’s service delivery (Molinari et al., 1995). 
Medical staff members’ knowledge regarding the clinical aspects of the 
hospital, as well as their ability to influence the board’s decision-making, is 
likely to lead to clinically and fiscally sound board decisions (Molinari et al, 
1995). Therefore, hospitals with medical staff participation on the board are 
expected to be more effective than those without medical staff participation. 
Resource dependency theory also explains the importance of having medical 
staff on the hospital board. The medical staff members on the hospital board 
provide useful up-to-date information to the board to take informed decisions 
regarding the hospital’s service and delivery issues (Medical Leadership 
Forum, 1992). This theory suggests the need of having skilled board 
members to ensure effective governance and drive the organization in the 
right direction (Christopher, 2010). 
 
2.6.4  Board Leadership Structure  
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 The board leadership structure is an important determinant of organizational 
performance. The board leadership structure may either have a board system 
where the CEO also acts as the board chair or a system where the CEO is 
different from the chairman of the board. The position of the CEO on a board 
may vary from being a full member of the board or just being in attendance 
when required. As a full member of the board, the CEO may either be the 
chairman of the board or simply stay as an ordinary member. The CEO has 
been considered integral to the functioning of the board, in that they bring 
valuable information to the decision-making process (Weiner 1993). 
McDonagh  et al. (2006) suggest that the integral role of the CEO is an 
important factor related to board performance. They explain that the CEO 
plays a unique role, as this person represents both management and 
governance, which makes the issue of leading the board even more critical.  
 
Molinari  et al.  (1997) found that the CEO participation on boards was 
associated with enhanced hospital financial performance. Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) also suggest that, the presence of the CEO on key 
committees is likely to increase board monitoring. Orlikoff (2005) argues that 
considering the challenges healthcare boards face today, the CEO faces 
greater pressure in engendering a good relationship with the board. In 
addition, Orlikoff describes the board as a multifaceted paradox in which the 
CEO plays a dual role: both leading and reporting to the board. Although the 
board is a single entity, it is composed of many unique individuals; some 
boards interact as partners and leaders, while others as followers. This 
variation and complexity require skilled leadership and diplomacy to bring 
about the board’s effectiveness.  
 
There is however an issue that arises as a result of the positions of the CEO 
and the board chair. The issue is whether the CEO should also serve as the 
board chair or the positions of CEO and chairperson should be occupied by 
two persons. CEOs may be considered with some suspicion, as their position 
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 on the board could be viewed as self-serving and thereby defeating the stance 
of the stakeholders theory.  Boards would, therefore, be mindful of the 
possibility of bias embedded in information received from the CEO (Weiner 
1993). Also, arising from this ambiguity are issues of power and authority 
between the board and the CEO (Heuerman 1989; Goodwin 1992). Such a 
situation may necessitate the need to decouple the positions of the CEO and 
the chairman of the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that concentration 
of decision management and decision control in one individual reduces 
board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. Brickley et al. (1997) 
support this position by suggesting that a board structure where the CEO also 
acts as chairperson leads to leadership facing conflict of interest, thus, giving 
preference for the system where the CEO’s role is separated from that of the 
board chairperson. Separating the functions of the CEO and board chair may 
be viewed as enhancing the board’s monitoring and control ability, and 
improving  director’s information processing capacities (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). Culica and Prezio (2009) found greater involvement of 
board chairs in hospital overall performance in contrast to the other board 
members. Rechner and Dalton (1991), however, found that firms with CEO 
duality have stronger financial performance relative to other firms. This 
position is what the stewardship theory postulates. 
 
2.6.5  Board Diversity 
In more general terms, board diversity refers to the various features that may 
be present among the board of directors that can affect decision-making 
(Carter  et al.,  2003; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). These board 
characteristics with respect to board diversity include those that are more 
visible, such as gender, ethnicity, and age and those that are less visible, 
including religion, occupation and education (Mahadeo et al., 2012). Board 
diversity provides access to unique resources otherwise difficult if not 
impossible to reach (Goodstein et al., 1994), as supported by the resource 
dependency theory. In the view of Carter  et al.  (2003), board diversity is 
essential in governance for two basic reasons. First, it promotes a better 
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 understanding of the market place, increases creativity and innovation, and 
makes problem solving effective. Secondly, it promotes more effective global 
relationships and increases  board independence because people with 
different gender, ethnicity or cultural background might ask questions that 
would not come from directors with more traditional backgrounds (see Arfken 
et al., 2004). 
 
The literature tends to emphasize more on board diversity on the basis of 
gender (see Burke 1994; Burke, 1997; Siciliano, 1996; Bilimoria, 2000; Carter 
et al. 2003). Boards of diverse gender background can improve the 
independence of the board and enhance managerial monitoring. The 
independence of the board and their effective monitoring are mostly 
associated with improved performance. Board diversity through the inclusion 
of females has been identified as an important determinant of performance. 
The management literature suggests that firms would benefit by engaging 
women on their boards of directors (Burke 1994; Burke, 1997). Pearce and 
Zahra (1991) observed in their study of the impact of boards on firm 
performance that a representation of diverse interests,  as posited by the 
stakeholder theory, including the number of female and minority members, 
was an important characteristic of an effective board. Bilimoria (2000) 
presents a case that having women on boards is desirable business practice 
because it is likely to improve the reputation of the firm, strengthen  the 
strategic direction (by better understanding women’s issues that may impact 
on such direction) and contribute positively to the firm’s female employees. 
Siciliano (1996) reports that boards with increased gender diversity are more 
likely to enjoy high levels of social agency mission achievement. Burke (1997) 
reports a significantly positive relationship between the number of females on 
boards and revenue and profit margins. In a study by Singh et al. (2001), they 
found that boards with female directors could be associated with higher 
revenue and profitability. Carter  et al. (2003) also found a positive 
relationship between board diversity (in terms of women and minorities) and 
firm value.  
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There is increasing recognition of the importance of women on hospital 
boards (see Adams, 2005; Galindo, 2006; Elstad and Ladegard, 2010). 
Hospital boards generally seek to recruit the most talented, dedicated, and 
accomplished people, and increasingly those people are women and people of 
colour with different perspectives, experiences, social network relationships, 
and problem-solving approaches. Elstad and Ladegard (2010) suggest that 
the higher the ratio of women, the greater the level of perceived influence, 
perceived social interaction outside the boardroom, and to some degree, 
perceived information sharing. Kazemek  et al. (2000) noted that the 
proportion of female board and committee members serving healthcare 
organizations is inadequately small, even though national studies have 
revealed that women make a majority of decisions about healthcare in their 
families. A 1999 survey conducted by the Governance Institute in California 
showed that only 23% of healthcare board members were female (Adams, 
2005).  According to Galindo (2006), many recognize that increasing the 
diversity of hospital governance (and for that matter, hospital management) is 
not simply a moral or social issue, but also a question of effectiveness and 
competitiveness. Thus, hospitals, like many other organizations, strive to 
increase the diversity of their boards. 
 
Board diversity is also explained by the stakeholder and resource dependency 
theories. Diversity with respect to gender may suggest the hospital’s way of 
reflecting its patients and the community it serves as explained by the 
stakeholder theory. Hospital boards recruit the most talented, dedicated, and 
accomplished people, and often  those people tend to be women with 
different perspectives, experiences, social network relationships, and 
problem-solving approaches  (Galindo, 2006; Elstad and Ladegard, 2010). 
According to Goodstein et al. (1994), board diversity also provides access to 
unique resources, otherwise difficult, if not impossible to reach, as supported 
by the resource dependency theory. The literature suggests that women tend 
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 to bring certain experiences and perspectives to bear in boardroom 
discussions and this ensures effective governance.  
 
2.6.6  Frequency of Board Meetings 
Board meetings are important in engaging the board to regularly review 
processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of its internal control 
system. These meetings also help the board to ensure that it receives relevant 
non-financial information to enable it assess the performance of the firm. The 
time a board spends together is its most precious commodity. A board is only 
truly a board, empowered to make decisions and take action when it is 
meeting. Therefore, ensuring that the board has the right type of information 
to govern, that its meeting time is spent wisely and productively, and that all 
communication with board members is designed to maximize the value of 
each meeting,  are critical to governance effectiveness. In examining what 
distinguishes good boards from great boards, it was concluded that 
exceptional boards make meetings matter (Board Source, 2005). Eeckloo et 
al.  (2004)  suggest that the rate of meetings can be an indicator for the 
authority of the board. A board meeting only a few times a year is likely to act 
more as a general assembly than as a real governing body. An extremely high 
rate of board meetings, on the other hand, may lead to an amalgamation of 
the tasks of the board and the executive management. 
 
Empirical evidence also shows that meeting frequency is an important 
dimension of an effective board (see Witt, 1987; Vafeas, 1999; Eeckloo et al., 
2004). For instance, Vafeas (1999) found that the annual number of board 
meeting increases following share price declines and operating performance 
of firms improves following years of increased board meetings. This suggests 
that  meeting frequently  is an important dimension of an effective board. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that the most widely shared problem 
directors face is lack of time to carry out their duties, and that board meeting 
time is an important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board. It is, 
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 however, suggested that board meetings are not necessarily useful because 
the limited time the outside directors spend together is not used for the 
meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves or with management, a 
problem that is a by-product of the fact that CEOs almost always set the 
agenda for board meetings (Fan, 2004). Witt (1987) notes that outstanding 
people who cannot always make monthly meetings may be available on 
quarterly basis and that time available for board meetings need not be 
reduced. Witt (1987) argues that policy issues are discussed in greater in 
depth at longer meetings. In their study, Culica and Prezio (2009) found that 
boards that met less than six times a year had higher marginal profit on 
average over three years than hospitals whose boards met more than 12 
times every year. Meeting between 7-12 times was associated with lower 
financial performance than having six or less meetings, but still significantly 
higher than the hospitals whose boards met more than once per month. That 
means, holding a board meeting almost every month or more often was not a 
good method to increase financial outcomes. A potential explanation for their 
finding may be that having meetings spaced out allowed for more time to get 
information in advance and preparation  for meetings is necessary for 
improved performance (Culica and Prezio, 2009).  
 
Board meeting time is regarded as an important resource in improving the 
effectiveness of a board (Lipton and Lorsch,  1992). Frequency of board 
meetings can be explained by the resource dependency theory in the sense 
that by having relevant information on regular basis, board members are 
better informed to contribute positively to the operations of the hospital and 
also assist in providing relevant resources to the hospital. Thus, with time 
being a very important resource to be used in addressing the numerous 
challenges facing hospitals, the resource dependency theory supports having 
frequent board meetings. 
 
2.6.7  Hospital Ownership Structure 
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 Health economists have drawn upon the general ownership literature in 
explaining the ownership structure and health services. The property-rights 
theory suggests that since private providers, especially for-profits, have well 
defined control rights, they have strong incentive to invest in innovations, but 
may over-emphasize cost control at the expense of non-contractible quality 
(Hart, 1995). For-profit organizations are presumably the most market-
oriented providers and would have higher incentives to introduce new 
services and technologies that attract more consumers (Banaszak-Holl et al., 
1996).  On the other hand, government-owned providers lack clear control 
rights to implement changes, and this constraint softens incentives for 
innovations. The property rights model predicts that private owners achieve 
lower costs, but quality may be higher or lower.  
 
Private (for-profit) providers will generally achieve lower costs for a given 
service than their government counterparts (Shen et al., 2005). Given the 
prevalence of not-for-profits in the health sector, much theoretical work by 
health economists focuses on not-for-profit providers and how they differ 
from for-profit firms (Shen et al., 2005). The extant theories indicate that not-
for-profit firms have an objective function different from that of profit 
maximization. Examples include maximizing quality, quantity and/or prestige 
(Newhouse 1970) instead of, or in addition to, maximizing net revenue 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998). Similarly, not-for-profit providers also focus 
on helping to fulfill demand for local public goods (Weisbrod, 1988) or meet 
unachieved needs  in the community (Frank and Salkever, 1991); or 
maximizing the well-being of specific important constituencies, such as the 
medical staff (Pauly and Redisch, 1973) or consumers (Ben-Ner and Gui, 
1993). 
 
The major ownership categories include for-profit, non-profit, and public 
ownership. For-profit ownership involves individuals (shareholders) who 
invest capital in return for claims on future profits. Thus, for-profit hospitals 
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 have a responsibility to shareholders to generate short-term and long-term 
profits. In contrast, non-profit hospitals, while needing short-term surpluses 
to finance their operations (Chang and Tushman, 1990), have a primary 
responsibility to their communities to provide necessary, quality services 
rather than to generate long-term profits. Consequently, whereas for-profit 
and non-profit hospitals both attempt to generate short-term profit margins, 
for-profit hospitals’ financial responsibility to shareholders is likely to result 
in higher long-term profitability than hospitals in the non-profit sector. Private 
hospitals have greater strategic flexibility, higher environmental sensitivity 
and higher demand for promoting market status (Goes and Park,  1997). 
Private hospitals do not have financial support from the government; hence, 
they have higher residual claimants to provide incentives for profit and 
further development (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Young et al., 2001). Public 
hospitals on the other hand have the financial support of the government and 
have to take numerous policy-related responsibilities into consideration. 
Therefore, they tend to adopt a conservative and stable policy (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). Price (1992) suggests that a high level of bureaucracy and lack 
of rapid reaction to market conditions lower public hospitals’ innovation in 
healthcare.  
 
Private  or  for-profit hospitals are wholly responsible for organizational 
performance in a competitive environment, hence, they adopt or extend new 
medical technology proactively (Rajshkha et al.,  1991).  While for-profit 
organizations would be expected to show higher operating margins because 
of the financial interests of their stakeholders than non-profit hospitals, in a 
Californian study, it was found that for-profit hospitals had higher margins 
only for 1985. The steep recession for California hospitals during the latter 
1980s are negatively impacting margins for all ownership hospital types 
(Molinari  et al., 1995). Other previous studies found that private hospitals 
performed better than the public hospitals (Barros, 2003; Weng et al., 2011). 
Hence, existing studies have indicated that boards function differently 
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 depending on whose interest they are protecting in terms of ownership. This 
can be explained by the stakeholder theory. 
 
2.6.8 Hospital Size 
The hospital size is looked at in terms of the number of beds in the hospitals. 
Hospital size is an important determinant of hospital performance. Large 
hospitals are said to have several advantages over smaller ones, including the 
availability of more resources, greater ability to raise capital and most 
important, a larger physician base for recruiting participants as well as 
usually a broader range of specialty services (Saleh, et al., 2002). However, 
the empirical literature is inconclusive in terms of the relationship between 
hospital size and performance. A number of previous studies have found that 
small hospitals are unstable and more likely to close (Lynch and Ozcan, 1994; 
Longo et al., 1996; Snow, 1996), while other studies have shown that at-risk 
small hospitals have already closed and future downsizing will occur in larger 
hospitals in an effort to squeeze excess capacity out of the system (Cleverly, 
1991; Rogers, 1996). Though Goldstein et al. (2002) did not find that larger 
hospitals always perform better, they argue that mergers, partnerships, and 
other forms of consolidation currently observed in the market place indicate 
that managers in the hospital industry understand the advantage of size 
(Japsen, 1996).   
 
Alexander and Lee (2006) found in their study that hospital size was 
positively related to efficiency, occupancy, and cash flow but was negatively 
associated with adjusted admissions. Larger hospitals may record higher total 
expense ratio and therefore cannot be said to be efficient. They are also likely 
to record higher occupancy and lower discharge. Therefore, the provision of 
quality care may be a challenge in larger hospitals considering the large 
number of patients that have to deal with. Smaller hospitals on the other 
hand are more likely to show better levels of efficiency and high discharge. 
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 This may be based on the provision of better health service quality, given the 
smaller numbers of patients associated with smaller hospitals.  
 
2.6.9  Hospital Age 
Age is also relevant in influencing performance. The extant literature 
suggests that over time, organizations are able to build innovative capacity 
based on their knowledge base and experience. They discover what they are 
good at and learn to be more efficient. Organizations specialize and find 
better ways to standardize, coordinate, speed up their operations, reduce 
costs and subsequently improve quality and performance (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Ericson and Pakes, 1995). According Cohen and Levinthal (1990), older firms 
tend to have a richer functional and productive knowledge base which can 
enhance the organization’s ability to exploit innovation and improve the 
diverse developments of technological innovation. Sorensen and Stuart (2000) 
also suggest that older organizations will have perfected the routines, 
structures, incentive programs, and other infrastructure that are needed to 
develop or adopt new technologies and bring them to market. 
The age of the hospital can therefore affect the performance of the hospital. 
Older hospitals have been argued to record better hospital performance. The 
reasoning here is that older hospital may have accumulated years of 
experience and therefore are able to translate such experience into better 
performance. The learning curve resulting from long years of operations by 
older hospitals leads to enhanced efficiency, delivery of better health service 
quality and eventually higher discharge. Younger hospitals on the other hand 
may not have accumulated such experience and therefore are likely to record 
lower performance in terms of efficiency, discharge and health service quality. 
Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) found that age of the hospital was significantly 
associated with the level of hospital technological innovation and this has the 
tendency of increasing performance.  
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 2.6.10 Location of Hospital 
The issue of location is an important factor for service providers such as 
hospitals (Goldstein et al., 2002). Hospitals located in urban centres may have 
access to better infrastructure compared to those situated in rural areas. 
Henry (1994) and Hudson (1995) explain that hospitals in rural locations have 
struggled in recent years and their survival may depend on developing. 
Robinson and Luft (1985) also suggest that that hospital location is important 
because the largest segment of a hospital’s market share comes from an area 
of proximity to the hospital. Young et al. (1992) also argue that hospitals 
located in affluent communities will typically treat a high volume of well-
insured patients and this will positively affect performance. 
 
The extant literature suggests that hospitals located in the urban areas tend 
to perform better than those located in rural communities. Rural hospitals are 
said to be at a disadvantage to urban hospitals (Henry, 1994; Hudson, 1995). 
It can be hypothesized that hospitals located in the urban area perform better 
than hospitals located in the rural community. Hospitals in urban centres are 
often better resources with infrastructure than those in the rural areas. Better 
infrastructure available to urban-based hospitals enables them to deliver 
better health service quality and show higher performance. Also, urban 
communities may have quite a number of hospitals and therefore, such 
competition may enhance competition and performance. Rural hospitals on 
the other hand experience less or no competition in their immediate region, 
therefore, they are likely to exhibit less performance compared to urban-
based hospitals. Goldstein et al.  (2002) suggest that hospital location is 
significantly related to performance, but that a hospital’s choice of strategy 
can moderate the effect of location. Alexander and Lee (2006) however found 
that hospitals in rural areas, compared with those in urban areas, had a 
greater share of the local market. 
 
2.7  Chapter Summary 
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 This chapter has provided a discussion of the literature on healthcare 
governance, ownership structure and the performance of hospitals. The 
chapter looked at the concepts of healthcare governance and clinical 
governance. Healthcare governance was defined to include the process of 
steering the overall functioning and effective performance of a hospital by 
defining the hospital’s mission, setting its objectives, supporting and 
monitoring their realization at the operational level (Flynn, 2002).  
 
The principles of good hospital governance were discussed and these were 
identified to include knowing what governance is, achievement of strategic 
ends, board-CEO relationship, unity of direction, unity of command, unity of 
accountability/responsibility,  ownership needs, self-Improvement, and 
understanding the cost of governance. It is expected that when hospitals 
adhere to these principles of good governance they are likely to experience 
better performance. The chapter also reviewed literature on hospital 
ownership and governance models. The major ownership types include for-
profit, not-for-profit, and public ownership. The not-for-profit hospitals are 
normally owned by religious groups and non-governmental organizations. 
Both not-for-profit and public hospitals have not-for-profit making motives. 
For-profit ownership entails shareholders who expect a return on their 
investment. The ownership type of the hospital obviously has implications for 
the form of governance system adopted by the hospital. The extant literature 
suggests that hospital governing boards and the professional team of 
executive managers constitute the axis of hospital governance.  
 
The literature chapter also discussed the importance of hospital boards and 
the role they play in healthcare quality. The essence of hospital governance is 
to ensure a more integrated approach of supporting and supervising all 
hospital activities, including clinical performance. Governing boards are 
recognized as being an important target for intervention for policymakers 
hoping to improve care in hospitals. High-performing and low-performing 
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 hospitals are said to be differentiated by the level of board activities. The 
chapter then considered the literature on the effects of board characteristics, 
including board size, board composition,board participation by medical staff, 
board leadership structure and duality, board diversity, and  frequency of 
board meeting  on hospital performance. It also discussed other control 
variables such as hospital size, hospital age and location of the hospital as 
important determinants of hospital performance. The literature also 
discussed the effect of ownership structure on hospital performance. 
 
It is important to understand how corporate and healthcare governance 
structures vary across countries (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992; Roe, 1993). The 
next chapter provides an overview of the healthcare system in Ghana, as this 
is relevant in appreciating hospital governance structures generally, but the 
Ghanaian hospital context in particular. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Overview of the Healthcare System in Ghana 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Improving the health status of the population of any nation has been 
identified as an important  ingredient in influencing its socio-economic 
development. Policies directed at healthcare provision seek among other 
things to offer access to sustainable quality health and in developing 
countries, improving the delivery of health services is critical to  the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In Ghana, the 
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 mission of the Ministry of Health (MoH) as captured in its policy document is 
to contribute to socio-economic development and wealth creation by 
promoting health and vitality, ensuring access to quality health, population 
and nutrition services for all people living in Ghana and promoting the 
development of a local health industry. This mission puts the concept of 
health beyond the confines of curative care to other socio-economic 
determinants of health. The ultimate goal of the health sector is to ensure a 
healthy and productive population that reproduces itself safely. Three key 
objectives have been set out to achieve this goal of the health sector and 
these are:  to ensure that people live long, healthy and productive lives and 
reproduce without an increased risk of injury or death; to reduce the 
excessive risk and burden of morbidity, mortality and disability, especially in 
the poor and marginalized groups; to reduce inequalities in access to health, 
populations and nutrition services and health outcomes (MoH, 2007). The 
attainment of these policy objectives is very critical to the efficient 
functioning of the healthcare system in Ghana.  
 
The structure of a country’s healthcare system is critical in ensuring efficient 
healthcare delivery. Understanding the healthcare system is also important in 
explaining the hospital governance structures. This chapter provides an 
overview of the healthcare system in Ghana. It provides a review of the history 
of the healthcare system, the structure and governance of the healthcare 
system, and healthcare financing and resource utilization. It then discusses 
targeted health programmes, health infrastructure, indigenous healthcare 
system, health sector reforms, and health information technology. The final 
section of this chapter summarizes the key issues discussed in the chapter. 
 
3.2  Ghana’s Healthcare System  
The history of Ghana’s healthcare system can be looked at under three eras: 
the pre-colonial  era (1844), the colonial era (1844-1957), and the post-
colonial era (1957  to date). In the pre-colonial era, the country had no 
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 organized health system and modern medical care was not available at the 
time. The key providers of healthcare were the traditional health practitioners, 
including herbalists, bonesetters, priest healers and traditional birth 
attendants (Yeboah, 2003).  
 
The colonial era witnessed the establishment of modern healthcare on a 
limited scale; however, this was not organized as a national system to benefit 
all people. The few who were privileged to benefit from this health system 
were mostly Europeans and their Ghanaian house helps (Kunfaa, 1996). Other 
Ghanaian indigenes who also utilized orthodox medical care included 
labourers from the mines, forestry/timber industry and construction workers 
so as to prevent the Europeans from getting infected by these workers. 
Healthcare during this period was centralized and basically curative,  which 
forms the root for the current urban and curative bias healthcare system 
(Yeboah, 2003). Clearly, Ghana’s healthcare system has been modeled along 
the lines of its colonial masters, Britain. The first government health services 
in Ghana can be traced back to 1880 when the Gold Coast Medical 
Department was established and concentrated on providing healthcare for the 
European population and government officials in particular. The healthcare 
system was focused on curative rather than preventive health services 
(Akortsu and Abor, 2011). Most of the healthcare facilities were, therefore, 
located in the core administrative districts with a centralized form of 
administration. The centralized healthcare system existed even after Ghana’s 
independence in 1957.  
 
The post-colonial period commenced from 1957-1980’s during which various 
governments (military and democratic) put in place strategies and policies to 
bring up the existing health system to modern standards. These expectations 
were,  however,  not met. It started with the Kwame  Nkrumah government, 
which ambitiously took steps to expand health services to every part of the 
country since economic conditions at the time were good. A number of 
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 commissions were set up and charged with the responsibility of restructuring 
the health system inherited from the colonial masters. Recommendations 
made by these commissions differed from the colonial health system mainly 
in the scope of health facilities the nation should have. This led to the 
formulation and implementation of a national plan referred to as the 7-year 
National Development Plan (1963-70) with the objectives of extending  and 
modernizing  existing hospitals (30 out 37 Government Hospitals were 
targeted) and also constructing additional health posts. 
 
The 7-year plan was abandoned when the first military intervention took over 
government in 1966 and put in place a 2-year Development Plan (1968-70), 
which aimed at reversing the urban biased health system, with equity being 
the key driving force. This was to be achieved by allocating resources to 
enhance rural health throughout the country, emphasizing on preventive and 
promotive health, including maternal and childcare, health education, water 
and sanitation and school health, training of more community and public 
health nurses, constructing   more health posts in  deprived regions and 
districts, and strengthening inter-sectoral collaboration,  especially with the 
Ministry of Education in order to develop the school health programme. 
 
There was a similar military intervention by Abrefa  Busia  (Prime Minister), 
whose government continued with various health reforms till the final coup in 
the 1980’s by Ft. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings during which the concept of Primary 
Healthcare was emphasized and Decentralization of Health  Service 
Administration Policy was strongly advocated and backed with the Local 
Government Law PNDC Law 207 of 1988. This policy sought to strengthen 
District Health Systems for effective management (Yeboah, 2003).  
 
It was not until 1972 that the government at the time attempted to 
decentralize healthcare services to the districts with policy formulation still 
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 being carry out at the central level. Several reforms that took place in 1977, 
1997 and 2002 and these have brought about a completely decentralized 
healthcare delivery system in the country, right from the national level to the 
sub-district levels. Subsequent to these reforms, two main functions had been 
identified for the health sector in Ghana. The first is policy formulation, 
regulation and coordination of the actions of actors in the health sector and 
the second had to do with the implementation of policy via health service 
delivery. The MoH has the responsibility of carrying the function of 
formulation, regulation and coordination of the actions of actors in the health 
sector. The public and private health service providers are responsible for the 
implementation of policy via health service delivery. In the public sector, the 
main health service provider is the Ghana Health Service with a national 
secretariat and service provision points (facilities) at the regions, districts, 
sub-district and community levels. In the private service, providers are the 
mission providers who operate mainly in rural areas as private not-for-profit 
organizations and the private for-profit organizations (Abekah-Nkrumah, 
2005; Abekah-Nkrumah et al., 2009). 
 
3.3  Structure and Governance of Ghana’s Healthcare System  
The healthcare system revolves around the MoH. Administratively, it has a 
hierarchical organizational structure from the central headquarters in Accra 
(the capital city) to the regions, districts, and sub-districts. Health services are 
delivered in primary, secondary, and tertiary health institutions. The primary 
healthcare system incorporates all institutions (clinics, health centres, and 
hospitals) and individuals whether private, public or traditional. All districts 
have also been subdivided into four to six sub-districts, and each sub-district 
covers a defined geographic area containing 20,000-30,000 people. The 
health centres are responsible for providing clinical, public health, and 
maternity services to the catchment population using a combination of clinic-
based, regular outreach, and mass campaigns in close collaboration with 
communities, community institutions and leaders, and village-based health 
workers and health institutions (MoH, 2009).  
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The district hospitals serve as the first referral point in the primary healthcare 
system. They provide clinical (outpatient and inpatient) and maternity services 
and serve as backup for health centres in the district. The regional hospitals 
are the second referral level. They act as the technical focal point for 
specialized clinical and diagnostic care in broad specialized areas like 
medicine, general surgery, pediatrics, and obstetrics and gynaecology. The 
teaching hospitals form the apex of specialized care in the country. They are 
the leading training and research institutions, and offer undergraduate and 
postgraduate training for doctors and other health professionals (MoH, 2009). 
Health services in Ghana are provided by four main categories of healthcare 
delivery systems. These are the public, private-for-profit, private-not-for-
profit, and traditional systems. The public sector, which is supported by the 
government, accounts for over 70 percent of the institutions.  
 
The MoH is charged with the responsibility of regulating the entire health 
sector and its main function is policy formulation, coordination and 
regulation of the stakeholders in the health sector. In formulating such 
policies or guidelines for regulation, it collaborates with various ministries, 
departments and agencies (MDAs),  as well as development partners and 
stakeholders in the health sector (Ackon, 2003; Abekah-Nkrumah, 2005). 
Policy implementation is carried out through the public, private and 
traditional sectors. At the public sector end, the Ghana Health Service, 
Teaching Hospitals Board and the quasi-government institution hospitals are 
the implementing agencies of the MoH. 
 
The Ghana Health Service is responsible for the implementation of 
government’s health policy and regulation of state-run health institutions 
(i.e., government hospitals, Polyclinics, and health centres). For the purpose 
of carrying out its functions, the Ghana Health Service has a secretariat that 
has been decentralized from the national level to the regions and the 
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 districts. At each level there is a team of management that administers the 
affairs of the service. The districts report to the regions and the regions 
report to the national level as stipulated in the Ghana Health Service and 
Teaching Hospitals Act (1996), Act 525. The Teaching Hospital Board (THB) is 
the institution responsible for the implementation of government’s health 
policy and regulation at the teaching hospital level. The Teaching Hospital 
Boards established under the Hospital Administration Law, 1988 (P.N.D.C.L. 
209), which are subject to Act 525, continued in existence. This means that 
teaching hospitals are still required even under Act 525 to have a hospital 
board.  The last of the public sector agencies is the quasi-government 
institution hospitals. This is currently an association and not a statutory body 
backed by relevant legislation. It is responsible for the implementation and 
regulation of hospitals owned by quasi-government institutions (Ackon, 2003; 
Abekah-Nkrumah, 2005). With the exception of teaching hospitals, the other 
public hospitals are not required under Act 525 to have a board. Public 
hospitals with a board might be following an existing practice prior to the 
passing of Act 525 or might be responding to administrative directive from 
their regional health directorate to have a board in place.  They might also be 
subscribing to best practice.  
 
The private sector also plays a significant role in Ghana’s health sector, 
representing about 40 percent of total healthcare delivery in the country. The 
Private Hospitals and Maternity Homes Board, established by Act 1958 (No. 9) 
as amended, is the regulatory body responsible for the private health sector. 
The main providers in the private sector are the mission-based providers; 
consisting of Christian and Moslem hospitals and the private medical and 
dental practitioners. Finally, a directorate in the MoH regulates activities of 
the traditional sector. However, the  institutional and legal framework 
necessary to carry out such work is currently not in place. The main 
traditional healthcare providers in this sector are the traditional medical 
providers, alternative medicine and faith-based healers (Ackon, 2003; 
Abekah-Nkrumah, 2005). The private hospitals are also not required by any 
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 Act to have a board. The formation of hospitals boards is at the discretion of 
the hospitals. In the case of the mission-based hospitals, most of the 
churches for instance have a dedicated  board overseeing a group of their 
hospitals in a particular district.    
 
Health management in Ghana is fairly decentralized. Within the Ghana Health 
Service, a nested approach involving District Health Management Teams, 
Regional Health Management Teams, and headquarters have been put in 
place. Complementing these arrangements are institutional/health facility 
management teams. Each of these management levels is a budget 
management centre with the responsibility for a defined programme of work 
supported by a defined operational budget. Presently, a sector-wide approach 
to health service delivery exists in Ghana. The principles underlying 
implementation of the sector-wide approach include an agreement between 
the Government of Ghana and health partners on a coordinated programme 
of work, an integrated approach to funding, and common implementation 
and evaluation arrangements. Under this arrangement, the MoH prepares an 
annual programme of work, which is funded from Government of Ghana 
funds, internally generated funds, and pooled donor funds. The MoH and 
partners meet twice a year to review and agree on the sector-wide 
performance targets (MoH, 2009). The structure of the health sector is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of Ghana’s Health Sector 
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Key: 
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 •  HC – Health Centres 
•  MBP – Mission Based Providers 
•  PMDP – Private Medical and Dental Practitioners 
•  TMP – Traditional Medical Providers 
•  AM – Alternative Medicine 
•  FH – Faith Healers 
Source: Five-Year Program of Work (2002-2006, p. 48) 
 
3.4  Ghana’s Healthcare Financing and Resource Utilization  
Prior to independence, the financing of healthcare was the sole prerogative of 
the colonial government at the time (Dummett, 1993). After independence in 
1957, Ghana provided free healthcare services to its population through 
public health facilities. There were no out-of-pocket payments in these 
facilities and care was financed solely from tax revenues. However, this was 
not sustainable in the light of the needs of other sectors of the economy, and 
the government had to find alternatives to this financing mechanism 
(Twumasi, 1975).  
 
In the 1970’s, nominal fees were introduced through legislations, but these 
proved insufficient to meet the needs of the health sector. The user fees were 
as a result of economic difficulties during the period (Twumasi, 1975). 
Between the 1970’s and early 1980’s, the global oil crisis from the sudden 
hike in oil prices on the international market severely affected the country. 
This immediately resulted in balance of payment difficulties, heavy debt 
burden and general economic disequilibrium. As a result, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed structural changes to 
improving the economy, which suggested withdrawal of state subsidies. This 
led to declines in the health budget, putting the health sector under severe 
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 economic pressure (World Bank, 1993). Government budget fell from 18.3 
percent to 10.1 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) between 1972 and 
1982, resulting in a fall in real expenditure in the education and health 
sectors of the economy. Equipment in health institutions fell into disrepair 
due to lack of spare parts and basic drugs were desperately in short supply 
and were often unavailable in rural clinics (Bawumia, 1998).  
 
In 1985, the government at the time introduced a cost recovery programme 
known as the ‘user-fees system’. Laws enabling the charging of fees dates 
back to 1969 with the introduction of the Hospital Fees Decree, 1969 
National Liberation Council Decree (NLCD) 360; Hospital Fee Decree, 1969 
(Amendment) Act, then, the 1970 (Act 325); then again the Hospital Fees Act, 
1971 (Act 387). These charges were, however, token fees charged compared 
to the 1985 legislation, which raised the fees above token levels (Smithson et 
al.,  1997).  There were,  however, exemptions for antenatal and family 
planning and communicable diseases (Nanda, 2002). The introduction of user 
fees greatly reduced the utilization of health services because most people 
could not afford the user fees and the fees were also not matched with 
improvement in quality of services provided. In spite of the introduction of 
the user fees, government still bore a considerable proportion of the 
expenditure in healthcare (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000). 
 
In 1992, the government, in conformity with the Bamako Initiative of 1988 
introduced the Revolving Drug Fund, which officially introduced the Full Cost 
Recovery Policy for drugs as a way of generating revenue to address the 
shortage of drugs. It was envisaged that the cost recovery process would 
contribute about 15 percent of the health sector resources. A review of the 
process in the First Five Year Programme of Work (1997-2001) of the MoH 
revealed that the contribution of the cost recovery process to the country’s 
health sector financing was below 10 percent. The application of the revolving 
drug fund policy was popularly termed ‘cash and carry system’. The cash and 
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 carry system caused a decline in the utilization of healthcare services, 
especially for the very poor, who needed the services most, since this 
represented a financial barrier to access healthcare (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000). 
 
In order to improve access to healthcare services, a law (Act 650, 2003) 
establishing a national health insurance scheme was enacted in October 2003 
known as the National  Health Insurance Scheme  (NHIS). This was with the 
ultimate vision of assuring equitable and universal access to healthcare for all 
residents of Ghana (MoH, 2004). The health insurance scheme is expected to 
provide funds to healthcare providers in bulk to aid in planning and to reduce 
the incidence of bad debt or charitable services, which tend to increase the 
expenditure pattern of healthcare facilities. This is ultimately expected to 
ensure efficient and effective delivery of healthcare service. The funding 
mechanism includes premiums paid by members to the insurance scheme 
they are registered for. Currently, 2.5 percent of all commercial invoices and 
pension contributions are paid into the health insurance fund. In year 2006, 
the health insurance fund represented about 31.6 percent of the total 
resource envelope of the health sector and in 2008, this accounted for 32.6 
percent of total health sector financing (MoH, 2006, 2008). According to the 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework for 2009, the NHIS was estimated to 
contribute 41 percent of overall revenue for 2009. In relation to its financing 
sources, the NHIS is heavily reliant on tax funding for 70–75 percent of its 
revenue. The  NHIS  has been decentralized into District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes and every Ghanaian is supposed to be a member of a 
district scheme in his or her area. The district schemes are the ones that 
contract the services of healthcare providers. The major problem confronting 
the Scheme is financial sustainability; considering that with a growing 
utilization of members, only a third is contributing to the scheme. There is 
also the problem of delays in reimbursing the facilities for services rendered 
to subscribers (Witter and Garshong, 2009).     
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 The various sources of financing public healthcare institutions in Ghana 
include government subvention, donor pooled funds and internally generated 
funds. The Government of Ghana funds are from budgetary allocations of the 
consolidated vote. This comes from budgetary allocation for healthcare 
institutions approved by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This 
funding could be viewed as government’s contribution to the financing of 
public hospitals and the source of this funding for healthcare delivery is 
usually from taxes. It has been the predominant source of funds for the 
health sector and constitutes about 60 percent of total transfer to the MoH. 
The subvention from government is used for paying salaries for healthcare 
staff on government payroll. The government subvention also covers 
administrative cost and services, including stationery and other items for the 
smooth running of hospitals. General investments and Highly Indebted Poor 
Counties [1] (HIPC)  funds considered as investment also form part of 
subvention to the healthcare facility. The contribution of government to 
investments in general, such as the rehabilitation of old buildings and the 
purchase of equipment, is generally minimal. 
 
Donor pooled and earmarked funds are external aid funding for the health 
sector. The pooled funds are from various countries and organizations that 
are pooled into an account for use by the health sector. The earmarked funds 
are also contributions by donors that are given for specific projects in the 
health sector. Sometimes the donations come in the form of vaccines for 
immunizations. Total inflows from donors into the health sector constitute 
about 25 percent of the sectors budget (Drechsler, 2006).  Donor pooled 
funds usually cover investment items and service delivery of the hospitals are 
generally the least reliable of all the other sources of funds (Akortsu and 
Abor, 2011).  
 
The internally generated funds come in the form of user charges. The 
Hospital Fees Regulation L.I. 1313 of 1985 introduced this system into public 
81 
 hospitals and the hospitals keep internally generated funds to supplement the 
annual budgetary allocation from the MoH (Ackon, 2003). These are revenues 
generated from drug fees and other patient fees raised by the hospitals. 
These funds could be from the payment of services by health insurance 
organizations that contracted hospitals and individuals who use the facility. 
Other activities that generate such funds are fees for the use of cafeteria 
services provided by health facilities, the use of parking space and other such 
activities. The internally generated funds are generally a very reliable source 
of funding the public hospitals. The internally generated funds are used on 
personal emoluments of contract workers, administrative expenses, services 
and investments. The use of internally generated funds for administrative 
expenses, investments and personal emoluments confirm the fact that 
government subvention, although may appear to be the highest financing 
source is actually inadequate in running the health facility (Akortsu and Abor, 
2011). Internally generated funds represent about 24.85 percent of the total 
approved health budget (MoH, 2006). 
 
3.5  Targeted Healthcare Programmes in Ghana 
One key targeted healthcare programme in Ghana is in respect of the safe 
motherhood programme of the MoH and the Ghana Health Service. The basis 
for this programme lies in the fact that many women in the country die as a 
result of complications related to pregnancy and childbirth (NPC, 2006). 
Maternal health has not received the attention it deserves,  and therefore, 
maternal mortality rate is still high, ranging from between 214 to 700 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births with some rural communities 
showing even higher rates (Ghana Health Service, 2005). The access to and 
use of quality maternal healthcare services are thus crucial for improved 
maternal-child survival. The effectiveness of a maternal healthcare 
programme also depends on how women at risk are willing to comply with 
necessary healthcare. It is argued that the use of maternal health services is a 
function of demographic, cultural, and socio-economic factors, such as age of 
women, birth order, size of household, education, ethnicity, place of 
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 residence, religious background, marital status, employment, income level 
and accessibility (Addai, 2000). Therefore, the goal of the safe motherhood 
programme is to improve women’s health in general and especially to reduce 
maternal morbidity and mortality, thereby contribute to reducing infant 
morbidity and mortality (Ghana Health Service, 2005). To achieve the above 
goal, the program seeks to among other things: 
1.  Make child bearing safe for all women 
2.  Contribute to improvement in infant health 
3.  Promote and maintain the physical, mental and social health of mother 
and baby by providing education on nutrition, family planning, and STI 
prevention including HIV/AIDS, the danger signs of pregnancy, rest/sleep 
and personal hygiene. 
4.  Help clients develop birth preparedness and complication readiness plans. 
5.  Detect and treat all complications arising in pregnancy, whether surgical, 
medical or obstetric. 
6.  Ensure the delivery of full term healthy baby with minimal stress or injury 
to mother and baby 
7.  Help prepare mothers to breastfeed successfully, experience normal 
puerperium and take good care of child physically, psychologically and 
socially and finally to 
8.  Prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. 
 
To ensure appropriate and expected return on interventions, the safe 
motherhood programme  targets married couples and individuals, 
adolescents, pregnant women, including adolescents, women and adolescents 
in their puerperium and their babies, men as well as families and 
communities. To manage the programme  effectively and ensure effective 
monitoring, it has been sub-divided into six major areas; antenatal care, 
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 labour and delivery care, postnatal care, family planning, Prevention and 
management of unsafe abortion and finally health education (Ghana Health 
Service, 2005).  
 
The main aim of the antenatal care programme is to establish contact with 
women in order to identify and manage current and potential risk and 
challenges. The providers are public and private healthcare facilities, as well 
as Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs). The main tool used is the supervision 
of labour and deliveries to ensure proper management of the four stages of 
labour, as well as early identification, proper management and or referral of 
complications by using personnel such as such midwives, general  medical 
practitioners, obstetricians and TBAs. The mix of postnatal services includes 
comprehensive screening for detection and treatment or referral of 
complications in mother and child, health education and counseling and 
finally family planning and motivation. Postnatal care is seen as one of the 
most important in the spectrum of maternal services since most maternal 
deaths occur during this period. The family planning programme is based on 
methods and practices to space births, limit family size and prevent unwanted 
pregnancies in addition to the prevention and management of reproductive 
tract infections (RTIs) such as STI/HIV/AIDS. The emphasis of the program is 
on adolescents and couples (Ghana Health Service, 2005).  
 
Some progress appears to have been made in the area of reproductive and 
child health, especially maternal health services. The current rate of progress 
is expected to continue to improve, looking at programs put in place by the 
health authorities, such as increasing levels of acceptance by men to become 
part of family planning programs amongst others (Ghana Health Service, 
2005; NPC, 2006). However, there are still challenges to deal with. These 
include high maternal mortality and abortion rates, poor access (financial and 
geographical) to safe motherhood services in the remote parts of the country, 
the high levels of poverty and low levels of education amongst women. These 
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 are likely to adversely affect efforts at reducing maternal mortality and 
morbidity. 
Table  3.1  shows a general trend in healthcare outcomes over the period, 
2006 – 2010. In all, the indicators suggest a gradual improvements in the 
health outcomes. However, a lot more needs to be done if Ghana is to achieve 
the MDGs. 
 
Table 3.1: Health Sector Wide Indicators, 2006 – 2010 
 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  POW 
20120 
Goal 
2010  Source 
Goal 1: Ensure that children survive and grow to become healthy and reproductive 
adults that reproduce without risk or injuries. 
Infant Mortality 
Rate (IMR) per 
1,000 live birth 
71  -  50  -  n/a     
Under 5 Mortality 
Rate (U5MR) per 
1,000 
111  -  80  -  n/a     
Maternal Mortality 
Ratio (MMR) per 
100,000 live birth 
n/a  -  451  -  n/a     
Under 5 prevalence 
of low weight for 
age 
18%  -  13.9%  -  n/a     
Total Fertility Rate  4.4  -  4  -  n/a     
Goal 2: Reduce the excess risk and burden of morbidity, disability and mortality 
especially in the poor and marginalized groups. 
HIV prevalence 
among pregnant 
women 15 –  24 
years 
3.2  2.6  2.2  2.9  1.9  2.0   
Incidence of Guinea 
Worm 
    501  242  <100  8  CHIM 
Goal 3: Reduce inequality in health service and health outcomes. 
Equity: Poverty 
(U5MR) 
1:1018    1:1.72    n/a  -   
Equity: Geography, 
service (supervised 
deliveries) 
1:2.05  1:2.143    1:1.49  1:1.90  1:1.79  CHIM 
Equity: Geography, 
resources (nurse: 
population) 
1:4.14  1:2.257  1:2.03  1:1.87  1:2.00  1:1.83  HR-
MOH 
Equity: NHIS, 
gender(female/male 
active ratio) 
n/a  n/a        -   
Equity: NHIS,  n/a  -  1:1.13    n/a  -   
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 poverty (lowest 
wealth 
quintile/whole 
population active) 
Thematic Area 1: Healthy lifestyle and healthy environment. 
% household with 
sanitation facility 
 
60.70% 
-  -    n/a  -   
% household with 
access to improved 
sources of drinking 
water 
78.10%  -  -    n/a  -   
Obesity in adult 
population (women 
aged 15 – 49 years) 
25.30%  -  9.3%    n/a  -   
Thematic Area 1: Health, Reproduction and Nutrition 
%  children 0-6 
months exclusively 
breastfed 
54%  -  -  -  n/a  -  CHIM 
% deliveries 
attended by a 
trained health 
worker 
44.5%  32.1%  42.2%  45.6%  50.3%  48.2%  CHIM 
Family planning 
acceptors 
25.4%  23.2%  33.8%  31.1%  n/a  23.5%  CHIM 
% pregnant women 
attending at least 1 
antenatal visit 
88.1%  91.1%  97.8%  92.1%  70%  90.6%  CHIM 
% U5s sleeping 
under ITN 
41.7%  55.3%  40.5%  n/a  50.0%  n/a  CHIM 
% children fully 
immunized (proxy 
Penta 3 coverage) 
84.2%  87.8%  86.6%  89.3%  87.9%  84.9%  CHIM 
HIV clients 
receiving ARV 
therapy 
7,338  13,429  23,614  33,745  51,814  47,559  CHIM 
Outpatient 
attendance per 
capita (OPD) 
0.55  0.69  0.77  0.81  0.82  0.89  CHIM 
Institutional 
Maternal Mortality 
Ratio (IMMR) per 
100,000 live births 
187  230    170  185  164  CHIM 
TB treatment 
success rate 
73.0%  79.0%  84.0%  85.6%  86.0%  86.4%  CHIM 
Thematic Area 3: Capacity development 
% population within 
8km of health 
infrastructure 
n/a  -  -  -  n/a  -   
Doctor: population 
ratio 
15,423  13,683  13,499  11,981  11,500  11,479  HR- 
Nurse: population 
ratio 
2,125  1,537  1,353  1,537  1,100  1,510  HR- 
Thematic Area 4: Governance and Financing 
% total MTEF  16.2%  14.6%  14.9%  14.6%  11.5%  15.1%  MOH 
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 % non-wage GOG 
recurrent budget 
allocated to district 
level and below 
40.0%  49.0%  49.0%  62.0%  50.0%  46.8%  MOH 
Per capita 
expenditure on 
health (USD/capita) 
25.4  23.01  23.23%    26  28.64%  MOH 
Budget execution 
rate (Item 3 as a 
proxy) 
89.0%  110.0%  115.0%  80.4%  95%  94.0%  MOH 
% of annual budget 
allocation to items 
2 and 3 disbursed 
to BMC by end of 
June 
n/a  n/a  23.0%  39.0%  40%  31%  MOH 
% population with 
valid NHIS 
membership card 
(active members) 
17.7%    44.7%  50.0%  60.2%  -   
Proportion of 
claims settled 
within 12 weeks 
n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  40%  -   
% IGF from NHIS  45.0%  n/a  66.5%  83.5%  70.0%  79.4%  MOH 
Source: Ghana Health Sector Review, 2010 
 
 
3.6  Health Infrastructure in Ghana 
Health infrastructure is important in improving the health status of people in 
the country. In Ghana, there is wide disparity when it comes to the availability 
of health infrastructure in the country in terms of human resources, hospitals, 
primary healthcare, community healthcare, and blood banks. The individual 
health infrastructures in the country are discussed below. 
 
Human resources for health is now widely recognized as the key element for 
achieving the MDGs and scaling up health interventions. The health workforce 
accounts for 9 percent of the total labor force and more than 65 percent of 
national healthcare budgets in Ghana. Experiences in Ghana reveal that 
shortage of human resource for health as well as misdistribution of the 
limited numbers poses great challenge not only to the health sector, but also 
to economic prosperity generally (Ghana Health Force Observatory, 2007). 
Health workforce is mostly concentrated in the Greater Accra and Ashanti 
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 regions. For instance, these two regions account for about 49.6 percent of 
doctors on government payroll. It has being reported that Korle-bu Teaching 
Hospital (located in Greater Accra) alone has more doctors than the three 
northern regions. There are over 5,000 professional nurses in the country and 
many other community health nurses and health assistants. Also, there are 
over 350 pharmacists, and over 2500 midwives all over the country. 
 
With respect to health facilities, there is uneven distribution of health facilities 
across the various regions of the country. Though there is at least one 
regional hospital in every region in addition to other hospitals, not all the 
districts have a hospital. This is particularly true in the case of the new 
districts. The country has 1,887 health facilities, including teaching hospitals 
and 3 psychiatric hospitals. Nine (9) regional hospitals, 86 district hospitals, 
11 polyclinics, and 927 health centres under the Ghana Health Service 
represent about 55 percent of the total health facilities (MoH, 2009). Figure 
3.2 shows the distribution of hospitals across the various regions in Ghana. It 
is obvious from the map that  the distribution of the hospitals is uneven. 
Ashanti region has the highest percentage of hospitals (27%), followed by the 
Greater Accra  (24%). Upper East (2%) and Upper West (3%) have the least 
percentage of hospitals. Clearly, the distribution of the hospitals is skewed in 
favour of two regions in the country, Ashanti and Greater Accra regions. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Hospitals in Ghana 
 
   Source: constructed by author 
 
Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) has been adopted by 
the Ghana Health Service as a national strategy for promoting accessible, 
quality and equitable services for  all Ghanaians, particularly those in rural 
areas. The CHPS model is based on the results of four years of field 
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 experimentation and demonstration by the MoH,  and the Navrongo Health 
Research Centre’s Community Health and Family Planning project, with 
technical assistance from the Population Council and USAID. According to 
those experiments, less than 40 percent of rural population has access to 
primary healthcare. 
 
In every region of the country, there is at least one regional blood bank. 
There is also a national blood bank in the country that supplies the other 
blood banks in event of shortage. However, blood given out to any blood 
bank is expected to be replaced later. The Korle-bu and Okomfo Anokye 
teaching hospitals have their  own  blood bank. There are other 
mission/private/quasi-government hospitals that run their own blood banks 
in the country.  
 
3.7  Indigenous Healthcare System in Ghana 
Indigenous or traditional medicine refers to health practices, approaches, 
knowledge and beliefs incorporating plant,  animal and mineral based 
medicines, spiritual therapies, manual techniques and exercise applied 
singularly or in combination to treat, diagnose and prevent illness or maintain 
well-being (World Health Organization, 2008). In most developing countries 
like Ghana, both the modern/orthodox and traditional forms of medicine are 
critical to the healthcare system. With an estimated population of over 22 
million, the number of health professionals responsible for delivering 
orthodox healthcare in Ghana is woefully inadequate. Over 70 percent of the 
population lives in the rural areas. Yet, over 75 percent of Ghanaian orthodox 
medical and paramedical personnel are concentrated in urban areas that have 
the large majority of modern health facilities to the detriment of the teeming 
rural dwellers. Many rural Ghanaians, therefore, have not been exposed to the 
benefits of modern changes in orthodox healthcare system. Consequently, 
most of these rural communities have to resort to the traditional healthcare 
system.  
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The traditional health system can be described using four broad aspects. First 
of all, it is a holistic approach that focuses on the whole person’s health 
rather than particular organs or disorders. Secondly, the body, spirit and 
environment (mainly spiritual and social) are all considered important to 
one’s health. Thirdly, the traditional healers use rituals, divination (getting 
information through supernatural ways), faith healing, offerings, herbs and 
other naturally derived medicines. Fourthly, there are different types of 
traditional healers –odinsinin  who are skilled in natural medicines, okomfo 
who heal through communication with ancestral spirits (spiritualists), 
traditional birth attendants and traditional surgeons. Traditional healthcare 
delivery provides a client-centred, personalized approach that is culturally 
appropriate and tailored to meet the specific needs of the patient. It embraces 
a wide range of practices,  including herbalism and spiritualism, and 
practitioners such as diviners, priests and faith healers.  
 
Since the late 1970’s, a number of international resolutions have been passed 
to promote regulation of traditional medicines and implementation of specific 
measures to govern Traditional Health Practitioners (THPs). A typical example 
is the primary healthcare concept, which advocates the use of appropriate 
technologies and methods in each country. Since the early 1990’s, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has advocated for the inclusion of THPs in the 
national AIDS programmes. In 2003, the 56th World Health Assembly of the 
WHO resolved, under its global strategy,  on alternative medicine that its 
member states must ensure that their healthcare systems promote and 
support provision of training and, if necessary, retraining of THPs, and a 
system for the qualification and/or accreditation or licensing of the 
practitioners. 
 
A few years later, the Ghana government enacted an Act to integrate THPs 
into the mainstream of primary healthcare. This Act affirms the dignity and 
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 respect of traditional medicine and offers a framework to ensure the efficacy, 
safety and quality of traditional healthcare services from registered and 
trained traditional practitioners. It also provides management and control 
over regulations, training and conduct of practitioners. A traditional health 
council has also been instituted to develop interest in traditional health 
practices by encouraging research, education and training. The Council must 
promote, regulate, and liaise between traditional health practitioners and 
other health sectors. 
 
The traditional health system is running parallel with the Ghana health service 
playing complementary roles to each other. The MoH is charged with the 
responsibility of identifying, training, regulating, standardizing and 
monitoring their activities. In recent times, traditional health system has been 
put on limelight projecting its implementation to the healthcare system in 
Ghana. In view of this, a scale up training programme was necessary. THPs 
received training and mentoring in diverse areas such as: HIV/AIDS, Home-
based  care, tuberculosis and directly observed treatment short-course, 
prevention and transmission of certain diseases. It was assumed that capacity 
building of THPs in identified areas of training and mentoring, and linking 
them to the healthcare system would result in increased acceptability and 
awareness of their role in health delivery, improved capacity to support the 
management of certain diseases and improved quality of traditional healing 
and access to voluntary counseling testing (VCT) services. 
 
The main challenges confronting the practice of indigenous medicine include 
inadequate resources, inadequate staff capacity, low level of literacy among 
majority of practitioners, and slow compliance of THPs to regulatory 
mechanisms 
 
3.8  Health Sector Reform/Healthcare Policy in Ghana  
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 Health sector reform is the sustained, purposeful change to improve the 
efficiency, equity and effectiveness of the health sector (Berman, 1995). 
Ghana’s health system has since independence undergone three major 
reforms in 1957, 1977 and 1997. The first of these reforms, which occurred 
at independence,  saw a massive development in infrastructure and human 
resources with the aim of addressing major health challenges confronting the 
nation at the time. Significant among these problems were environmental 
sanitation, malnutrition and high infant mortality rate, variety of diseases and 
shortage of medical personnel. 
 
The second attempt at reforming the health sector took place in 1977, as a 
result of the perceived inadequacies of the 1957 reform to effectively address 
the existing increasing and complex health challenges. It was significantly 
modeled on the Primary Healthcare system, which emphasized community 
healthcare and community involvement in promoting health and healthcare.  
The health system witnessed another attempt at reform in 1997, the main 
components of which were stipulated in the medium term strategy that 
spanned from 1997 to 2001. This reform aimed at achieving significant 
reduction in the infant, child and maternal mortality rates effective control of 
risk factors that expose individuals to the major communicable disease, 
increased access to health services especially in the rural areas, establishment 
of health systems effectively reoriented towards the delivery of public health 
services, and strengthening and effective management of health systems. 
 
The second five-year programme of work, which began in 2002 and was 
expected to end in 2006,  detailed the current health sector strategy. The 
overall goal was to help  address the health inequalities in the country. 
Evidence abound that this particular strategy was tailored in harmony with the 
immediate past one (strategy) to  improve the quality of health delivery, 
increase access to health services, improve the efficiency of health service 
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 delivery, foster partnerships to improve health, and improve financing to the 
health sector 
 
Then came the third five-year programme of work (5YPOW), which gave 
consideration to lessons learnt from the 5YPOW I and II. This particular 
programme of work was strategically developed to respond effectively to the 
challenges met during the implementation of the previous ones. It contains 
the goals, mission and strategic objectives of the health sector, as has been 
stipulated in the first and second ones. This document provides the basis for 
the drawing of the annual work plan to ensure adequate response to priority 
interventions for human resource development and the ultimate reduction of 
poverty and the creation of wealth. Over the five-year period, the document is 
expected to offer the basis for guiding and coordinating the activities of 
players in the country’s health sector (MoH, 2008a). 
 
In an attempt to ensure clarity and less difficulty in the achievement of its set 
objective, the third 5YPOW is grounded on a number of principles. First, the 
creation of wealth through health and this is in acknowledgment of the fact 
that poor health is expensive to individuals, societies and nations, and thus 
any attempt to fight poverty, as well as create wealth should incorporate 
health issues. Second, making sure that the national health insurance works 
well. Admittedly, one of the significant innovations in Ghana’s health system 
has been the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme. In spite of 
the enormous positive impacts of this scheme, however, there are still 
challenges confronting its implementation. For this reason, the 5YPOW has 
been developed in a way as to help overcome these challenges, significant 
among which is poor access, including both geographical and financial 
access. The document aims to facilitate the provision of incentive to 
healthcare providers, organizational arrangements and quality service 
management. Third, limiting inequalities and this basically aims at bridging 
the gap between the rich and the poor in accessing healthcare delivery. 
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 Fourth, giving maximum attention to priorities and although there are a lot of 
challenges confronting the health system, in an attempt to address these 
problems, there is the need to prioritize. That is, identifying which of the 
problems to address first before the other. 
 
The 5YPOW is fashioned as a departure from the past by setting out priorities 
that will emphasize concentration on each year’s annual programme of work. 
There are  four strategic objectives of the third 5YPOW  and these include: 
promoting an individual lifestyle and behavioral model for improving health 
and vitality, by addressing risk factors and by strengthening multi-sectoral 
advocacy and actions; rapid scaling up within the existing capacity, high 
impact interaction and services targeting the poor, disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups; investing in strengthening health system capacity to 
sustain high coverage; and promoting governance, partnership and 
sustainable financing. 
 
3.9  Health Information Technology in Ghana 
Health information technology is necessary for improving information 
management needed for achieving the health system’s goals and objectives. 
Advancements in technology and the increasing value of integrated health 
data, as well as the management of that data also represent a vital thrust 
underpinning information management in the health sector. An efficient 
health system requires accurate and instantly accessible information and this 
is vital for improving care for patients, improving the performance of the 
healthcare system and the health status of Ghanaians. It is also about 
providing decision-makers with accurate information so that they can make 
informed decisions (MoH, 2006; MoH, 2008b). Health information is 
particularly important for resource allocation and public health action in 
countries such as Ghana, where resources are limited (MoH, 2007). The health 
sector information system in Ghana is confronted with a number of 
challenges, including: multiple and uncoordinated information systems. 
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 These systems do not communicate with each other resulting in data 
redundancy, duplications and inconsistencies amongst the various 
information sources; no formal links to sources of information outside the 
health sector and overall performance of health information system is 
dependent on abilities of individual managers rather than corporate needs; 
weak policy and legal framework for the health information system and lack 
of national plan for health information;  low level of human resources and 
capacity. Inadequate personnel with advanced skills in health information and 
Districts do not have formally designated health information officers; limited 
capacity for effective health information system planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation; absence of an updated strategic plan to guide the 
overall development and implementation of a sector-wide health information 
leading to the slow progress in developing systems for managing health 
information in the sector;  and  lack of systematic investment in the 
development of data management capabilities within the health sector. Most 
investments continue to be programme focused and centred around the 
development of reporting systems based on specific indicators.  
 
Some attempts have,  however, been made to improve information 
management in the health sector. The first is improving the human resource 
available for data collection and analysis at the district and regional levels. 
Steps have been taken in this regard to set up and support the training of 
health information officers at the Kintampo Rural Health Training School. The 
second major strategy is improving central level capacity for collation and 
analysis to support decision-making. The focus has been on building the 
capacity at the Centre for Health Information Management to be able to 
produce the kind of analyzed data required by the sector. The third is 
strengthening of data collection and analysis at the district level. Steps were 
therefore taken to study and understand the health information needs and 
demands at the district level and to design systems that will improve data 
collection and reporting, enhance the use of data and facilitate self-
assessment at the district level. A ‘platform’ for the collation of reports at the 
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 district level was introduced through the District Health Management 
Information System. It was also to enhance the management of data 
generated and the reports required to be produced by the districts. It also 
looks at improving the scope of use of the information generated as a result 
for decision-making. Two key tools have been developed for the purpose: a 
‘Decision Support Manual’ to guide the interpretation and presentation of the 
routinely collected data at the district level and, a District-Wide Computer 
Assisted Information Management System  to facilitate the management of 
reports at the districts (MoH, 2008b). 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the healthcare system in Ghana. It provided a review 
of the history of the healthcare system, the structure and governance of the 
healthcare system and healthcare financing and resource utilization. The 
chapter then discussed targeted health programmes, health infrastructure, 
indigenous healthcare system, health sector reforms, and health information 
technology.  
 
The structure of the healthcare system in Ghana has gone through several 
changes and reforms, usually with every change in government, and this 
would have implications for the type of governance structures adopted by 
healthcare institutions. It is observed from the structure of the health system 
in Ghana that government decisions through the Ministry of Health has direct 
implications for the running of hospitals of all categories. This is because the 
MoH has the responsibility of carrying the function of formulation, regulation 
and coordination of the actions of actors in the health sector. In formulating 
such policies or guidelines for regulation, it collaborates with various 
ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs),  as well as development 
partners and stakeholders in the health sector. The public and private health 
service providers via the health service delivery system implement these 
action policies.  
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 There is,  therefore,  the need to have various governing boards that will 
oversee the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of these actions at the hospital level. This is supported by 
hospital governance studies, which indicate that one of the key elements 
needed in order to achieve excellence in hospitals is having a clear mission 
and an achievement-orientated culture in which to realize it, and these are the 
core responsibility of a hospital board. However, in Ghana, it is only teaching 
hospitals that are required under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching 
Hospitals Act 1996 (Act 525) to continue having a board, after the passing of 
this law by the then government in 1996. In the case of the other public 
hospitals, they are not required under Act 525 to have a board. Therefore, 
public hospitals with a board might be following an existing practice prior to 
the passing of Act 525 or might be responding to administrative directives 
from their regional health directorate to have a board in place. The Private 
Hospitals and Maternity Homes Board, established by Act 1958 (No. 9) as 
amended, is the regulatory body responsible for the private health sector. The 
main providers in the private sector are the mission-based providers; 
consisting of Christian and Moslem hospitals and the private medical and 
dental practitioners. However, the institutional and legal framework necessary 
to carry out such work is currently not in place. Thus, the private hospitals 
are also not required by any Act to have a board. The formation of a hospital 
boards is thus at the discretion of the respective private hospitals. In the case 
of the mission-based hospitals, some of the churches for instance have a 
dedicated board overseeing a group of their hospitals in a particular district. 
The content of the final and third 5YPOW, which includes amongst other 
plans, promoting governance, partnership and sustainable financing in  the 
health sector, coupled with many other issues confronting the health sector, 
and hospital in particular, such as the recent demonstration and agitation 
within hospital employees of Ghana’s premier and largest hospital, for the 
dissolution of the governing board, as well as the firing of the CEO of the 
hospital, has necessitated a study to examine not just the characteristics of 
the hospital boards across all categories, but also to ascertain what impact 
these governing boards have on the performance of hospitals in Ghana.  
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The next chapter discusses the hypotheses development and provides a 
framework that links the existing literature and theoretical stances to hospital 
board  characteristics and ownership structure to aid in the empirical 
investigation.   
 
 
Chapter 4 
Governance Theories and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the  theories and the emanating hypotheses 
development  as well as  provides a framework for analyzing the effects of 
hospital governance and ownership structure on performance. The chapter 
begins by discussing the various governance theories and constructing a 
conceptual framework, which shows how the relevant  theoretical 
considerations explain hospital governance. Considering the complexity of 
the issues surrounding the healthcare sector, it is appropriate to use a 
multiple theoretical approach in examining the governance, as well as 
ownership structures and their impact on the performance of hospitals 
(Beasley et al., 2009). Thus, the theoretical basis of this study on healthcare 
governance can conveniently be covered under the managerialism theory, 
stakeholder theory, and the resource dependency theory. 
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 The conceptual framework shows how these theories inform hospital board 
characteristics and subsequently on performance. The chapter then explains 
how the hypotheses are developed to guide the empirical investigations. The 
hypotheses are specifically based  on how the presence of hospital board, 
hospital board characteristics (i.e.,  board size, board composition, medical 
staff participation board leadership structure board diversity, and frequency 
of meetings), ownership structure, and the control factors influence the 
performance of hospitals. 
 
4.2  Governance Theories 
A number of governance theories exist that explain the governance systems 
and structures of organizations. There have been issues of an integrative 
theoretical approach in corporate governance studies over the years because 
there is the lack of an overarching theoretical perspective in viewing the role 
of governing boards and performance of organizations (Hendry and Kiel, 
2004). In a study to analyze the mainstream academic thoughts on the roles 
of governing boards, Hung (1998) indicates that there is no single competent 
and integrative theory or model to explain the role played by governing 
boards (Hung, 1998). Hung (1998) explains that the roles of governing 
boards and how they perform is consistent with and at the same time reflects 
some of the main arguments of six different schools of thoughts also referred 
to as governance theories. These include agency theory, stewardship theory, 
institutional theory, managerialism theory, stakeholder theory, and resource 
dependency theory (Hung, 1998). This is because board involvement is such a 
complex phenomenon that no single theoretical perspective can adequately 
capture the entire processes involved. These governance theories are 
discussed in the following section in turn and particular emphasis is placed 
on those theories that are applicable in explaining the governance structures 
of hospitals in a complimentary rather than contradictory manner. 
 
4.2.1  Agency Theory  
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 It has been a long recognized phenomenon that modern firms suffer from the 
separation of ownership and control. They are run by professional managers 
(agents), who are expected to seek the interests of the owners or 
shareholders (principals) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  Lan and  Heracleous, 
2010; Solomon, 2011). The agency relationship is said to be a contract under 
which  one or more persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf, and it involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent. The agency theory addresses the 
relevance of having separate individuals responsible for the protection of 
shareholder interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). This is supported by Gay (2002), and Filatotchev and Wright 
(2011),  who argue that the agency theory is best suited for larger 
organizations, comparatively, with an extended ownership base. Similarly, 
Shaoul et al. (2012) suggest that the agency theory approach puts so much 
attention on the monitoring tasks that various corporate governance 
mechanisms may perform in publicly listed companies, but does not focus 
much on corporate governance in smaller companies. The agency theory is 
said to postulate that a conflict of interest exists between members of an 
organization in which owners are not involved in the day-to-day running of 
the organisation as opposed to managers who are responsible to the daily 
running of the organization (Roe, 1994). Thus, there is always the need for 
owners to reduce agency costs and control the opportunism of managers. 
This calls for good corporate governance, which is deemed to provide control, 
while promoting economic enterprise and corporate performance (Keasey et 
al.,  2005).  Gay (2002), however, argues that an agent’s interest in an 
organization will solely be with the intention of meeting organizational goals 
rather than himself. He added that this avoids the problems associated with 
conflict of interest. However, this may not always be the case and it has long 
been recognized that there may be a possible divergence of motivational 
interests between the two parties. The interests of professional managers or 
agents may be different from those of the owners or principals, thus, creating 
the agency problem. While owners or shareholders may be interested in 
maximizing the value of the firm, management on the other hand may be 
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 involved in managerial shirking, perquisite and non-optimal investments, 
which are detrimental to shareholder value maximization  (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Brickley, and Zimmerman, 2010; Harford and Maxwell, 
2012).  
 
An asymmetry of information can also exist as the managers have continual 
access to information, whereas the shareholders may only receive annual 
reports. It is this asymmetry that makes it difficult for shareholders to 
monitor the activities of managers. In agent-principal contracts, these agency 
problems persist especially in instances where  the financiers 
(principal/owners) are not qualified or informed enough to decide what to do 
when the unexpected happens, the very reason they hired the manager in the 
first place. Consequently, the manager ends up with substantial residual 
control rights and therefore discretion to allocate funds as he chooses 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Agency theory suggests that managers’ control of 
information regarding their own performance and organizational activities 
can lead to the manipulation of information to serve the managers’ own 
personal interests to the detriment of owners’ interests (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Armstrong et.al. 2010). In view of this, Warhurst (2004) considered the 
roles and responsibilities of business in today’s society, and wonders what 
the future role of the organizations will be and in doing so, provides some 
prime examples of firms that have achieved both success and failure with 
respect to the agency theory.  
 
The agency problem could be addressed by aligning the interests of the 
managers with that of the owners. The process of aligning these two sets of 
interests comes with cost known as the agency cost. The agency costs include 
the  control and the monitoring of activities of the board of directors.  The 
desire to limit agency costs has resulted in firms behaviors (agents) that are 
consistent with owners’ expectations (principal) resulting in a superior level 
of performance  (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen,  1983).  An effective 
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 governance system involves developing and implementing governance 
mechanisms and processes. For instance, a good CEO-board relationship, 
proper accountability/responsibility policies and an effective board structure 
may ensure that the interests between the principal and agent are fully 
aligned (see Taylor, 2000; Christopher, 2010). 
 
The agency relationship as applied in a hospital situation may differ from that 
in the corporate setting, considering that there are different stakeholders 
involved, including patients, hospital, medical staff, and community care 
groups, amongst others. However, problems can and invariably do arise 
whereby the agent may not always act in the best interests of the principal 
(Murphy and O’Donohoe, 2006). In an attempt to minimize the potential for 
opportunistic decision-making by the hospital medical staff, it is suggested 
that outside physicians help to monitor the information given by their 
colleagues so as to decrease the medical staff's potential to influence the 
board into making decisions intended to serve their own personal interests at 
the expense of other stakeholders and the hospital as well as give a more 
objective perspective on prevailing issues within the medical field. The 
involvement of outside physicians serves as a reference point for monitoring 
the medical staff's board recommendations, thereby lowering the chances of 
opportunism by medical  staff board members. Agency theorists have 
advocated increased outside board participation to protect shareholders’ 
equity and financial interests. Therefore, hospitals with medical staff and 
outside physician board participation will have better financial performance 
than boards with medical insider board participation and no outside 
physicians (Molinari et al., 1995). 
 
For the purpose of this study, agency theory is not used because there are 
actually no real owners when it comes to the health sector. Thus, the concept 
of governance is more of a shared responsibility between the board and 
senior management of the hospital, rather than a principal-agent relationship 
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 or superior-subordinate relationship. The health sector is more concerned 
about the ultimate goal of improving the health of its clients/customers 
rather than maximizing profit of shareholders. Hence, the focus here is 
basically on stakeholders and not the traditional shareholders proposed by 
the agency theory. 
 
4.2.2  Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory suggests that managers are only motivated to act in their 
shareholders’ best interest and that managerial opportunism is not important 
and does not even exist since the manager’s main aim is to do a good job 
and be a good steward of the assets of the organization/corporate body 
(Davis  et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This governance theory 
suggests that managers are motivated by a need to achieve, provide high-
level commitment and gain intrinsic satisfaction by performing challenging 
work and exercising responsibility and authority in order to gain recognition 
from peers and bosses (Davis  et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Therefore, the main objective of management is to improve on organizational 
performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Contrary to the agency theory, 
stewardship theory replaces the lack of trust to which the agency theory 
refers with the respect for authority and inclination to ethical behaviour.  
 
Stewardship theory places great importance on the role of management in 
protecting the interest of the shareholders. The effective management of the 
firm requires having skilled managers in place and also adopting appropriate 
governance processes. Such skilled managers are expected to maintain a 
certain level of professionalism and they may belong to professional bodies 
that have their own professional and ethical guidelines and codes of conduct 
that are relevant in achieving the effective governance of the organization. 
This environment of professionalism, when considered together with the 
presence of appropriate mandatory governance frameworks at the national 
level, provides an element of control in the organizational environment that 
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 influences firm behavior consistent with owners’ expectations (Christopher, 
2010). The sociological, ethical and cultural values of the country in which 
these organizations are situated are also useful in determining the element of 
trust that can be placed with the management of organizations. These 
environmental influencing factors vary with countries and organizations and 
would in turn determine the type of governance monitoring and control 
mechanisms to be adopted. It is argued that in countries where there are 
sophisticated levels of governance regulations and strong professional and 
ethical guidelines, the costs of control mechanisms tend to be less giving 
room for flexibility to introduce more intrinsic and empowering processes as 
opposed to having extrinsic rewards and control processes (Christopher, 
2010). 
 
This theory indicates that a manager in favour of organizational interests 
outweighs those that are self-serving and that given a choice between the 
two, their behaviour will not deviate from the best interests of their 
organization. It is argued that even if the interests are misaligned between 
the two parties, the manager  will still place a higher value on achieving 
organizational goals than personal gain (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et 
al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).Gay (2002) argues that considering 
that there is no conflict of interest between managers and owners, the main 
concern of both parties should be on identifying and creating an 
organizational structure that permits effective coordination to be achieved. 
Davis  et al.  (1997) further support this view by explaining that the 
performance of the steward is made effective by the structural situation in 
which they operate.  
 
Stewardship theory therefore suggests that having managerial insiders or 
executive directors on the board has the tendency of strengthening board 
effectiveness. This is because management as stewards tends to have better 
knowledge and appreciation of issues impacting on the organization’s 
105 
 operations. Consequently, a board structure with more executive directors 
may lead to better decision-making and enhanced performance (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The stewardship theory also 
recognizes the importance of giving the CEO free hand to operate in such a 
situation. Also, allowing the CEO to chair the board (i.e., CEO duality) may be 
more beneficial than having a different person chair the board. This is 
because, with the board system where the CEO also acts as chairman, the CEO 
would have greater flexibility to pursue the organization’s objectives without 
hindrances from the board (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). 
 
Considering the various scandals and reports of maleficence and cases of 
negligence by hospitals in recent times, stewardship theory does not seem to 
explain the governance practices in healthcare. Existing literature does not 
support the assertion of having majority insiders or executive directors on 
governing boards (Culica and Prezio, 2009;  Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).In 
as much as managers can be trusted to seek the interest of the organisation 
according to the stewardship  theory, the myriad of challenges facing the 
healthcare sector demands having in place a strong, independent, and well-
functioning board to tackle and find solutions to these issues, and this cannot 
be left in the hands of insiders or executive directors.(See Yermack, 1996; 
John and Senbet, 1998).Therefore this study does not look at healthcare 
governance through the stewardship theory’s point of view. 
 
4.2.3  Institutional Theory  
Institutional theory seeks to find explanation to how structures such as rules, 
norms, and routines become established in society and spread over time and 
even become authoritative guidelines for social behavior. Much of modern 
institutional theory arose from the work of Berger and Luckman (1967), who 
argue that social reality is a human construction created through interaction. 
The process by which actions are repeated and given similar meaning by self 
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 and others is defined as institutionalization. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue 
that modern societies have many institutionalized rules, which provide a 
framework for the creation and elaboration of formal organizations.  
 
Institutional theory emphasizes on the idea that organizations are more than 
a means to produce goods and services – they are also social and cultural 
systems. It, therefore, suggests that organizations, and organizational actors, 
do not only seek to compete for resources, but they ultimately seek 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). It stands to reason that many of the 
environmental forces on organizations are not based on efficiency or 
effectiveness, but on social and cultural pressures to conform to a given 
structural form (Scott, 2001). According to Scott (1987), the concept of 
‘institution’ generally refers to relatively enduring systems of social beliefs 
and socially organized practices associated with varying functional areas of 
societal systems such as religion, work, politics, laws, and regulations.   
 
Scott (2001) shows three different levels of analysis used by institutional 
theory. At the first level, there are societal (and global) institutions, where 
models and menus are both formally proposed and informally enacted. These 
provide the institutional context: what is deemed possible, acceptable, and 
legitimate. Such institutions shape, constrain and facilitate structures and 
actions at lower levels.  The second level looks at governance structures, 
which consists of the first of the three organizational fields (i.e., 
organizations operating in the same domain), and then of organizations 
themselves. The organizational level of analysis is also important as 
organizations vary by function, size, structure, culture, and capacity for 
change and they all influence, and are influenced by their organizational 
fields and institutional environments. At the third level, there are the actors in 
institutional settings who may be individuals or groups (Hartley el al, 2002) of 
which each level affects, and is affected by the forces of diffusion and 
imposition of institutional norms, while inventing new ways of operating and 
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 negotiating the establishment of institutional norms (Scott, 2001). Thus, the 
reasoning behind institutional theory is that all social actors are seeking 
legitimacy, and/or reinventing legitimacy norms, within the institutional 
environment (North, 1990). 
 
Davis (2005) argues from a sociological viewpoint that the most relevant and 
promising corporate governance research is the one that seeks to understand 
the institutional context in which it occurs. For instance, Deeg and Perez 
(2000) noted that the institutional dynamics within the European Union is 
contributing to the convergence of corporate governance practices there. 
Similarly, Groenwegen (2004) suggests that institutional economics is shifting 
its focus from firms and individuals to institutional environments to better 
explain corporate governance behaviour and results. According to Aguillera et 
al. (2006), giving some recognition to the idea that firms operate from within 
a given society and political tradition, which invariably influences decision-
making within the firm, leads to the conceptualization of corporate 
governance as relationships within the firm and between the firm and its 
environment. It is argued that multiple institutions interact to influence the 
perceived legitimacy of corporate governance practices within a nation 
(Aguillera  et al.,  2006). This is supported by the call by the OECD (2006) 
advocating for pluralism, adaptability and flexibility in corporate governance 
to suit peculiar requirements of individual countries. This indeed lends 
credence to cultural relativism, which argues that the standards of conduct 
vary with the norms and values of the host country; thence, there is no single 
moral standard, only local moral practice (Dellaportas et al., 2005). Corporate 
governance practices afford various nations the necessary reputation and 
acceptance in the global economy, thus, neo-institutional theory is concerned 
with social legitimization processes and outcomes.   
 
According to the institutional-linkage perspective, the primary role of the 
governing board is to link the hospital to its external environment (Pfeffer, 
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 1973). It views the establishment of external environmental linkages as 
necessary for the procurement of inputs that organizations require to survive. 
Pfeffer (1972) observed that the size, composition, and function of hospital 
governing boards were related to the organizations’ external resource needs. 
Prior research suggests that the structure of a hospital’s governing board 
depends both on the institution’s concern with the effective management of 
external linkages and its internal efficiency goals (Pfeffer, 1973; Kaufman et 
al., 1979). 
 
However this current study tackles the issue of external linkages using 
external directors and their connections and expertise as suggested by the 
resource dependency theory. Institutional theory is not used in this study 
because, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no studies in 
healthcare governance in Ghana to draw comparisms on. Drawing from the 
definition of institutional theory as "Policy-making that emphasizes the formal 
and legal aspects of government structures"(Kraft public policy, 2007), there are 
no governance codes or legal framework for corporate governance in Ghana 
to contextualize this study, thus, this study is not hinged on institutional 
theory. 
 
4.2.4  Managerialism Theory  
The rather divergent views of who should or should not be on a governing 
board has received so much attention leading to the formulation of two 
important perspectives that offer varying explanations regarding the role of 
insiders on a governing board as explained by the managerial and agency 
theories.  The managerialist perspective believes that having top-level 
management being part of the governing board enhances board decision-
making and effectiveness. This perspective argues that informational 
advantages necessary to keep boards informed and capable of making sound 
decisions is provided when there is insider board participation (Molinari et al, 
1995). Molinari et al.  (1995) continue to argue that boards need the 
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 knowledge and information of top-level insiders who are involved in the day-
to-day running of the firm to guide board members in operational decision-
making and governance activities. Thus, insiders’ knowledge and experience 
will afford the board the ability to monitor and govern the firm more 
effectively (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
 
Hospital boards typically include the CEO as well as medical staff members. 
The CEO on the board is expected to provide administrative information 
concerning the hospital, while the medical staff members keep the board well 
informed about the hospital's service and delivery issues (Molinari  et al., 
1995).  Other theorists like Eisenberg (1976), however, disagree with this 
position and indicate that insider board participation poses informational 
asymmetries that can  lead to opportunistic board decision-making  (Moe, 
1984). The potential for opportunistic behavior through insider board 
participation is explained by the agency theory in the sense that insider board 
participation results in conflict of interest between management and 
shareholders, thereby seriously impeding the core responsibility of the 
governing board to protect the interest and wealth of shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Molinari et al., 1995). 
 
Medical staff representation on the board may include inside and outside 
physicians. Inside physician board members are physicians who are medical 
staff members of the particular hospital, whereas outside physician board 
members are physicians who are not staff members of the particular hospital. 
Molinari  et al. (1995) suggest that medical staff members’ knowledge 
regarding the clinical aspects of the hospital, as well as their ability to 
influence the board’s decision-making through their voting privileges, is likely 
to lead to clinically and fiscally sound board decisions. Therefore, hospitals 
with medical staff participation on the board are expected to be more 
effective than those without medical staff participation. Also, in the case of 
hospital boards with medical staff participation, boards with voting medical 
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 staff participation are more effective than those without voting medical staff 
representation. Thus, an effective hospital board is expected to include 
medical staff participation. 
 
4.2.5  Stakeholder Theory  
The broader determining factors affecting the governance of both private and 
public sector organizations are said to be indirectly attributable to the 
changing environment in which organizations operate. It is suggested that an 
important part of this changing environment involves an increased level of 
social obligations and third party interest in organizations, which extend the 
obligations from a single shareholder to multiple stakeholders. Freeman 
(1984) proposed stakeholder theory for the strategic management of 
organizations in the late twentieth century. Later from this period, this theory 
gained so much importance, with key works by Clarkson (1995), Donaldson 
and Preston (1995), Mitchell et al. (1997), Rowley (1997) and Frooman (1999) 
giving rise to greater theoretical depth and development. Thus, the theory 
evolved over the years and has been adopted by many organizations as a 
management tool (see Mainardes, et. al. 2011). Other studies reiterate the 
need for organizations to go beyond the traditional pool of shareholders and 
consider new external stakeholders in legitimizing new forms of managerial 
understanding and action (Jonker and Foster, 2002). Until recently, hospital 
governance was mainly  about managing structure and infrastructure, 
departments and divisions, but looking into the future, the main focus will be 
on the care requirements of the patient and the needs of other stakeholders 
(Eeckloo, et al., 2004).    
 
It is important that organizations, in satisfying all stakeholders of an 
organization, recognize the interest of these stakeholders and address them 
through appropriate strategies (Christopher, 2010). Stakeholder theory is in 
line with the evolution of corporate governance, whereby the concept was 
broadened to include not just shareholders, but all stakeholders of the 
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 organization. This theory operates on the premise that managers will treat 
the interests of all stakeholders as if they have intrinsic value to the firm. It is 
also assumed that no one set of interests will dominate over another (Murphy 
and O’Donohoe, 2006; Jamali, 2008).  
 
Some authors have provided insights to the various stakeholders and the 
increased pressures on corporations to respond to stakeholders. The 
organization’s stakeholders may include workers, suppliers, clients, owners, 
and society who tend to have an interest in the operation of the organization 
(see Simmons 2004).  According to Waddock  et al.  (2002),  the pressure to 
reform stakeholder related practices was expected because of changing social 
trends and institutional expectations. Waddock  et al. (2002)  categorized 
these stakeholders as primary and secondary. The primary stakeholders 
include employees who are particular about where to work and customers 
who are also mindful of purchasing from responsible and socially conscious 
companies. Important secondary stakeholders include non-government 
organizations (NGOs), activists, communities and governments.  The 
pressures from such secondary stakeholders were suggested as arising out of 
a growing concern for human rights standards, labour standards and 
environmental concerns. Berry and Rondinelli (1998)  also suggest that 
stakeholder interests from governments,  customers, employees and 
competitors are necessary to arrive at socially responsible decisions. Cobb et 
al.  (2005)  noted that there was a strong relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. It is argued these levels of 
stakeholder interests for corporate social responsibility predominantly existed 
in developed countries where such stakeholder rights were supported by 
strong government regulations and stringent legal liabilities for non-
compliance (Christopher, 2010). 
 
Stakeholder theory suggests that the composition of the board should 
consider representatives of all interested parties in order to ensure consensus 
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 among stakeholders. The board is a mechanism for addressing conflicts and 
creating the necessary cohesion. The representation of all stakeholder groups 
on boards is, therefore, necessary for effective corporate governance 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Luoma and Goodstein (1999)  found that 
corporations were under increased pressure to include stakeholders such as 
suppliers, customers, employees and members of the public on their board of 
directors. They suggest that this pressure was in response to the need for 
corporations to deal more effectively with public and government scrutiny. 
They also suggest that the pressure was as a result of the adoption of 
statutes that gave the board the right to consider the interest of non-
shareholder interests as well as the growing size and complexity of today’s 
modern corporation. Donaldson and Preston (1995) as cited in Gay (2002) 
argue that there are three key aspects to the stakeholder theory: descriptive, 
instrumental and normative. The descriptive aspect aims to illustrate that the 
theoretical underpinnings of the theory correspond to reality. The next is the 
instrumental aspect which tries to show a link between the stakeholder theory 
and organizational performance. Finally, the normative aspect is concerned 
with the moral groundings of the stakeholder theory. 
 
The stakeholder theory provides the basis for managers to understand the 
various needs of the extended stakeholder base and reconcile it with the 
various purposes of the organization. This enables them to maximize 
stakeholder value. Stakeholder theory addresses and recognizes that 
organizations have a myriad of stakeholders and then seeks to integrate their 
needs through the creation of multiple objectives There are, however, 
differing definitions and views on who stakeholders really are, and also 
exactly which stakeholders’ interests are most important and deserve the 
urgent attention of managers or board (see Mitchell et.al,1997). It is argued 
that this theory is particularly important for developing and implementing 
adequate governance mechanisms and processes relative to the broader 
environmental influences and interdependencies of organizations with various 
internal and external stakeholders (Christopher, 2010). 
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Vincent-Jones et al. (2009) suggested that public participation initiatives in 
healthcare are considered part of a new trend in democratic societies towards 
an increased role for citizens and service-users in public services governance. 
Representation of community stakeholders on boards is essential and given 
the changes in the market, strategic thinking may be a critical activity. 
Therefore, board members are likely to support strategic activities that are 
compatible with their backgrounds and the interests of the populations they 
represent. In many communities, hospital boards are the only and most 
influential venue for local community leaders to affect healthcare decision-
making (Alexander et al., 2001). Hospital board members must therefore be 
seen as community advocates.   
 
 
4.2.6  Resource Dependency Theory  
The resource dependency theory assumes that organizations have some 
active roles to play in responding to external or environmental influences by 
focusing specifically on the availability of the necessary expertise and know-
how within the organization to appropriately respond to these influences and 
sometimes agitations from the environment within which the organization 
operates (Fennell and Alexander, 1987; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The 
resource dependency theory posits that the ability of organizations to operate 
under an environment of complexity associated with its wider 
interdependencies is directly related to the quality and effectiveness of the 
directors who make up the board or its ‘board capital’ (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al. 2000). The board’s human 
capital resources are accrued from the collective experience and expertise of 
board members, which includes insiders with knowledge of company strategy 
and operations. It also includes business experts with knowledge of corporate 
strategy, support specialist with knowledge of legal and regulatory affairs, 
community inﬂuential with knowledge, and relationships with external 
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 stakeholders, including the government and local communities (Hillman et al., 
2000). It is, therefore, argued that firms are better off with large boards, as 
each new board member brings both expertise and access to resources. 
Having more board members would, therefore, provide the firm with greater 
expertise and access to resources. These resources could include access to 
markets, access to new and better technologies, and access to raw materials 
among other things (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002).  
 
Bear  et al.  (2010) indicated in their study among other theories that the 
resource dependence theory provides a broad theoretical underpinnings for 
how board diversity and composition inﬂuence ratings for CSR and how, in 
turn, CSR inﬂuences corporate reputation. The resource dependence theory is 
said to offer the rationale for the board’s function of providing critical 
resources to the ﬁrm including legitimacy, advice, and counsel (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). In the same study, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) add that the 
ability of the board to perform their monitoring function will depend on 
having the appropriate mix of experience and capabilities to evaluate 
management and assess business strategies. These board resources offer the 
corporation support in understanding and responding to its environment 
(Boyd, 1990). 
 
It is argued that firms  are better off with large boards. Each new board 
member brings both expertise and access to resources. Having more board 
members would, therefore, provide the firm with greater expertise and access 
to resources. These resources could include access to markets, access to new 
and better technologies, and access to raw materials among other things. 
Large boards are more likely to contain directors with greater diversity in 
education and industry experience. This diversity allows the board members 
to provide management with high quality advice (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
According to Christopher (2010), directors must be equipped with the skills, 
knowledge and expertise to be able to build effective external relationships 
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 and secure adequate resources to address the interest of these multiple 
stakeholders and wider environmental impacts under current operating 
condition. Prior studies indicate a positive correlation between board capital 
and firm performance (Pfeffer, 1972; Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al., 1999). Others  
(see Daily et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Singh et al., 1986; Hillman et al., 
2000) show that directors who bring value or resources to an organization are 
able to improve the effective operation of an organization, and therefore, 
enhance organizational performance and prospects for survival. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) saw the service role of directors 
as enhancing the company reputation, establishing contacts with the external 
environment and serving as council to executives.  
 
The resource dependence approach, developed by Pfeffer (1972), and Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978), emphasizes that external directors enhance the ability of 
a firm to protect itself against the external environment, reduce uncertainty, 
and/or co-opt resources that increase the firm’s ability to raise funds or 
increase its status and recognition. It is also argued that a board composed of 
influential members from the organization’s external environment performs a 
boundary-spanning function that absorbs uncertainty, reduces operational 
dependencies, exchanges information, represents the organization to 
external stakeholders, and enhances overall performance (Middleton, 1987). 
Firms attempt to reduce the uncertainty of outside influences to ensure the 
availability of resources necessary for their survival and development. The 
board is, hence, seen as one of a number of instruments that may facilitate 
access to resources critical for company success. There are four primary types 
of broadly defined resources provided by boards of directors. These are: (1) 
advice, counsel, and know-how; (2) legitimacy and reputation; (3) channels for 
communicating information between external organizations and the firm; and 
(4) preferential access to commitments or support from important actors 
outside the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
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 In the case of hospitals, the resource dependency theory may also explain the 
relevance of having medical staff on the hospital board. The hospital board 
typically includes medical staff members who are expected to keep the board 
informed about the hospital’s service and delivery issues (Medical Leadership 
Forum, 1992). Considering the increasingly complex environment in which 
organizations operate and an increasingly competitive environment, there 
seem to be the need for skilled directors to steer organization in the right 
direction. The resource dependency theory also has obvious implications for 
the size, diversity, and composition of boards of directors and implications 
for the selection and profile of senior managers and the consequent 
governance processes in the furtherance of effective governance (Christopher, 
2010). Thus, the impact of such a high quality board of directors is an 
improvement in the entire efficiency of the organization, thus minimizing cost 
(Williamson, 1984). 
 
In view of the complexity of the issues confronting the healthcare sector, 
healthcare governance can best be understood and adequately investigated 
when looked at under the lenses of multi-theoretical stances.  
 
4.3  Conceptual Framework  
Following the discussion of the extant literature, this study pulls together the 
issues raised in a multi-theoretical framework as illustrated in Figure 4.1 to 
guide the empirical investigation. The constructed framework shows the 
relevant theoretical stances in explaining the governance of organizations, 
especially hospitals. Managerialism theory, stakeholder theory, and resource 
dependency  theory  tend to provide better explanation to the effects of 
hospital governance and ownership structure on performance and therefore, 
this study focuses on these three theoretical perspectives. The following is a 
discussion of the main tenets of each of these selected theories. 
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 Managerialism theory argues for the need to have top-level management as 
part of the board, since that enhances board decision-making and 
effectiveness. This theory argues that because management is involved in the 
daily operation of the organization, they are capable of providing adequate 
and useful information to guide the board in its work. Hospital boards should 
typically include the CEO and inside medical staff members who are expected 
to provide administrative information concerning the hospital and also keep 
the board well informed about issues regarding the hospital’s service delivery 
(Molinari et al., 1995). Stakeholder theory suggests a good representation of 
all the stakeholders of organization on the board to ensure its effective 
functioning and the composition of the board should consider representatives 
of all interested parties, in order to ensure consensus among stakeholders. 
The theory indicates that representation of all stakeholder groups on boards 
is,  therefore,  necessary for effective governance of the organization. 
Hospitals are likely to have board with representations from several 
stakeholder groups (Eeckloo et al., 2004; Christopher, 2010).  
Resource dependency theory also suggests the relevance of board members 
in terms of the skill, knowledge and expertise they bring to bear in order to 
build effective external relationships and secure adequate resources for the 
operation of the organization and to address the interest of the multiple 
stakeholders. One way to attain this is by having outside board members. The 
theory suggests the need for a wider board because each board member 
brings expertise and access to resources. Also, larger boards tend to have 
directors with greater diversity in experience and management could benefit 
from such diversity in the form of quality advice. Hospitals tend to have board 
members from diverse background and expertise. Proponents of the resource 
dependence theory argue that external directors enhance the ability of an 
organization to protect itself against the external environment, reduce 
uncertainty, or co-opt resources that increase the organization’s ability to 
raise funds or increase its status and recognition (see Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Middleton, 1987).  
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 The extant literature also indicates that the performance of hospitals is 
explained by their governing board characteristics (i.e.,  board size, board 
composition, board participation by medical staff, board leadership structure, 
board diversity, and frequency of board meetings), their ownership structure, 
and standard control factors (i.e.,  age, size, location). These board 
characteristics flow from the relevant theoretical stances. Board size is related 
to the stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory, which suggest the 
need for large board size to enhance performance. However, recent thinking 
is leaning towards small boards because they are said to be more efficient 
than larger ones. Smaller hospital boards tend to focus more on their role 
within the system and recent empirical studies support the view that higher 
performing hospitals have smaller board size (Gu et al., 2010; Büchner, 
2012).  
 
Board composition is explained by the managerialism theory, and resource 
dependency theory. Managerialism proposes that inside directors are in a 
better position than outside directors to motivate managers in order to 
enhance performance. Inside management tend to have better insights about 
the operation of the hospital and therefore are in a better position to drive 
performance. The resource dependence theory supports this, by arguing that 
external directors enhance the ability of an organization to protect itself 
against the external environment, reduce uncertainty, or attract more 
resources and thereby increases its performance. Board participation by 
medical staff is linked to both the managerialism and resource dependency 
theory. Hospitals are said to benefit from involving inside or outside 
physicians as this leads to enhanced performance. Apart from the operational 
knowledge they bring to bear, medical staff can refer their private practice 
patients to the hospital, thereby serving as patient referral links. Also, outside 
physician board members help to keep hospital boards informed regarding 
developments in patient care and practices. 
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 The literature suggests that a board leadership structure where the CEO also 
acts as chairperson may lead to conflict of interest among the leadership. 
Therefore, a board where the CEO’s role is separated from that of the board 
chairperson is preferred. Stakeholder theory argues that CEO duality hinders 
the overall stakeholder orientation of board members. Therefore, separating 
the role of the CEO and board chair may lead to improvement in the board’s 
monitoring and control, and therefore enhance performance. Board diversity 
may also flow from the resource dependency theory based on the experiences 
and perspectives women bring to bear in boardroom discussions. Diversity on 
the hospital board is important in order to increase effectiveness and 
competitiveness  as suggested  that having a diverse board with female 
representation result in improved performance. Diversity in terms of gender 
could also indicate the hospital’s way of reflecting its consumers/patients and 
the community it serves and this can be explained by the stakeholder theory. 
Hospital boards are said  to recruit the most talented, dedicated, and 
accomplished people, and increasingly those people tend to be women with 
different perspectives, experiences, social network relationships, and 
problem-solving approaches. Frequency of board meetings is also identified 
as an important board characteristic since it ensures that the board receives 
relevant information on the hospital to enable it to make useful decisions that 
will enhance performance. Frequency of board meetings can be explained by 
the resource dependency theory,  in the sense that, by having relevant 
information on regular basis, board members are better informed to 
contribute positively to the operations of the hospital and also assist in 
providing relevant resources to the hospital. 
 
It is crucial therefore, to note that although individual theories have generally 
been useful in explaining some motivations for corporate governance 
practices and structures, they have been limited in their individual ability to 
fully explain the various motivations influencing different governance 
structures (see  Christopher, 2010; Chen and Roberts, 2010;  Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2012).  This study examines how the hospital board 
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 characteristics affect performance, and given that the various hospitals board 
characteristics are explained by managerialism theory, stakeholder theory, 
and resource dependency theory, it is appropriate to adopt a multi-theoretical 
approach.  From the discussion  on how the different theoretical stances 
underpin the relevance of the various hospital  board characteristics, it  is 
shown  that no one individual theory adequately explains the hospital 
governance characteristics. Considering the limitations with each of these 
theoretical stances, adopting  a multi-theoretical framework is useful as 
illustrated in prior studies (see Christopher, 2010; Chen and Roberts, 2010; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2012).  Using  a  multi-theoretical framework  is even 
more relevant for understanding the  governance  structures of hospitals, 
considering the complexities of issues in healthcare governance. Therefore, 
this study adopts a combined or multi-theoretical framework as it provides a 
stronger basis for explaining  the effects of healthcare governance and 
ownership structure on the performance of hospitals within the Ghanaian 
context.  
 
Figure 4.1: Multi-Theoretical Framework for Healthcare Governance, 
Ownership and Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant Theoretical Stances  
Managerialism theory 
Stakeholder theory 
Resource dependency theory 
Board Characteristics 
Board size 
Board composition 
Medical staff participation 
Board leadership structure  
Board diversity 
Frequency of meetings 
 
 
Hospital 
performance 
Ownership Structure 
Public hospital  
Not-for-profit hospital 
For-profit hospital 
Control Factors 
Hospital size 
Hospital age 
Location 
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Source: constructed by author 
 
In terms of hospital ownership structure, it is expected (as shown in Figure 
4.1) that the different ownership forms may exhibit variations in performance 
given the differences in the hospitals’ objectives and mission. It is also 
expected that the various ownership forms can interact with hospital board 
characteristic in order to influence performance of the hospitals. With respect 
to the control variables, it is expected that smaller and older hospitals may 
perform better than their larger and younger counterparts. Also, hospitals 
located in the urban centres are more likely to perform  better than those 
located outside the urban communities. The literature points to the fact that, 
the performance of hospital could be influenced by the adoption of good 
hospital governance structures. It may also depend on the hospitals’ 
ownership structure and other control factors.  
 
4.4  Hypotheses Formulation 
This chapter provides a framework for analyzing the effects of hospital 
governing boards, ownership structure, and control factors on the 
performance of hospitals. The extant literature suggests that the performance 
of hospitals is influenced by the presence of hospital board. Hospital 
performance is also explained by hospital board characteristics, hospital 
ownership structure, and other control variables. In the light of the above 
discussions, a  number of specific hypotheses are formulated to test the 
effects of the presence of hospital board, board characteristics, ownership 
structure, and control factors on the performance of hospitals. 
 
4.4.1  Presence of Hospital Board 
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 The presence of hospital board is very important in affecting the performance 
of hospitals. Hospital governance is said to be the process of steering the 
overall functioning and effective performance of a hospital by defining its 
mission, setting objectives and having them realized at the operational level 
(Flynn, 2002; Eeckloo et al.,  2004). Hospital boards serve as an important 
component of healthcare governance and they play a crucial role in the 
healthcare delivery system. The hospital board is accountable for the overall 
performance of the hospital and also contributes in shaping the health facility 
they represent. Their functions include fundraising, establishing operating 
procedures, enlisting the support of others, budgeting and fiscal control, and 
balancing the organization with differing viewpoints (Fenn, 1971). They act as 
policy makers, focusing on establishing mission and a strategic direction for 
the hospital; others assume the role of boundary spanners, focusing on 
building and maintaining relations with key external constituencies and 
fundraising; while still others devote much of their time and attention to 
overseeing the performance of the hospital and its management team 
(Widmer, 1993).  
 
The hospital board also plays an important role in providing service quality. 
According to Lister (2006), the board has a key role in establishing policies 
and guidelines that help to drive the quality transformation process. The 
board ensures that the clinical and organizational initiatives in place to 
enhance quality and safety are ongoing processes and involve long-term 
effort to improve services and healthcare outcomes (Braithwaite, 2008) and 
move the quality agenda forward (Becker 2006; Pomey et al., 2008). Sandrick 
(2007) suggests that, the board should serve as the driving force behind all 
quality and safety efforts in the organization.Based on the discussion on the 
importance of hospital board in influencing performance, it is hypothesized 
that: 
 
H
1a:  The presence of hospital board is related to higher performance.  
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 H
1b:  The presence of hospital board is related to lower performance. 
 
4.4.2  Board Size 
Board size is the number of board members on the hospital board. The size 
of the hospital board is said to affect the performance of the hospital. Some 
researchers (see de Andrés-Alonso et al., 2009) believe that larger boards are 
capable of delivering better performance. This is believed to be accounted for 
by the increased range of expertise larger boards present in reaching 
decisions. Also, larger boards make it difficult for powerful CEOs to have their 
way. Zahra and Pearce (1989) for instance argue that board size is said to be 
associated with a wide range of expertise on the board and the breadth of 
participation in decision-making. This position is based on the resource 
dependency theory which seems to suggest the availability of skill, knowledge 
and expertise they bring to bear in order to build effective external 
relationships and secure adequate resources for the operation of the 
organization found within larger boards (Christopher,  2010). The 
stakeholders theory also points to need to consider all interested parties in 
the constituting the board to ensure representativeness  (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). 
 
It is,  however,  argued that larger boards are detrimental to performance. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) for instance suggest that large boards tend to 
reduce effectiveness, thereby allowing powerful CEOs to exert some level of 
control.  In examining whether the size and occupational configuration of 
hospital governing boards were related to the institutions’ efficiency and 
quality of care, Kaufman et al. (1979) found that larger boards were 
associated with higher costs. In the view of Jensen (1993), maintaining small 
boards can help improve their performance and that larger boards are less 
likely to function effectively. The argument is that larger boards are said to 
increase coordination costs and free-rider problems.  Smaller boards are 
therefore preferred. Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Kosnik (1990) explain 
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 that accountability by directors is increased with smaller boards. In examining 
the governance structures of healthcare organizations as reported by 
healthcare leaders, Delbecq and Gill (1988) found that large boards are not 
appropriate for the purpose of developing timely and strategic policies. Bader 
(1991) found that boards are able to function better when they have a 
workable board size and  that the health system works best with lean 
governing boards having the average of seven to ten members. Gu et al. 
(2010) found that higher performing hospitals tended to have smaller boards. 
In her study of German hospitals, Büchner (2012) observed that board size 
should not exceed a critical threshold, because a large board might delay 
decisions, thus adversely affect performance. A small board size ensures that 
the board members focus more on their role within the hospital system, thus, 
it is hypothesized that: 
 
H
2a:  Larger Board size is associated with lower hospital performance.   
H
2b:  Larger Board size is associated with higher hospital performance.           
4.4.3  Board Composition  
Board composition is the percentage of outsiders on the hospital board. The 
issue is whether to rely on more outside (or more inside directors). The 
argument in support of having inside directors is that, they are familiar with 
activities of the organization and serve as monitors to top management. 
Jermias (2007) suggests that board independence has a negative effect on 
innovative efforts and performance. His finding agrees with the theory of 
managerialism, which posits that inside directors are able to motivate 
managers better than outside directors  to undertake profitable projects 
because they have superior access to firms’ specific information. Others such 
as Delbecq and Gill (1988) and Molinari et al. (1993) argue that having a high 
proportion of directors with business-related occupations enables the board 
to receive up-to-date operational information and financial and strategic 
expertise.  
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Other studies (see Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), however, seem to suggest 
that, outside directors are rather active in influencing performance. Having a 
high  proportion of non-executive directors is likely to increase the 
independence of the board and this provides a better forum for decision-
making. It is also believed that board-monitoring quality will be stronger with 
more external or non-executive directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that board members especially outside directors have the incentive to develop 
reputations as experts in corporate decision-making, and this aspiration 
commits them into making quality decisions. Generally, the board is said to 
be more independent when it has a higher percentage of outside directors.  
 
Some researchers have pointed to the important role of outside directors in 
monitoring and advising, both of which have the tendency of enhancing 
performance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994). Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990), and Gautam and Goodstein (1996) explain that outside 
directors are necessary to adequately monitor top management's 
performance. Dalton et al., (1999) argue that, the independence of directors 
is an essential requirement for board effectiveness. Others such as Conger et 
al. (2001) and Ibrahim et al. (2007) show that, inside directors’ work for the 
CEO and therefore, are reluctant to oppose and challenge strategic proposals 
of the CEO. This has the tendency of adversely affecting performance. On the 
other hand, increasing the number of outside directors on the board, result in 
enhanced board effectiveness and better performance of the organization 
they govern. Board composition enhances board monitoring and 
effectiveness,  which could lead to improved performance.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H
3a: A board composed of a higher proportion of outsiders is   
     related to higher performance. 
126 
 H
3b: A board composed of a higher proportion of outsiders is   
     related to lower performance. 
 
4.4.4  Board Participation by Medical Staff 
The participation by medical staff on the hospital board is also important in 
influencing performance. From the theoretical viewpoints of managerialism 
and resource dependency, hospitals benefit from involving inside or outside 
physicians in their governance structures. Apart from technical/ operational 
knowledge of the hospital, medical staff can also serve as patient referral 
links. Equally so, outside physician board members inform board members 
about patient care issues and practices. Both theories provide reasonable 
explanations underlying the enhanced hospital performance of boards with 
inside or outside physician participation (Molinari et al., 1995). It is argued 
that participation of medical staff on the board is important in reducing 
potential conflict between the goals of the system and those of the medical 
groups and this may align the interests of the organization and affiliated 
physicians. Also, having medical staff being represented on the board enables 
members gain necessary information about the internal efficiency of the 
hospital (Young et al., 1992; Alexander et al., 1995). Medical personnel are 
usually interested in delivering quality healthcare and therefore their presence 
on the hospital board should enhance quality healthcare (Gardner, 1992; 
Gautam and Goodstein, 1996). Ibrahim et al. (2007) also argue that board 
members with healthcare background are more interested in the immediate 
need to deliver quality services. Shortell and LoGerfo (1981) found that 
medical staff board participation improves hospital quality outcomes such as 
surgical mortality rates.  
 
Prior studies have shown that hospitals with medical staff participation on the 
hospital board tend to exhibit better performance (see Molinari et al., 1993; 
Molinari et al., 1995; Goes and Zhan, 1995; Prybil, 2006; Gu et al., 2010). 
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 Goes and Zhan (1995) also observed an improvement in hospital performance 
when physicians are members of the board of directors of the hospital. In a 
study of hospitals in California by Molinari  et al.  (1993), they found that 
medical staff board participation has a significantly greater influence on 
hospital performance. They also indicated that medical personnel on the 
board were given voting privileges that had greater influence on the 
performance of the hospital as compared to non-voting medical participation. 
In their other study, Molinari  et al.  (1995) found that participation of 
physicians on the hospital board has a significantly positive effect on hospital 
operating margin. They explain that physician involvement in hospital 
governance results in positive benefits to the hospital. Prybil (2006) also 
found that high performing hospitals had a greater proportion of medical 
staff voting members. Gu et al. (2010) confirmed in their study that hospitals 
that have greater percentage of physicians on the hospital board tend to 
show higher performance. However,  others  hold a contrary view on the 
relevance of involving physicians on hospital boards. This practice is 
criticized on the basis that there could be a potential conflict of interest for 
physician  board members. In recent times, when hospitals develop more 
closely aligned economic relationships with some or all of the staff, the 
traditional, representational approach of selecting physician board members 
are coming into irreconcilable conflict (www.greatboards.org). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H
4a:  A board consisting of a higher proportion of medical staff   
       is associated with higher hospital  performance. 
H
4b:  A board consisting of a higher proportion of medical staff   
       is associated with lower hospital  performance. 
 
4.4.5  Board Leadership Structure  
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 Board leadership structure also influences hospital performance. The board 
leadership structure or CEO duality is looked at in terms of the position of the 
CEO on the hospital board. The hospital board typology may be such that the 
CEO also serves as the chairman of the board or it may be such that two 
different persons occupy the positions of CEO and board chair. McDonagh et 
al. (2006) explain that the CEO plays a unique role, as he represents both 
management and governance, which makes the issue of leading the board 
even more critical. They suggest that the CEO’s important role helps in 
attaining good board performance. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest 
that the presence of the CEO on key committees is likely to increase board 
monitoring. Orlikoff (2005) argues that the CEO has a greater responsibility 
on his shoulders in ensuring a cordial relationship with the board considering 
the challenges healthcare boards face currently. Orlikoff describes the board 
as a very complicated one in the sense that the CEO plays a dual role: both 
leading and reporting to the board. The board is composed of many unique 
individuals; some boards interact as partners and leaders, while others as 
followers. This variation and complexity requires skilled leadership in order to 
bring about the board's effectiveness. This is supported by the managerialism 
theory, which recognizes the role of the CEO  in  the daily  running of the 
hospital and the need to be part of the hospital board. This is important for 
the board to receive regular updates on operational and administrative issues 
to be able to take well-informed decisions.  
 
The question, therefore, is whether the CEO should equally serve as the board 
chair or the positions of CEO and chairperson are decoupled. The extant 
literature  recommends  a board leadership structure where two different 
people perform the roles of the CEO and board chairman and this has the 
tendency of enhancing board effectiveness, while CEO board duality adversely 
affects performance. The stakeholder theory supports the view that, for the 
interest of all various stakeholder of the hospital to be properly addressed, 
there must be separate people occupying the position of the chair of the 
board, and the position of the CEO (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  The 
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 separation of the two roles is also considered as good governance practice 
(Taylor, 2000; Christopher, 2010). However, this position is not supported by 
some studies like Rechner and Dalton (1991), who found that firms with CEO 
duality have stronger financial performance relative to other firms supporting 
the position is what the stewardship theory postulates. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H
5a:  Board leadership structure adversely affects hospital 
performance. 
H
5b:  Board leadership structure improves hospital performance.  
 
4.4.6  Board Diversity 
Board diversity  has  been identified as an important determinant of 
performance  with a number of studies suggesting that it can improve 
governance, performance and disclosure (Carter et al., 2003; Barako and 
Brown,  2008).  Board diversity  is  broadly defined to include the various 
attributes that may be represented among directors in the boardroom in 
relation to board decision-making (see Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). They 
grouped these attributes as those that are directly observable (age, gender, 
ethnicity, and nationality) and those that are less visible (religion, education 
and occupation) (see Mahadeo et al., 2012). 
 
In this study, board diversity is defined as the proportion of women  on  a 
hospital’s  board. Available literature suggests that firms would benefit by 
engaging women on their boards of directors (Burke 1994; Burke, 1997). 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) for instance noted that a representation of diverse 
interests, including the number of female and minority members, was an 
important characteristic of an effective board. According to Bilimoria (2000), 
having women on boards is desirable business practice because it is likely to 
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 improve the reputation on the firm, the strategic direction (by better 
understanding women’s issues that may impact on such direction) and also 
contribute positively to the firm’s female employees. Siciliano (1996) reports 
that, boards with increased gender diversity are more likely to enjoy high 
levels of social agency mission achievement. Burke (1997) found a 
significantly positive relationship between the number of females on boards 
and revenue and profit margins. Singh et al. (2001) also found that boards 
with female directors could be associated with higher revenue and 
profitability. This position is supported by another study by Carter et al. 
(2003) who found a positive relationship between board diversity and firm 
value.  
 
The importance of having women on hospital boards has gained so much 
recognition in recent times. Most hospital boards normally would like to 
employ the most talented, dedicated, and accomplished people, and 
increasingly these people are found to be women and people of colour with 
different perspectives, experiences, social network relationships, and 
problem-solving approaches. This increases the diversity of their boards and, 
hence,  hospital governance (and for that matter, hospital management), 
which many  recognize as not simply a moral or social issue, but also a 
question of effectiveness and competitiveness (Galindo, 2006). Elstad and 
Ladegard (2010) argue that the higher the proportion of females on the 
board, the greater the level of perceived influence, perceived social 
interaction outside the boardroom, and to some degree, perceived 
information sharing.  Governance experts caution against representational 
governance; so that if a woman is selected to be a member of a board it 
should be based on her qualifications and competence like all other board 
members, and not be based on her gender  (www.greatboards.org).  It  should 
therefore be  expected that boards  with  diverse gender background will 
improve board independence and enhance managerial monitoring and 
subsequently improve performance. Thus, the hypotheses are that:  
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 H
6a:  Board diversity on the basis of the proportion of female  
       representation is associated with higher hospital performance. 
H
6b:  Board diversity on the basis of the proportion of female  
       representation is associated with lower hospital performance. 
 
4.4.7  Frequency of Board Meetings 
The frequency of board meetings has been identified as an important 
determinant of performance. Board meetings are useful for the board to 
receive important information that helps it evaluate the performance of the 
firm through these meetings. A board’s authority is exhibited in the number 
of times it meets (Eeckloo et al., 2004). This means a board cannot be called 
a board with the mandate to make decisions and take action, when it is not 
meeting. In differentiating between good and great boards, it was concluded 
that exceptional boards make meetings matter (Board Source, 2005). It stands 
to reason that frequent board meetings are important to ensure the board’s 
effectiveness.  
 
Previous studies have found a positive relationship between number of board 
meetings and performance. For instance, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that 
most directors face the problem of lack of time to carry out their duties, and 
that board meeting time is an important resource in improving the 
effectiveness of a board. This position is supported by Vafeas (1999) who also 
suggests that frequent meeting is an important dimension of an effective 
board as operating performance of firms improves following years of 
increased board meetings. Culica and Prezio (2009),  however,  found that 
boards that met less than six times a year had higher marginal profit on 
average over three years than hospitals whose boards met more than 12 
times every year. This means meeting  between 7-12 times was associated 
with lower financial performance than having six or less meetings, but still 
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 significantly higher than the hospitals whose boards met more than once per 
month. Thus, holding a board meeting almost every month or more often was 
not a good method to increase performance. This finding could be explained 
by the reason that having meetings spaced out allowed for more time to get 
information in advance and prepare for meetings to improve organizational 
performance. The issue is whether the frequency of board meeting improves 
performance. It is therefore, hypothesized that: 
 
H
7a:  The frequency of board meetings is associated with higher  
        hospital performance. 
H
7b:  The frequency of board meetings is associated with lower hospital   
       performance. 
 
4.4.8  Hospital Ownership Structure 
The strategic focus of the hospital will have implications for performance. 
For-profits organizations have well-defined control rights, and they have 
strong incentive to invest in innovations, but they may over-emphasize cost 
control at the expense of non-contractible quality (Hart, 1995). For-profit 
organizations are presumably the most market oriented providers and would 
have higher incentives to introduce new services and technologies that attract 
more consumers (Banaszak-Holl et al., 1996). Government-owned providers 
lack clear control rights to implement changes on the other hand, and this 
constraint softens incentives for innovations. Not-for-profit firms have an 
objective function of maximizing quality, quantity and/or prestige (Newhouse 
1970), as well as maximizing net revenue (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998), 
helping to fulfill demand for local public goods (Weisbrod, 1988) or meet 
unmet need in the community (Frank and Salkever, 1991); or maximizing the 
well-being of specific important constituencies, such as the medical staff 
(Pauly and Redisch, 1973) or consumers (Ben-Ner and Gui, 1993).  
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Private hospitals have greater strategic flexibility, higher environmental 
sensitivity and higher demand for promoting market status (Goes and Park 
1997). Private hospitals do not have financial support from the government; 
hence, they have higher residual claimants to provide incentives for profit and 
further development (Kimberly and Evanisko,  1981; Young et al., 2001). 
Public hospitals on the other hand have the financial support of the 
government and have to take numerous policy-related responsibilities into 
consideration. Therefore, they tend to adopt a conservative and stable policy 
(Milgrom and Roberts,  1992). Price (1992) suggests that a high level of 
bureaucracy and lack of rapid reaction to market conditions lowers public 
hospitals’ innovation in healthcare. 
 
Rajshkha et al. (1991) suggest that private hospitals are wholly responsible 
for organizational performance in a competitive environment; hence;  they 
adopt or extend new medical technology proactively. Molinari et al. (1995) 
found that, for-profit chains had higher margins only for 1985. The steep 
recession for California hospitals during the latter 1980’s are negatively 
impacting margins for all ownership hospital types. Barros (2003) compared 
two hospitals and found that private hospital performed better than the 
public hospital. Weng et al. (2011) also found that private hospitals perform 
better than public hospitals. In this study, hospital ownership is defined in 
terms of not-for-profit hospitals (mission-based) hospitals, for-profit (private 
hospitals), and public hospitals. It is hypothesized that: 
 
H
8a: Not-for-profit (mission) and for-profit (private) hospitals perform  
     better than public hospitals.  
H
8b: Not-for-profit (mission) and for-profit (private) hospitals exhibit  
      lower performance than public hospitals.  
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4.4.9  Interaction Effects of Hospital Board Characteristics and 
Ownership  
Interaction effect looks at the effect of a combination of related features 
(independent variables). It is the combined effect of two treatment variables 
coupled with the individual main effects (Hair et al., 2009). This means that 
the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable is 
moderated by a third variable (the product term of the independent variables) 
(see Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). It is clear from the 
extant  literature that board characteristics and ownership structure are 
important in influencing the performance of hospitals. Though prior studies 
considered board characteristics and ownership structure as separate 
independent factors affecting performance, intuitively, it is expected that 
interacting these variables may have more significant effect on performance. 
The effects of board characteristics on hospital performance may be different 
under various ownership forms. In this study, board characteristics include 
board size, board composition, board participation by medical staff, board 
leadership structure, board diversity, and frequency of board meetings. 
Ownership structure in this study is a categorical variable, which consists of 
public hospitals, mission-based (not-for-profit) hospitals and private (for-
profit) hospitals where public hospitals is considered the reference point. 
Therefore, using public hospitals as the reference point, it is hypothesized 
that: 
 
H
9a:  The interactions of mission-based and private hospitals with board   
       characteristics yield better hospital performance than public  
      hospitals. 
H
9b:  The interactions of mission-based and private hospitals with board   
       characteristics yield lower hospital performance than public  
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       hospitals. 
 
4.5  Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the various governance theories with the justification 
for not basing this study on some of these theories. The conceptual 
framework,  which shows how the relevant  theoretical considerations, 
including managerialism theory, stakeholder theory, and resource 
dependency theory explain hospital governance  was also discussed. The 
managerialism theory argues for the need to have top-level management as 
part of the board since that enhances board decision-making and 
effectiveness. This theory argues that because management is involved in the 
daily operation of the organization, they are capable of providing adequate 
and useful information to guide the board in its work. Hospital boards should 
typically include the CEO and inside medical staff members who are expected 
to provide administrative information concerning the hospital and also keep 
the board well informed about issues regarding the hospital’s service 
delivery. The stakeholder theory suggests a good representation of all the 
stakeholders of organization on the board to ensure its effective functioning 
and the composition of the board should consider representatives of all 
interested parties in order to ensure consensus among stakeholders. The 
theory indicates that representation of all stakeholder groups on boards is, 
therefore, necessary for effective governance of the organization. Hospitals 
are likely to have board with representations from several stakeholder 
groups. The resource dependency theory also suggests the relevance of 
board members in terms of the skill, knowledge and expertise they bring to 
bear in order to build effective external relationships and secure adequate 
resources for the operation of the organization and to address the interest of 
the multiple stakeholders. The theory suggests the need for a wider board 
because each board member brings expertise and access to resources. Also, 
larger boards tend to have directors with greater diversity in experience and 
management could benefit from such diversity in the form of quality advice. 
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 Hospitals tend to have board  members from diverse background and 
expertise.  
 
The conceptual framework shows how these theories inform hospital board 
characteristics and subsequently on performance. The chapter also explahow 
the hypotheses  and alternative hypotheses  are developed to guide the 
empirical investigations. The hypotheses are specifically based on how the 
presence of hospital board, hospital board characteristics (i.e.,  board size, 
board composition, medical staff participation board leadership structure 
board diversity, and frequency of meetings), and  ownership structure, 
influence the performance of hospitals.  It is however to be noted that the 
reverse of the equation could also happen. In this case the governance 
structure and ownership forms are determined by how well or worse a 
hospital performs. Thus,  there  is  an element of endogeneity in all the 
hypotheses formulated. However this does not pose a problem in this study 
because the issue of endogeneity is particularly relevant in the context 
of time series analysis  of causal processes  (Greene, 2002). This  study 
examines the association of hospital performance  with  governance 
characteristics  and ownership structure in the midst of some control 
variables, and not necessarily causal effect between these variables. 
 
The main objective of this study is,  therefore,  to examine the effects of 
healthcare governing boards and ownership structure on the performance of 
hospitals from the perspective of a developing country like Ghana, which have 
been excluded in prior empirical studies. The next chapter describes the 
methodology adopted in this study.  
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter five discusses and describes the methodology used in this study. 
This study employs a quantitative research design in its data collection and 
analysis. The method of data analysis used in this study involves the use of 
multiple regression models in  investigating the effects of healthcare 
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 governance and ownership on the performance of hospitals in Ghana. This 
chapter includes the philosophical paradigm and justification for adopting 
quantitative research. The chapter explains the type of study conducted, the 
population and data source for the study, the data used in the study, and the 
sampling procedure. It also discusses issues of validity and reliability of the 
data, and the method used in analyzing the data. The ethical issues are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.2  Philosophical Paradigm and Justification. 
Philosophical paradigm deals with the belief or worldview about the way data 
on a phenomenon should be gathered and analyzed (Levin 1988). This study 
is based on the positivistic paradigm (also known as, experimentalist or 
traditionalist), which assumes that the world is external and independent of 
the researcher. Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that in 
the social as well as natural sciences, data derived from sensory experience, 
and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, are together the 
exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1988).  
 
Positivists are of the view that reality is stable and can actually be looked at 
and described from an objective and detached point without necessarily 
interfering with the phenomena being studied (Levin, 1988). This often 
involves manipulation of reality with variations in only a single independent 
variable so as to identify regularities in, and to form relationships between, 
some of the constituent elements of the social world.  The approach of 
positivism to the social world in social research is basically about combining 
deductive logic with empirical and mainly quantitative methods in order to 
seek generally applying regularities. Positivism focuses on measurement and 
depends on facts to discover social phenomena and relationships. Hypotheses 
testing and measurements are elements of this method of research (Payne 
and Payne, 2004). Interpretivism on the other hand shares the view that social 
science cannot be adequately studied using methods and tools in the natural 
139 
 sciences. This is because a research procedure should reflect the 
distinctiveness of humans against the natural order (Bryman, 2012). 
 
The study into healthcare governance, ownership structure, and performance 
of hospitals in Ghana was fundamentally motivated by the extant literature on 
general issues of corporate governance and its relationship with performance 
of firms and corporations. This subsequently resulted in the concept of 
corporate governance being incorporated into the healthcare sector due to 
rising concerns in the management and performance of healthcare 
institutions.  The existence of several theories on corporate and healthcare 
governance was also a push factor for formulating hypotheses (based on the 
theories) that were tested in the conduct of this study (positivist), rather than 
conducting the study based on personal experiences or observations of the 
actors to determine reality and build theories (interpretive), as described by 
Lofland and Lofland (1995), and Bryman (2012). This study sought to explain 
behavior in the healthcare sector (i.e.,  performance), which is a major 
positivist approach, and not necessarily to understand the behavior (hospital 
performance) as propagated by interpretivists. 
 
This study lends itself to the nomothetic approach to social science research, 
which focuses on the systematic protocols and techniques. It focuses on the 
process of testing hypotheses and is based on the construction of scientific 
tests and the use of quantitative techniques for analyzing data. The 
nomothetic methodology also comprises of tools such as surveys, 
questionnaires, personality tests and standardized research instruments 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1988). The justification for adopting a quantitative 
method in this study stems from the fact that it provides a framework for 
addressing the relationships among variables involved in the study. The use 
of quantitative research design is useful for dealing with a cause and effect 
relationship. The assumption is that there is a ‘reality’ out there worth 
investigating, and would involve searching for regularities and relationships 
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 between its composing elements. This study is equally based on the 
assumption that there are some factors within the hospital that contribute to 
the performance of the hospital (Burrell and Morgan, 1988). 
 
This study employs the use of the survey strategy and questionnaires for 
gathering and analysing the data to address its objectives. This is due to the 
large sample size of this study and is built on the basic positivist assumption 
that hypothesised regularities can be verified by an adequate experimental 
research program or falsified. Also, using a survey strategy gives the 
researcher more control over the research process and when sampling is 
used, it is possible to generate findings that are representative of the whole 
population (Saunders et al.,  2007). The philosophical approach adopted in 
this study was useful in dealing with the effects of hospital governance and 
ownership structure on hospital performance. 
 
5.3  Population and Data Source  
A population consists of all members of the group about which one would 
want to draw a conclusion. It refers to the individuals or items that share one 
or more characteristic from which data is been gathered and analyzed 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2010). In this study, our population includes all 
hospitals in Ghana. The data source is the list of all health facilities obtained 
from the Ministry of Health and at the time of this study, this comprised of 
three hundred and four (304) hospitals, one thousand, one hundred and 
twenty four (1,124) clinics, eleven (11) polyclinics, nine hundred and twenty 
seven (927) health centres, two hundred and fifty four (254) maternity homes, 
and eighty four (84) community health compounds in Ghana. The three 
hundred and four (304) hospitals were made up of one hundred and twenty 
two (122) public hospitals (with four being teaching hospitals), fifty-six (56) 
mission-based hospitals, and one hundred and twenty six (126) private 
hospitals. This study focused on the hospitals given that they have well-
organized structures and better record keeping systems. The list of hospitals 
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 obtained from the Ministry of Health was used to draw the sample for the 
study. 
 
5.4  Sampling and Data Collection Process 
The sampling process includes selecting a representative part of the 
population for the purpose of determining parameters or characteristics of 
the whole population (Cooper and Schindler, 2010). The sampling frame for 
this study included some hospitals in Ghana. The study started with the 
adoption of stratified sampling, which divided the population into a number 
of strata based on common attributes. The main advantage of using this 
approach is that, by dividing the population into a series of relevant strata the 
researcher is able to ensure that the sample is more likely to be 
representative and each of the strata is proportionally represented within the 
sample (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
In this study, the hospitals were classified  into three strata (i.e.,  public 
hospitals, not-for-profit or mission-based hospitals, and for-profit or private 
hospitals). Out of the total population of hospitals, questionnaires were sent 
to a little more than half of each stratum. The reason was to ensure that at 
least 50% of each stratum and for that matter the entire population was 
included in the sample. Specifically, the questionnaires were sent to eighty 
(80) public hospitals, forty (40) mission-based hospitals, and eighty (80) 
private hospitals. Out of the two hundred (200) hospitals contacted, 
responses were received from one hundred and thirty two (132) hospitals 
made up of 65 public, 31 mission-based, and 36 private hospitals. This was, 
however,  after several follow-ups and resending of the questionnaires to 
other hospitals either because management in these hospitals were willing to 
complete the questionnaire or because of proximity in terms of distance 
(regions),  and also, the use of research assistants to reach many more 
hospitals, in order to deal with the prevailing non response and increasing of 
the sample size. This situation arose because of the fact that the survey was 
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 completed by top management and executives of the hospitals, who were 
either busy and did not have time to respond to the questions, or simply did 
not want to disclose information regarding their governance practices and 
structure. The 132 hospitals represent 66% response rate. The resulting 
response rate was quite high for a survey of this type considering that 
empirical studies involving surveys have been known to generate far lesser 
percentage response rates. The high response rate could also be explained by 
the involvement of research assistants. The hospitals used in this study 
included those with hospital board structures and those without  hospital 
board structures. The rationale for including hospitals with a board structure 
and those without a board structure is to enable the researcher ascertain 
whether or not the presence of hospital board structures has any effect on 
hospital performance. Data on the healthcare governance was obtained from 
top management of the hospitals. 
 
The composition of the overall sample of hospitals for which responses were 
received is indicated in Table 5.1. Public hospitals represent 49.2% of the 
sample of hospitals for which responses were received. Not-for-profit or 
mission-based hospitals account for 23.5% of the sample, while for-profit or 
private hospitals represent 27.3% of the sample of hospitals for which 
responses were received for this study. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Composition of the Sample of Hospitals 
Hospital Type  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative 
Public hospitals  65  49.2  49.2 
Not-for-profit hospitals  31  23.5  72.7 
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 For-profit hospitals  36  27.3  100 
Total  132  100   
 
With respect to the health service quality data, the sample was based on thirty 
(30) randomly selected patients from each of the hospitals that were finally 
selected for the study. There is a rule of thumb of the choice of n = 30 for a 
boundary between small and large samples and for the purpose of estimating 
a mean, 30 observations is enough (see Hogg and Tanis, 2011).  Since the 
purpose of the health service quality data is for estimating the average 
SERVQUAL score, using a sample size of 30 is appropriate. Both in-patients 
and outpatients were sampled. The patients were provided with information 
and consent form and were assured of the confidentiality of the information 
collected. 
 
This study relied on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was 
obtained through questionnaire administration. This was followed up with 
personal,  as well as telephone interviews. Both closed and open-ended 
questionnaires  were used to allow for in-depth questioning and for 
respondents to be  able to express themselves. Secondary data was also 
obtained from existing hospital records, strategic documents, and board 
minutes. 
 
 
5.5  Validity and Reliability 
Validity deals with two issues and these are first, the extent to which the data 
collection methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure 
and second, the extent to which research findings are really about what they 
profess to be about (Saunders et al., 2007). Statistical instruments were used 
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 with the ultimate purpose being to ensure that questionnaire items have 
content validity and that the data collection methods accurately measure what 
they were intended to (Hinkin, 1995) To this end, the researcher made use of 
multiple and different sources of evidence. The researcher did solicit 
participants’ views of the credibility of the data collected and the findings and 
interpretations from the study. The researcher relied on some of the 
respondents who were useful in reviewing the findings and reports to ensure 
validity of the data and findings. Responses to the questionnaire were also 
crosschecked with hospital records to ensure that the information received 
was actually what existed in these hospitals. 
 
Reliability on the other hand addresses, the extent to which the data 
collection methods will yield consistent findings, and similar observations will 
be made or conclusions reached by other researchers, or whether there is 
transparency in how sense was made from the raw data. Reliability requires 
consistency in data and findings and it involves demonstrating that the data 
collection process and data produced can be repeated with the same results 
(Saunders et al., 2007). In this study, the data was collected with a survey 
tool. The original questionnaire was pre-tested among both officers 
considered expert in the area of knowledge of healthcare governance and 
managers representative of likely respondents (see Darroch, 2003). The 
responses were then coded and captured in STATA software version 11 for 
the analysis. This gives an outline of exactly how ‘sense’ was made out of the 
raw data for easy replication. Further statistical tools were used to ensure 
rigour of the study with regards  to its validity and reliability. These are 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.6  Method of Data Analysis  
Considering the quantitative method approach adopted in this study, the 
method of data analysis includes multiple regression approach. The study 
employs multiple regression models in investigating the effects of healthcare 
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 governance and ownership on performance of hospitals. Three main 
regression models were estimated. In the first model, the study focused on 
both hospitals with a hospital governing board and those without a board. 
The idea is to ascertain whether or not the existence or presence of hospital 
board, ownership structure and control factors affect performance of the 
hospitals. A dummy variable (HospBoardPresesnce) was introduced to define 
whether or not a particular hospital has a board in place. The first model is, 
therefore, stated succinctly as: 
 
          𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝗼 + 𝗽1(𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝗿2(𝑂𝑊𝑁) + 𝜔3(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) + 𝜀………1 
 
In the second model, the study limited the sample to only hospitals with 
board structures. Specifically, 91 of the hospitals had a governing board so 
these were used in determining how hospital board characteristics, ownership 
structure, and control factors affect hospital performance. Hospital board 
characteristics include board size, board composition, board participation by 
medical staff, board leadership structure, board diversity, and frequency of 
board meetings. This model is also stated as follows:  
 
          𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝗼 + 𝗽1(𝐻𝐵𝐶) + 𝗿2(𝑂𝑊𝑁) + 𝜔3(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) + 𝜀……….………………...2 
 
A third model is also estimated in order to examine the interaction effects of 
hospital board characteristics and ownership structure on performance. This 
also involves the 91 hospitals with boards and these hospital board 
characteristics are interacted with the ownership variable. The model is given 
as follows: 
 
           𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 = 𝗼 + 𝗽1(𝐻𝐵𝐶) + 𝗿2(𝑂𝑊𝑁) + 𝜃3(𝐻𝐵𝐶 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁) + 𝜔4(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) + 𝜀……3 
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5.6.1  Dependent Variable: Measures of Hospital Performance     
Previous studies examining the effect of hospital governance on performance 
in developed countries have tended to focus on financial performance given 
that these hospitals are motivated by profit (see Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; 
Molinari  et al., 1993; Molinari et al., 1995; McDonagh, 2006; Culica and 
Prezio, 2009). However, in the case of developing countries like Ghana, it is 
important to consider performance from the operational and service 
perspectives because most  hospitals are mostly public and mission-based 
hospitals with no profit motive.  
 
In this current study, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓  in the model is the dependent variable and it 
represents hospital performance. This is measured using four performance 
indicators and these are: occupancy, discharge, efficiency, and health service 
quality. These measures of performance are defined as follows: 
1.  Occupancy is defined as the ratio of average daily census to statistical 
beds.  
 
2.  Discharge  is the ratio of inpatients discharged to total  number of 
inpatients. 
 
3.  Efficiency is defined as the ratio of total expenses to statistical beds. 
 
4.  Health service quality is measured using the SERVQUAL scale. 
 
Occupancy, Discharge and Efficiency look at performance from the health 
providers’ point of view. Health service quality considers performance from 
the perspective of patients  and this is measured using the Parasuraman’s 
SERVQUAL scale adopted by Carman (1990), Cronin and Taylor (1992) and 
Çaha (2007) for the healthcare sector. SERVQUAL serves as the dependent 
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 variable in this study and is a vector of SERVQUAL scores. The SERVQUAL 
scale has 22 statements and consists of the following five dimensions: 
Tangibility (physical facilities, equipment and appearance of personnel), 
Assurance (courtesy and knowledge of staff and their ability to inspire trust 
and confidence), Responsiveness (willingness to help customers and provide 
prompt services), Reliability (ability to perform the expected service 
dependably and accurately), and Empathy (caring, individualized attention 
provided to customers). This study focused on only perception scores rather 
than the gap between perception and expectation given that in developing 
countries, like Ghana, most patients may not have an idea about ideal 
standards or expectations of service quality. 
 
Patients indicated the degree or extent of service quality of each item using a 
seven-point scale, with 1 denoting ‘Strongly Disagree’ and 7 representing 
‘Strongly Agree’. This format has been recommended for healthcare surveys 
(Elbeck,  1987; Steiber, 1989). For each SERVQUAL dimension, the actual 
degree of a service quality dimension can be represented by averaging of the 
measurement item ratings for that particular dimension. For example, 
questions 1 –  4 (4 questions) represent  Tangibility. Questions 5 –  9 (5 
questions) represent Reliability. Questions 10 –  13 (4 questions) represent 
Responsiveness. Questions 14-17  (4 questions) represent Assurance  and 
questions 18-22 (5 questions) represent Empathy. The response numbers for 
these items are totaled and divided by the number of questions. The result is 
the score for each service quality dimension. A vector for the five SERVQUAL 
dimensions is used as a profile of healthcare quality for the hospital. An 
average score for all five dimensions is the overall SERVQUAL score and is 
given as: 
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: the overall SERVQUAL score. 
: score for i dimension of service quality. 
 
5.6.2  Independent Variables: Healthcare Governance and Ownership 
Structure  
In model 1, HospBoardPresence is defined as a dummy variable, taking the 
value of 1 where the hospital has a board in place and 0 where the hospital 
has no board. 
 
HBC  in model 2 is the hospital board characteristics, which include board 
size, board composition, board participation by medical staff, board 
leadership structure, board diversity, and frequency of board meetings. This 
study focuses specifically on hospital board characteristics and these are 
defined as follows:  
 
1.  Board size is defined as the number of board members. 
 
2.  Board  composition  is defined as the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board. 
 
3.  Board participation by medical staff is the proportion of medical staff 
on the board. 
 
4.  Board leadership structure is a dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board 
chair and 0 if otherwise. 
 
5.  Board diversity is defined as the proportion of females on the board. 
0 S
i S
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6.  Frequency of board meetings is the log of number of board meetings 
in the year. 
 
OWN in the models represents hospital ownership structure and it is defined 
as a categorical variable = 1 if public hospital, 2 if not-for-profit or mission 
hospital and 3 if for-profit or private hospital. 
 
In model 3, HBC × OWN represents the interaction term. The interaction term 
is derived by multiplying each of the hospital board characteristics with the 
ownership variables to ascertain their combined effects on hospital 
performance. 
  
 is the constant in the equation, and  represents the error term. 
 
5.6.3  Control Variables 
In the models, Control is included as a vector of the control variables. Apart 
from hospital governance and ownership structures, there are other factors or 
variables that explain the performance of hospitals. These factors are 
included in the model as control variables. In other words, the control 
variables are factors that might affect the performance of hospitals and 
previous studies have included these control variables (see Alexander, 1988; 
Weiner and Alexander, 1993; Molinari et al., 1995; Alexander and Lee, 2006). 
These control variables include, size of the hospital, age of the hospital, and 
location of the hospital. They therefore included to ensure the robustness of 
the model and to minimize specification bias. The control variables are 
defined as follows: 
 
α ε
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 1.  Hospital size of the hospital is defined in terms of the log of number of 
hospital beds. 
 
2.  Hospital age  of the hospital is defined as the number of years in 
existence. 
 
3.  Location is a dummy and it is defined as 1 if the hospital is located in 
the national capital (Accra) and 0 if it is located outside the national 
capital. 
 
The extant literature suggests that older and smaller hospitals may perform 
better than their younger and larger counterparts. Also, hospitals located in 
the urban centers tend to perform better than those in the rural communities. 
It is expected that, in the case of Ghana, hospitals located in national capital, 
Accra are better resourced and experience more competition and, thus, 
perform better than those located outside the national capital. 
 
5.6.4  Estimation Issues 
This study adopts multiple regression method in investigating the effects of 
healthcare governance and ownership on the performance of hospitals. The 
study uses average figures for the variables between the period, 2005 and 
2010 in the analysis. The general form of the regression model employed in 
this study follows that used in previous empirical studies (Molinari  et al., 
1995; Alexander and Lee, 2006) with some modifications where necessary. 
This general form of the model given as follows: 
 
 
Where    represents the dependent variable in the estimation model, 
includes the set of explanatory variables in the estimation model,   
ε β α + + = X Y  
Y X
β
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 represents the coefficients,   is taken as the constant in the equation, and   
is the error term. In this study, the explanatory variables include the hospital 
governance, ownership structure and control factors.  
 
This regression model is based on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), a 
method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. 
This method minimizes the sum of squared vertical distances between the 
observed responses in the dataset and the responses predicted by the linear 
approximation. The OLS estimator is consistent  when the regressors are 
exogenous and there is no perfect multi-collinearity, and optimal in the class 
of linear unbiased estimators when the errors are homoscedastic and serially 
uncorrelated  (Greene, 2002). There is the likelihood of other unobserved 
factors determining the performance of hospitals other than governance 
characteristics, ownership structure  and control variables. However, this  is 
not so much of a problem to affects the findings of this study. This is because 
observable data used was not randomly selected and therefore a causal effect 
is not established,  but rather a correlational association using a non-
experimental design (Acemoglu et al, 2001)  
 
 
The estimation generates the t-statistic, the R-squared, P-values, and the F-
statistic. These are explained as follows: 
 
The t-statistic tests whether the coefficients are equal to zero. If the errors 
approximately follow a normal distribution, t follows a Student-t distribution. 
Under weaker conditions, t is asymptotically normal. Large values of t indicate 
that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that the corresponding 
coefficient is not zero. The P-value expresses the results of the hypothesis 
test as a significance level.  P-values  of less than 0.10 are considered 
significant (Greene, 2002).  
α ε
ε
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The R-squared is the coefficient of determination indicating goodness-of-fit of 
the regression. It tells us what proportion of the variance in   is explained 
by the regressors    in the model. The R-square is equal to one if fit is 
perfect, and is equal to zero if the regressors  have no explanatory power 
whatsoever (Greene, 2002). 
 
The  F-statistic  tries to test the hypothesis that all coefficients (except the 
intercept) are equal to zero. The F-statistic has F (p–1, n–p) distribution under 
the null hypothesis and normality assumption, and its p-value  indicates 
probability that the hypothesis is indeed true (Greene, 2002). 
  
With this regression model explained above, it is possible to adequately 
estimate the effects of hospital governance, ownership structure and control 
factors on the performance of hospitals in Ghana. The regression results are 
reported in Table 7.1 and 7.2 in chapter seven. 
 
5.7  Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues in research relate to gaining access, collecting data, data 
processing, data storage and writing up the research findings in a moral and 
responsible manner (Saunders et al., 2007). In this study, consent letters were 
obtained from the Ghana Health Service and the Association of Private 
Medical and Dental Practitioners in order to gain access to data from the 
public, mission-based and private hospitals in Ghana. Patients were also 
provided with information and consent forms and were assured of  the 
confidentiality of the information collected. Sufficient information regarding 
the purpose of the study, duration of the study, procedure, discomforts, and 
benefits associated with the study were provided to enable participants make 
informed decisions  about participation. The respondents were informed of 
Y
X
X
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 the fact that the research is purely for academic purposes and that 
information provided would be treated with strict confidentiality. They were 
assured that individual respondent’s details would not be disclosed and the 
study would also not be inimical to them.   
 
5.8  Chapter Summary  
Chapter five discussed and described the methodology employed in this 
study. This chapter includes the philosophical paradigm and justification for 
adopting quantitative research. The chapter explains the type of study 
conducted, the population and data source for the study, the data used in the 
study, and the sampling procedure. It also discusses issues of validity and 
reliability of the data, and the method used in analyzing the data. The ethical 
issues are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
This study is based on the positivistic paradigm, which assumes that the 
world is external and independent of the researcher. Positivists are of the 
view that reality is stable and can actually be looked at and described from an 
objective and detached point without necessarily interfering with the 
phenomena being studied (Levin, 1988; Burrell and Morgan, 1988). The study 
employs a quantitative research design in its data collection and analysis. The 
justification for adopting a quantitative method in this study stems from the 
fact  that  existing theories make it easier to formulate 
assumptions/hypotheses that can be tested using statistical tools. 
Quantitative methods also provide a framework for addressing the 
relationships among variables involved in the study. The use of quantitative 
research design is useful for dealing with a cause and effect relationship. 
 
The method of analysis used in this study involves the use of multiple 
regression models in investigating the effects of healthcare governance and 
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 ownership on the performance of hospitals in Ghana. The next two chapters 
present and discuss the results of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
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 Discussion of Results on the Characteristics 
of Hospital Boards 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The first objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of hospital 
boards in Ghana. This chapter presents the analysis and discusses the 
empirical results on the characteristics of hospital boards in Ghana. The 
chapter also examines and compares the characteristics of the hospital 
boards of public, mission-based and private hospitals. The findings on the 
characteristics of hospital board are discussed in line with the best practices 
in healthcare board governance. The analysis on the characteristics of 
hospital boards is based on descriptive statistics. First, the chapter presents 
the descriptive summary statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables used in the study. The descriptive statistics show the mean, 
minimum and maximum values of the dependent variables (occupancy, 
discharge, efficiency, and health service quality), and independent variables 
(hospital board dummy, board size, board composition, medical staff on 
board, board leadership structure, board diversity, frequency of board 
meetings, size, age, and location.  
 
The results indicate that about 69% of the surveyed hospitals have governing 
boards. Half of the public hospitals have a hospital board in place. All the 
mission-based hospitals sampled have a board, and about 80% of the private 
hospitals have a hospital board in place. Public, mission-based, and private 
hospitals with a board in place tend to exhibit different board characteristic in 
terms of board size, board composition, medical staff representation on 
board, board leadership structure, board diversity, and frequency of board 
meetings.  
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 This chapter also includes a correlation matrix results in order to ascertain 
the degree of multi-collinearity among the variables used in the study. The 
results of the correlation analysis suggest that multi-collinearity does not 
pose a problem in the empirical models. 
 
6.2  Descriptive Statistics 
This section looks at the descriptive statistics for all the hospitals sampled for 
this study, a comparison of the mean values across hospital forms, and best 
practice of hospital board governance. Table 6.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for all the hospitals. Table 6.2 provides a comparison of the mean 
values across hospital forms, and Table 6.3 shows best practice of hospital 
board governance.  
 
6.2.1  Descriptive Summary Statistics – All Hospitals 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive summary statistics of variables used in the 
study for all the hospitals. It shows the mean values for the overall sample. 
The mean occupancy ratio is 0.53 suggesting that on the average 53% of the 
hospital beds are occupied daily. The minimum and maximum occupancy are 
given as 0.01 and 5.30, respectively. The mean discharge is 0.94, indicating 
that on the average the hospitals discharge 94% of inpatients. The minimum 
and maximum are also shown as 0.18 and 1.65, respectively. Given the large 
values of the efficiency, the values were logged with a mean efficiency of 
9.42. The minimum and maximum efficiency are also shown as 3.91 and 
maximum 19.93, respectively.   
 
The overall mean score of health service quality is 4.79. This indicates that 
the service quality ratings of Ghanaian hospitals are just above the mid-point 
of the scales, given that the scale is, 1 – 7. It is observed that patients do not 
perceive they are receiving excellent healthcare service quality. The quality of 
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 service is just above average. This is contrary to the findings by Turkson 
(2009) in 2003 and 2004 that generally the quality of healthcare delivery was 
perceived to be high for most of the indicators used. Following from the 
findings of this current study, however, Ghanaian hospitals may have to step 
up their service quality standards to ensure patients are receiving the best 
healthcare services. The minimum and maximum values of service quality are 
2.74 and 6.83, respectively.  
 
In examining the characteristics of hospital boards, the results show that 69% 
of the hospitals sampled have hospital board structures in place. The 
remaining 31% of the hospitals do not have a  hospital board. Clearly, the 
majority of hospitals in Ghana have a governing board. With respect to those 
with a hospital board, the mean board size is 6 with maximum board size of 
25. The mean value of 6 falls short of what is recommended by Bader (1991), 
who suggests that, in health systems with several boards, the system works 
best with lean governing boards having the average of seven to ten members. 
The mean board composition is 0.51, indicating that outside board members 
represent 51% of  the total board membership. This means the boards are 
made up of majority of outside members. The mean medical staff 
representation on board is 0.38, meaning that medical staff represents 38% 
of the board. The mean board leadership structure of 0.45 indicates that 45% 
of the hospitals have the CEO also serving as the chairman of the hospital 
board. This also means that, on the average, 55% of the hospitals have 
separated the roles of the CEO and the board chair. Board diversity is 0.37 
signaling that fact that females represent 37% of the hospital board members. 
In terms of frequency of board meetings, the mean is 5 with minimum and 
maximum of 1 and 48, respectively. This means that, on the average, board 
meetings are held five times in a  year. The mean hospital size is 102.70, 
indicating an average number of hospital beds of approximately 103 with a 
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 1,800. The average age of the hospitals is 
approximately 38 years. The minimum and maximum ages are 1 and 129. 
Location with a mean of 0.63 suggests that 63% of the hospitals in the sample 
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 are located in the national capital (Accra), while the remaining 46.90% are 
based in other parts of the country or outside Accra. 
  
In order to address  the problem of non-normality of the data a log 
transformation of some of the variables (occupancy, efficiency, frequency of 
board meetings, and hospital size) is applied.  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Summary Statistics – All Hospitals  
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max  Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Occupancy  0.53  0.511  0.01  5.30  4.23  5.08 
Discharge  0.94  0.12  0.18  1.65  -2.75  -2.75 
Efficiency   9.42  2.46  3.91  19.93  1.48  6.69 
Health service quality  4.79  0.89  2.74  6.83  -0.22  2.73 
Presence of hospital board  0.69  0.46  0  1  -0.82  1.67 
Board size  6.20  5.58  0  25  1.09  3.78 
Board composition  0.51  0.28  0  1  -0.42  2.19 
Medical staff on board  0.38  0.28  0  1  0.80  2.70 
Board leadership structure   0.45  0.50  0  1  0.21  1.05 
Board diversity  0.37  0.24  0  1  0.67  3.27 
Frequency of board meetings  5.38  6.53  1  48  4.44  4.28 
Hospital size   102.70  191.25  3  1800  -0.23  2.17 
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 Hospital age  38.24  24.96  1  129  0.72  3.16 
Location  0.55   0.50  0  1  -0.20  1.04 
Occupancy is defined as the ratio of average daily census to statistical beds. 
Discharge is the ratio of inpatients discharged to total number of inpatients. 
Efficiency is defined as the ratio of total expenses to statistical beds. Health service 
quality is measured using the SERVQUAL scale. Hospital board is a dummy variable 
and is defined as 1 where the hospital has a board in place and 0 where the hospital 
has no board. Board size is defined as the number of board members. Board 
composition is defined as the proportion of outside board members on the board. 
Board participation by medical staff is the proportion of medical staff on the board. 
Board leadership structure is a dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board chair and 0 if 
otherwise. Board diversity is defined as the proportion of females on the board. 
Frequency of board meetings is the number of board meetings in the year. Hospital 
size is defined as the number of hospital beds. Hospital age is defined as the number 
of years the hospital has been in existence. Location is a dummy variable = 1 if the 
hospital is located in the national capital and 0 if it is located outside the national 
capital.  
 
6.2.2  Mean Values across Forms of Hospitals 
Table 6.2 presents the mean values of the dependent and independent 
variables across the three forms of hospitals. A multiple-sample test of means 
is carried out to ascertain whether or not the mean values across the sample 
groups (hospital types) are the same. The results as shown on Table 6.2 
indicate that with the exception of efficiency, the mean values of all the 
variables are statistically and significantly different across the hospital types. 
The three dependent variable, occupancy, discharge, and  health service 
quality differ significantly across the various hospital types. The hospital 
board characteristics and control variables – board size board composition, 
medical staff on board, board leadership structure, board diversity frequency 
of board  meetings, hospital size, hospital age, and location also differ 
significantly across the forms of hospitals. 
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The public hospitals have the highest occupancy rate of 62%, followed by not-
for-  profit or mission-based hospitals (54%). For-profit or private hospitals 
have the lowest occupancy with a mean value of 43%. The for-profit hospitals 
exhibit the highest discharge with a mean value of 0.99. Not-for-profit 
hospitals follow in terms of discharge with a mean value of 0.96. Public 
hospitals record the lowest discharge (0.93). Mission-based hospitals and 
private hospitals tend  to perform better than public hospitals in terms of 
occupancy and discharge. The highest discharge is associated with the lowest 
occupancy and this can be seen in the case of for-profit or private hospitals. 
The public hospitals, which have the lowest discharge, exhibit the highest 
occupancy. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of total expenses to statistical 
beds and therefore the lower the ratio, the higher the level of efficiency. The 
results reveal that not-for-profit or mission-based hospitals are the most 
efficient followed by for-profit or private hospitals and lastly public hospitals.  
 
In terms of patients’ perception of health service quality, the results show 
that there are significantly different mean values of service quality across the 
three forms of hospitals. For-profit or private hospitals record the highest 
score with a mean value of 5.02, followed by not-for-profit or mission-based 
hospitals with a mean score of 4.92. Public hospitals record the lowest level 
of health service quality with a mean sore of 4.64. The mean scores for both 
mission-based and private hospitals are above the overall mean, suggesting 
that mission and private hospitals are perceived to provide better health 
service quality than the average hospital. Public hospitals however show a 
lower mean score in terms of health service quality compared to the overall 
mean score.  
 
Public hospitals tend to be the largest with a mean bed size of approximately 
164. For-profit hospitals are the smallest with a mean bed size of 
approximately 35. Not-for-profit hospitals also have a mean bed size of 
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 approximately 68. Public hospitals are the oldest with a mean age of 
approximately 49 years, followed by not-for-profit hospitals, which indicate a 
mean age of approximately 29 years. For-profit hospitals are the youngest 
with a mean age of approximately 25 years. In terms of location, the results 
indicate that, about 82% of not-for-profit or mission-based hospitals sampled 
are located in the national capital, Accra with less than 18% located outside 
Accra, while 69% of the private hospitals sampled are located in the national 
capital. About 35% of the public hospitals sampled in this study are also 
located in the national capital, Accra. 
 
Table 6.2: Mean Values across Forms of Hospitals  
Variable  Public 
Hospitals 
Not-for-
Profit 
Hospitals 
For-Profit 
Hospitals 
  All 
Hospitals 
Multivariate 
Test of 
Means 
Occupancy  0.62  0.54  0.43  0.53  13.38*** 
Discharge  0.93  0.96  0.99  0.94  24.60*** 
Efficiency   9.53  9.09  9.33  9.42  4.59 
Health service quality  4.64  4.92  5.02  4.79  25.03*** 
Presence of hospital 
board 
0.5  1  0.8  0.69  76.96*** 
Board size  7.26  7  4.53  6.20  37.99*** 
Board composition  0.38  0.62  0.54  0.51  54.62*** 
Medical staff on 
board 
0.39  0.29  0.43  0.38  20.62*** 
Board leadership 
structure  
0.36  0.36  0.61  0.45  23.50*** 
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 Board diversity  0.29  0.39  0.41  0.37  23.02*** 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
7.08  3.28  5.38  5.38  67.88*** 
Hospital size   164.20  68.13  34.60   102.70  267.66*** 
Hospital age  49.40  29.01  25.07  38.24  182.89*** 
Location      0.35       0.82  0.69    0.55  155.27*** 
Note: ***Significant at 1 percent level. Occupancy is defined as the ratio of average 
daily census to statistical beds. Discharge is the ratio of inpatients discharged to total 
number of inpatients. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of total expenses to statistical 
beds. Health service quality is measured using the SERVQUAL scale. Hospital board is 
a dummy variable and is defined as 1 where the hospital has a board in place and 0 
where the hospital has no board. Board size is defined as the number of board 
members. Board composition is defined as the proportion of outside board members 
on the board. Board participation by medical staff is the proportion of medical staff 
on the board. Board leadership structure is a dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board chair 
and 0 if otherwise. Board diversity is defined as the proportion of females on the 
board. Frequency of board meetings is the number of board meetings in the year. 
Hospital size is defined as the number of hospital beds. Hospital age is defined as the 
number of years the hospital has been in existence. Location is a dummy variable = 1 
if the hospital is located in the national capital and 0 if it is located outside the 
national capital.  
 
 
In examining and comparing the characteristics of hospital boards across the 
forms of hospitals, the results indicate that in terms of the presence of 
hospital board, half (50%) of the public hospitals have a hospital board in 
place as shown on Table 6.2. This may be attributed to the fact that, 
according to the Hospital Administration Law, 1988 (P.N.D.C.L. 209), Act 525, 
only teaching hospitals are required to have hospital board. Interestingly, 
there  are only four teaching hospitals out of the total of 304 hospitals in 
Ghana. The other public hospitals in Ghana are not required to have a board. 
The need to constitute a board in a public hospital is an internal decision and 
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 therefore, most hospitals appear not to have strong incentives to constitute a 
board. All the not-for-profit or mission-based hospitals sampled have a board. 
The mission-based hospitals tend to have dedicated boards overseeing group 
of hospitals within particular districts of the country. About 80% of the for-
profit or private hospitals have a hospital board in place. Considering the 
profit orientation of private hospitals, they may see the need to have a 
governing board to provide direction for the hospital especially when most of 
these hospitals tend to be owner-managed.    
 
Out of the number of hospitals with a board, public and not-for-profit 
hospitals have a board size of approximately 7. For-profit or private hospitals 
have a board size of approximately 5. Public and not-for-profit hospitals have 
board size that falls within the range recommended in literature as indicated 
on Table 6.3. Bader (1991) suggests that, in health systems with several 
boards, the system works best with lean governing boards having the average 
of seven to ten members. 
 
Mission-based hospitals have the highest proportion of non-executive 
directors represented on the board (62%), followed by private hospitals with a 
mean of 54%. Public hospitals have the lowest proportion of outside directors 
(38%). Both mission-based and private hospitals have more than half outside 
or independent directors on their hospital board. This is consistent with best 
practice, which suggests that, the board should be composed of majority non-
executive board members. However, public hospitals do not comply with best 
practice in terms of the proportion of outside directors on their board. They 
have less than 50% of outside directors represented on their hospital board. 
Private hospitals have the highest percentage of medical staff on the board 
(43%), with public hospitals following with 39% medical staff representation 
on the board. Not-for-profit or mission hospitals report the lowest percentage 
of medical staff on their board with a mean 29%. In terms of board 
participation of medical staff, the results indicate that all the hospital forms 
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 have medical staff represented on their board. This finding complies with 
best practice, as shown on Table 6.3. 
With respect to board leadership structure, the results indicate that 36% of 
the public  hospitals have one person combining the roles of CEO and 
chairperson of the hospital board. Also, 36% of the mission hospitals have the 
CEO also doubling as the board chair. In Ghana, majority of mission-based 
and public hospitals maintain a board typology, where the CEO’s position is 
separate from that of the board chair. Such a board structure complies with 
best practice. In the case of for-profit or private hospitals, majority (61%) of 
them have their CEO also serving as the board chair. Majority  of private 
hospitals in Ghana having the CEO also serving as the board chair may be 
attributed to the fact that most of these private hospitals are owner-managed 
and the owner-manager may also want to serve as the chair-person of the 
hospital board in order to maintain control. The board leadership structure of 
most private hospitals does not comply with best practice. 
 
With regards to board diversity, the results as indicated on Table 6.2 signal 
that for-profit hospitals have the highest female representation on the board 
with a mean of 41%, followed by not-for-profit hospitals with a mean of 39% 
percent female representation. Public hospitals maintain the lowest female 
representation on the board, recording a mean of 29%. Interestingly, all the 
hospital forms have female representation on their board, but in all the 
hospital types, board diversity or percentage of females on the hospital board 
is less than 50%.  
 
The board of directors for public hospitals has the highest frequency of board 
meetings. On the average, they meet about 7 times in a year. For-profit or 
private hospitals also meet on the average 5 times in a year. Not-for-profit or 
mission-based hospitals have lowest frequency of board meetings. Not-for-
profit hospitals meet about 3 times in a year. The extant literature suggests a 
minimum of four meetings in a year. Apart from mission-based hospitals, the 
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 other two forms of hospital generally hold the required number of meetings 
as recommended.  
Table 6.3: Best Practices in Healthcare Board Governance  
Board 
Characteristics  
Best Practice   Public 
Hospitals 
Not-for-
profit 
Hospitals 
For-profit 
Hospitals 
 
All 
Board size  Between 7 and 10 
board members. 
        ×       × 
Board 
composition 
Board should be 
composed of 
majority non-
executive directors. 
     ×             
Board 
participation  
by medical staff 
The board should 
have medical staff 
representation. 
               
Board leadership 
structure  
The role of CEO 
should be separated 
from that of board 
chair. 
      ×
a       ×
a        ×
b       ×
a 
Board diversity  There should be 
female 
representation on 
the board 
               
Frequency of  
board meetings  
The board should 
hold a minimum of 
four meetings in a 
    ×         
166 
 year. 
  means does comply. 
       × means does not comply. 
       ×
a Less than 50% of the hospitals have CEO also acting as board chair. 
       ×
b Over 50% of the hospitals have CEO also acting as board chair. 
 
6.3  Correlation Analysis  
A correlation analysis is performed in order to evaluate the extent of multi-
collinearity among the independent variables. Correlation analysis shows the 
strength and direction of association between two variables. It is useful for 
creating a summary measure that reflects the covariation between two 
variables. The correlation analysis is based on both the Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients. Pearson correlation is appropriate for 
measuring the variables on an interval  or ratio scale, while the Spearman 
correlation is useful when the variables are measured on an ordinal scale 
(Everitt,  2002). Considering that board size, board composition, board 
participation by medical staff, board diversity, frequency of board meetings, 
hospital size, and hospital age are measured on an interval or ratio scale, the 
correlations among these variables are based on Pearson correlation 
coefficients, while the correlations among the other variables (i.e., hospital 
board, board leadership structure, hospital ownership structure, and location) 
are based on Spearman correlation because the variables are measured on an 
ordinal scale. These are either defined as dummy or categorical variables. 
Table 6.4 presents the correlation matrix constructed by showing the 
association between the variables.  
 
The correlation results show that board size has significantly negative 
correlations with medical staff on board, board leadership structure, gender 
diversity, ownership structure, and location,  but has significantly positive 
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 associations with hospital size and hospital age. Board composition is 
significantly and negatively correlated with medical staff on board, board 
leadership structure, frequency of board meetings, hospital size and hospital 
age,  but has a significantly positive correlation with ownership structure. 
Medical staff representation on boards  shows statistically significant and 
positive correlations with board leadership structure, board diversity, 
frequency of board meetings, and location. Board leadership structure 
indicates statistically significant and positive correlations with board diversity, 
frequency of board meetings, ownership structure, and location, but it signals 
a significantly negative correlation with hospital size. Board diversity has 
statistically significant and positive correlations with ownership structure, 
hospital age, and location. Frequency of meetings is negatively correlated 
with ownership structure but is positively correlated with hospital size and 
hospital age. Ownership structure is significantly and negatively correlated 
hospital size and hospital age, but it is positively correlated with location. 
There is a significantly positive correlation between hospital size and hospital 
age but there is negative correlation between hospital size and location. The 
correlation results also show statistically significant and negative relationship 
between hospital age and location. 
 
In all, the degree of the correlation coefficients suggests that multi-
collinearity do not pose a potential problem in the regression models. 
Therefore, the entire hospital board characteristic, ownership structure and 
the control variables can be captured in the same model. The hospital board 
dummy is also captured in a separate model investigating the presence of 
hospital board and ownership structure on hospital performance.   
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Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix  
  Hospital 
board 
Board 
size 
Board 
composition 
Medical 
staff on 
board 
Board 
leadership 
structure  
Board 
diversity 
Frequency 
of board 
meetings 
Ownership 
structure 
Hospital 
size (log) 
Hospital 
age 
Location 
Hospital 
board 
1.000                     
Board size  0.571***  1.000                   
Board 
composition 
0.000***  -0.028  1.000                 
Medical staff 
on board 
0.000***  -0.230***  -0.363***  1.000               
Board 
leadership 
structure  
0.000***  -0.267***  -0.309***  0.460***  1.000             
Board 
diversity 
0.000***  -0.231***  -0.017  0.254***  0.450***  1.0000           
Frequency of 
board 
meetings 
0.000***  -0.043  -0.345***  0.233***  0.191***  0.017  1.000         
Ownership  0.300***  -0.181***  0.222***  -0.014  0.211***  0.176***  -0.094**  1.000       
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 structure 
Hospital size   -0.010  0.229***  -0.101**  -0.074  -0.178***  -0.044  0.141*  -0.279***  1.0000     
Hospital age  -0.202***  0.312***  -0.270***  -0.043  0.004  0.133***  0.113**  -0.410***  0.346***  1.0000   
Location  0.316***  -0.120***  -0.003  0.217***  0.119**  0.125***  0.068  0.302***  -0.156***  -0.246***  1.000 
Note: ***, ** and * mean significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively. Hospital board is a dummy variable and is defined as 1 
where the hospital has a board in place and 0 where the hospital has no board. Board size is defined as the number of board members. Board 
composition is defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Board participation by medical staff is the proportion of medical 
staff on the board. Board leadership structure is a dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board chair and 0 if otherwise. Board diversity is defined as the 
proportion of females on the board. Frequency of board meetings is the number of board meetings in the year. Hospital ownership structure is 
defined as a categorical variable = 1 if public hospital, 2 if not-for-profit hospital and 3 if for-profit hospital. Hospital size is defined as the number 
of hospital beds. Hospital age is defined as the number of years the hospital has been in existence. Location is a dummy variable = 1 if the hospital 
is located in the national capital and 0 if it is located outside the national capital.  
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 6.4  Implications from Descriptive Statistics 
The first objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of hospital 
boards in Ghana. The findings of this study revealed that majority (68.92%) of 
the hospitals sampled have hospital board structures in place. This signals 
the importance Ghanaian hospitals place on having a governing board. 
Hospital boards are said to constitute an important element of healthcare 
governance and they play a very significant role in the healthcare delivery 
system. With respect to the public hospital, half of them have a hospital board 
in place. The other public hospitals do not have a board since this is not a 
requirement. Therefore, the need to constitute a board in a public hospital is 
mainly an internal decision. The legal framework within Ghana does not 
mandate all hospitals except the four (4) teaching hospitals to have  a 
governing board. All the mission-based hospitals were found to have a board. 
The mission-based hospitals have dedicated boards overseeing group of 
hospitals within  particular districts of the country. In the case of private 
hospitals, their profit motivation may compel them to have a governing board 
in order provide direction for the hospital, given that most of these hospitals 
tend to be owner-managed. This may explain why the majority (80%) of the 
private hospitals have board in place. The findings have shown the 
importance mission-based and private hospitals place on the role of hospital 
boards. This is in tandem with what Bader (1993) and Alexander et al. (2009) 
suggest that the hospital board is a central factor in healthcare governance as 
they hold the legal responsibility for establishing objectives, and reviewing 
management’s performance to ensure that the health facility is well run. They 
establish that the board has the ultimate accountability in terms of how the 
hospital functions. 
 
In examining hospitals with a board, the results of this study indicate that the 
board size of hospitals in Ghana is on the average 6. This number, however, 
falls short of the general literature prescription. Bader (1991) suggests that in 
health systems with several boards, the system works best with lean 
governing boards having the average of seven to ten members. The 
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 ownership type of the hospital has implications for the form of governance 
system adopted by the hospital. The board size (5) of private hospitals also 
falls below the suggestion by Bader (1991). The resource dependency theory 
is not adhered to where the board size is not large enough to contain 
members with diverse background of skills, resources and expertise to make 
the right decisions that will enhance the performance of the organization. 
Boards of private hospitals operate as corporate boards, where board 
members are usually paid or compensated, and considering the profit making 
orientation of private hospitals, measures are put in place to cut down on 
cost. Therefore, they usually engage smaller-size board. Such boards tend to 
be focused as a function of the narrower constituencies to which the 
organization is responsible (Ewell, 1987). Public and mission-based hospitals, 
however, have a board size of (7) that falls within the range recommended in 
literature. They mainly operate as philanthropic boards and in the view of 
Pfeffer (1972), are often large in size, representing a wide range of interest.  
 
The findings reveal that outside board members constitute a little over half of 
the total board membership consistent with the position of Yermack (1996) 
and  John and Senbet (1998) that a high representation of outside board 
members increases the independence of the board. Dalton et al. (1999) also 
argue that the independence of directors is an essential requirement for 
board effectiveness. These outside directors would ensure that stakeholders’ 
interests are protected as suggested by the stakeholder theory. With respect 
to board composition across the hospital forms, both mission-based and 
private hospitals have more than half outside or independent board members 
represented on their hospital board, consistent with best practice. In the case 
of public hospitals, however, there is non-compliance with best practice 
considering that outsider board members constitute less than half of the 
hospital board. 
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 Medical staff representation on the hospital board is said to be an important 
characteristic of hospital boards. It is argued that medical staff members 
provide relevant information to board members and keep the board well 
informed about the hospital’s service and delivery issues. The findings of this 
study show that the hospitals boards have some (38.37%) representation by 
medical staff. This shows the importance Ghanaian hospitals place on the role 
of medical staff on hospital board. Though, all the three hospitals have 
medical staff represented on their board, private hospitals have the highest 
percentage of medical staff on the board, followed by public hospitals and 
mission-based hospitals. Managerialism and resource dependency theories 
both make a case for the benefits that hospitals stand to derive from having 
medical  staff especially physicians on their hospital board. This was 
evidenced in this study as private hospital have the highest number of 
medical staff on their boards, showed the highest service quality score as well 
as discharge rate. This could be attributed  to the contribution of medical 
officers to board discussions on policies aimed at improving on service 
delivery, thereby ensuring better service quality in these hospitals. 
 
The board leadership structure of 44.67% suggests that less than half of the 
total number of hospitals in Ghana have the CEO also serving as the chairman 
of the hospital board, meaning the remaining 55.33% of the hospitals have 
separated the roles of the CEO and the board chair. The general prescription 
is to have a board structure where the roles of the CEO and the board chair 
are decoupled. However, in this study many of the hospitals practice the CEO 
duality system with the CEO and board chair positions occupied by the same 
person. The majority (64%) of both mission-based and public hospitals adopt 
a board typology, where the CEO’s position is separate from that of the board 
chair,  and is consistent with the literature prescription. Mission-based and 
public hospitals have owners that are different from the managers and 
therefore, CEOs tend to act as the agents to protect the interest of the actual 
owners according to the agency theory. In the case of private hospitals, since 
most of them are owner-managed, they tend to adopt a board leadership 
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 structure where the person combines the roles of CEO and board chair. In this 
study majority (60.87%) of private hospitals have their CEO also serving as the 
board chair and this model is in conflict with best practice. From the 
stakeholder perspective, having the CEO also serving as the board chair 
seriously impedes the overall stakeholder orientation of board members. 
Therefore, separating the functions of the CEO and board chair is important 
in enhancing the board’s monitoring and control ability, and to improve 
director’s information processing  capacities (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998) 
and thereby reduce agency cost. 
 
It is suggested that having females on the board is desirable business 
practice because it improves the reputation and strategic direction (Bilimoria, 
2000). Siciliano (1996) explains that, boards with increased gender diversity 
are more likely to enjoy high levels of social agency mission achievement. 
Elstad and Ladegard (2010) suggest that the higher the ratio of women, the 
greater the level of perceived influence, perceived social interaction outside 
the boardroom, and to some degree, perceived information sharing. In this 
study, hospitals in Ghana are found to have (36.79%) female representation of 
their board. This is even higher than the 1999 survey conducted by the 
Governance Institute, La Jolla, California, which showed that only 23% of 
healthcare board members were female (Adams, 2005). In Ghana, though all 
the hospital forms have female representation on the board, the proportion of 
females differs across the various hospitals forms. The findings of this study 
indicate that, private hospitals have the highest female representation on the 
board 40.78%), followed by mission-based hospitals (39.36%), and then public 
hospitals (29.44%). This finding is in tandem with existing literature 
indicating that, in situations where the CEO doubles as the chair of the board, 
more females are appointed on such boards to push through the agenda of 
the CEO with ease. 
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 The findings of this study also reveal that, on the average, hospitals in Ghana 
hold board meetings five times in a year. This is in compliance with the 
general prescription of four meetings annually. The board meetings are 
important in engaging the board to regularly review processes and 
procedures to ensure the effectiveness of its internal control system. Board 
meetings provide the opportunity for the board to also assess the 
performance of the hospital. Public and private hospitals generally hold the 
prescribed number of board meetings annually. Public hospitals have the 
highest number of board meetings of 7 times annually, followed by private 
hospitals,  which hold board meetings 5 times in the year, and then lastly 
mission-based hospitals,  which hold board meetings 3 times annually. 
Clearly, the number of board meetings held by mission-based hospitals on 
annual basis, fall short of the general prescription of 4 times.  This could be 
attributed to the problems with having a large board size (as mission 
hospitals have large boards). Meetings of large board are difficult to convene 
and the costs of logistics for having board meetings increase with large 
boards.  
 
6.5  Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the analysis and discussion on the results on the 
characteristics of hospital board governance in Ghana. The descriptive 
statistics for all the hospitals sampled indicated that 53% of the hospital beds 
are occupied daily and on the average the hospitals discharge 94% of 
inpatients. The mean log efficiency is 9.42. The overall mean score of health 
service quality is 4.79 suggesting that the health service quality ratings of 
Ghanaian hospitals are above the mid-point of the scales, given that the scale 
is, 1 –  7. The descriptive statistics also showed the mean values of the 
dependent variables across the three sample groups.  The results show a 
strongly significantly different performance across the three ownership types 
(at 1% significant level). Public hospitals have the highest occupancy of 62%, 
followed by mission hospitals (54%), and private hospitals (43%). For-profit 
hospitals exhibit the highest discharge (0.99) followed by mission hospitals 
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 (0.96), and public hospitals (0.93). Mission-based hospitals and private 
hospitals appear to perform better than public hospitals in terms of 
occupancy and discharge. Mission-based hospitals are the most efficient in 
terms of the management of expenses, followed by private hospitals and 
lastly public hospitals. However, in terms of patients’ perception of health 
service quality, private hospitals record the highest score (5.02), followed by 
mission-based hospitals (4.92) and lastly, public hospitals (4.64). The mean 
scores of both mission-based and private hospitals are above the overall 
mean, suggesting that mission and private hospitals are perceived to provide 
better health service quality than the average hospital. 
 
With respect to the characteristics of hospital board governance, the results 
showed that 69% of all the hospitals sampled have hospital board structures 
in place. With respect to hospitals with a board, the mean board size is 6 and 
external or non-executive board members represent 51% of the total board 
membership, while medical staff represents 38% of the board. About 45% of 
the hospitals have the CEO also serving as the chairman of the hospital board 
on the average. About 37% of the hospital boards have female representation 
and on the average, board meetings are held 5 times in the year.  
 
In terms of the of hospital board governance across the forms of hospitals, 
the results indicated that half (50%) of the public hospitals have a hospital 
board in place. All the not-for-profit or mission-based hospitals sampled have 
a board. The mission-based hospitals tend to have dedicated boards 
overseeing group of hospitals within particular districts of the country. About 
80% of the for-profit or private hospitals have a hospital board in place. Out 
of the number of hospitals with a board, public and not-for-profit hospitals 
have a board size of approximately 7. For-profit hospitals have a board size 
of approximately 5. Public and not-for-profit hospitals have board size that 
fall within the range recommended in literature. Mission-based hospitals have 
the highest proportion of non-executive directors represented on the board 
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 (62%), followed by private hospitals with a mean of 54%. Public hospitals have 
the lowest proportion of outside directors (38%). Private hospitals have the 
highest percentage of medical staff on the board (43%), with public hospitals 
following with 39% medical staff representation on the board. Not-for-profit 
or mission hospitals report the lowest percentage of medical staff on their 
board with a mean 29%. The results indicate that 36% of the public hospitals 
have one person combining the roles of CEO and chairperson of the hospital 
board, while 36% of the mission hospitals have the CEO also doubling as the 
board chair. For-profit hospitals have the highest female representation on 
the board with a mean of 41%, followed by not-for-profit hospitals with a 
mean of 39% female representation. Public hospitals maintain the lowest 
female representation on the board, recording a mean of 29%. Apart from 
not-for-profit hospitals, the other two forms of hospital generally hold the 
required number of meetings as recommended. The boards of public 
hospitals meet about six times in a year, while private hospital and mission-
based hospitals meet annually about 5 times and 3 times, respectively.   
 
This chapter also included a correlation analysis in order to evaluate the 
extent of multi-collinearity among the independent variables. Overall, the 
degrees of the correlation coefficients for the independent variables suggest 
that multi-collinearity do not pose a potential problem in the regression 
models. This informed the model estimations and the regression results are 
discussed in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion of Results on the Effects of 
Healthcare Governance and Ownership 
Structure on Performance 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The chapter has four main objectives. First, the chapter seeks to ascertain 
whether or not the presence of hospital board affects hospital performance. 
Second, it aims to evaluate the effect of healthcare board characteristics on 
hospital performance.  Third, it hopes to examine the effect of hospital 
ownership structure on hospital performance. Finally, the chapter seeks to 
investigate the interaction effects of hospital board characteristics and 
ownership structure on performance. The study employed multiple regression 
models in addressing the effects of healthcare governance and ownership 
structure on hospital performance. This chapter presents the analysis and 
discusses the regression results.  
 
The regression results are in three parts. One part looks at the effects of the 
presence of hospital board and ownership structure on the performance of 
hospitals. In this first part, the dependent variables, which are the 
performance indicators, include occupancy, discharge, efficiency and health 
service quality. The independent variables are the presence of hospital board 
(dummy), ownership structure, and control factors (hospital size, hospital age 
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 and location). The second part examines the effects of hospital board 
characteristics and ownership structure, and control factors on the 
performance of hospitals. The performance indicators also include 
occupancy, discharge, efficiency and health service quality. The independent 
variables are the hospital board characteristics (board size, board 
composition, medical staff on board, board leadership structure, board 
diversity, and frequency of board meetings), ownership structure (public 
hospitals, not-for profit, and for-profit), and the control factors (hospital size, 
hospital age and location). In the third part, the hospital board characteristics 
are interacted with the ownership forms to ascertain the effects on 
performance.  
 
The variance inflation factor (VIF), which is a more formal method to 
determine the presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables, 
is also used. The VIF is used to measure how much variances of estimated 
regression coefficients are inflated  when compared to having uncorrelated 
predictors. The VIF is computed as the reciprocal of tolerance: 1 / (1 - R
2). 
Generally, a maxi {VIFi} > 10 suggests that multicollinearity is unduly affecting 
the least squares estimates of the regression coefficients (Hair et al., 2009; 
Kutner, 2004). The results of this study as shown in all the regression tables 
indicate that the VIF for the independent variables are less than 10. This 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem and therefore, all the hospital 
board characteristics, ownership structure and the control variables can be 
included in the same regression model. This study sought to establish the 
correlation amongst dependent (hospital performance) and independent 
(governance characteristics, ownership type and control) variables. 
Correlation does not equal causation, because the observational data used in 
establishing such an association is usually not randomly assigned (Haber and 
Menaldo, 2011).  
  
 
179 
 7.2  The Presence of Hospital Board, Ownership Structure and 
Performance 
This section presents and discusses the regression results. Table 7.1 presents 
the regression results on the effects of the presence of hospital board and 
ownership structure on performance. The results indicate that the presence of 
hospital board has statistically and strongly significant  negative effect on 
occupancy  (at 5% significant level) but  weakly significant positive effect on 
discharge rate (at 10% significant level) and strongly significant positive effect 
on health service quality (at 1% significant level). This means hospitals that 
have a governing board in place have lower occupancy and higher discharge 
compared to those without a board. The results also suggest that hospitals 
with governing boards are perceived to deliver better health service quality 
compared to hospitals without a governing board. This could be attributed to 
the fact that governing boards perform their supervisory and regulatory roles 
properly thereby ensuring that the hospitals deliver good quality care.  
Hospital boards are necessary in taking decisions that would improve the 
quality of services provided by the hospitals. The result on the effect of the 
presence of hospital board on health service quality is consistent with the 
first hypothesis (H
1) and it also supports the position of Lister (2006), who 
suggests that the board has a key role in establishing policies and guidelines 
that help to drive the quality transformation process. The finding also 
supports the position of Kroch et al. (2006) who argue that hospital boards 
have the ultimate responsibility of ensuring improvement in the quality of 
healthcare provided by the hospital. The findings here support recognize the 
important role hospitals boards play in ensuring better performance and 
quality health service delivery. According to Flynn (2002) and Eeckloo et al. 
(2004), healthcare governance as the process of steering the overall 
functioning and effective performance of a hospital by defining [its] mission, 
setting objectives and…[having them realized] at the operational level. 
     
In terms of hospital ownership structure, the results show that compared to 
public hospitals both not-for-profit (mission-based) and for-profit (private) 
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 hospitals exhibit lower occupancy  (at 1% significant level),  and higher 
discharge (at 5% significant level). Not-for-profit hospitals perform better in 
terms of efficiency than public hospitals (at 5% significant level). Also, for-
profit (private) hospitals demonstrate higher patients’ perception of service 
quality (at 5% significant level) compared to public hospitals. It can be argued 
that, both mission-based and private hospitals perform better in terms of 
occupancy and discharge because they tend to provide prompt and 
appropriate treatment. This could also be explained by the assertion that 
managers of these hospitals unlike their public counterpart are able to 
implement initiatives and innovations to improve efficiency and service 
quality (Hart, 1995). Patients in mission-based and private hospitals may 
therefore recover quickly and may be discharged faster. Considering the huge 
number of patients in the case of public hospitals, treatment and proper care 
tend to be delayed resulting in higher occupancy and lower discharge. The 
higher occupancy rate and lower discharge rate in the public hospitals may 
also be a result of receiving of referral cases from the mission-based and 
private hospitals.  
 
The results of this study also suggest that mission-based and private 
hospitals are capable of providing better quality of healthcare to their 
patients compared to their public counterparts. One possible reason is the 
fact that these hospitals do not have too many patients and as such may be in 
a better position to provide individualized care to the few patients. Public 
hospitals, however, have to deal with very high number of patients because of 
the relatively low service charges. Therefore, they may not be able to treat 
patients as unique individuals as required compared to their mission and 
private counterparts. Another reason for the good performance in private 
hospitals could result from the fact that, employees are well compensated 
and remunerated in private hospitals compared to public hospitals, and 
thereby influencing employee morale and this motivates them to perform 
better. The findings with respect to ownership structure generally support the 
hypothesis that not-for-profit (mission) and for-profit (private) hospitals 
181 
 perform better than public hospitals.  In the case of private hospitals, the 
results suggest that patients have a high perception of service quality 
consistent with hypothesis  (H
8a). Private hospitals demonstrate significantly 
higher level of health service quality compared to public hospitals. This may 
be due to the smaller number of patients they have to deal with. Public 
hospitals on the other hand, tend to deal with very large number of patients 
and this may affect their quality of health service delivery. In this study, it was 
found that, greater number (80%) of private hospitals have a governing board 
in place,  whereas the 50% of the public hospitals have a board in place. 
Therefore, private hospitals’ strategic decisions on quality assurance (clinical 
governance) may be said to be more effective than measures put in place by 
public hospitals to ensure good quality of health service. The provision of 
better health service delivery by the private hospitals may also explain the 
lower occupancy rate and higher discharge rate. Mission-based hospitals are 
also found to be efficient in terms of managing cost. They provide services at 
relatively lower cost compared to public hospitals. The results with respect to 
the effect of ownership structure are consistent with existing literature that 
private hospital are usually market oriented  and tend to be more keen on 
introducing new services and technologies that attract more clients,  thus 
provide better healthcare services (Rajshkha et al., 1991; Banaszak-Holl et al., 
1996). The findings of this study also support the position of Barros (2003) 
and Weng et al.  (2011) that private hospitals perform better than public 
hospitals.  
 
Table 7.1: Effects of Hospital Board and Ownership Structure on 
Performance  
Variable  Occupancy  Discharge  Efficiency  Service 
Quality 
VIF 
Hospital board   -0.3309 
(-2.53)** 
0.0280 
(1.84)* 
0.5755 
(1.48) 
0.3268 
(3.00)*** 
1.29 
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 Ownership structure:           
   Not-for-profit hospitals  -0.1769 
(-2.98)*** 
0.0429 
(2.57)** 
-0.8910 
(-2.11)** 
0.1602 
(1.20) 
1.43     
   For-profit hospitals  -0.3156 
(-5.81)*** 
0.078 
(2.37)** 
-0.3660 
(-0.85) 
0.2992 
(2.47)** 
1.74 
Hospital size   0.0004 
(4.01)*** 
-0.0124 
(-1.93)* 
0.0027 
(1.50) 
-0.1503 
(-2.71)*** 
1.52 
Hospital age  -0.0008 
(-0.87) 
0.0004 
(1.24) 
-0.0146 
(-2.12)** 
0.0073 
(2.95)*** 
1.31 
Location  0.0743 
(1.72)* 
0.0254 
(1.92)* 
0.4737 
(1.34) 
-0.3663 
(-3.76)*** 
1.20 
Constant  0.5875 
(8.14)*** 
0.9806 
(29.55)***    
9.3964 
(18.19)***      
4.9238 
(21.89)*** 
 
R-squared  0.1364  0.0769  0.0419  0.0803   
F-stat  10.27  4.76  1.85  5.72   
Prob> F  0.0000  0.0001  0.0896  0.0000   
Obs  132  132  132  132   
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
mean significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively. Hospital 
board is a dummy variable and is defined as 1 where the hospital has a board in place 
and 0 where the hospital has no board. Hospital ownership structure is defined as a 
categorical variable = 1 if public hospital (reference point), 2 if not-for-profit hospital 
and 3 if for-profit hospital. Hospital size is defined as the log of number of hospital 
beds. Hospital age is defined as the number of years the hospital has been in 
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 existence. Location is a dummy variable = 1 if the hospital is located in the national 
capital and 0 if it is located outside the national capital.  
 
In terms of the control variables, the results of this study reveal that hospital 
size has a strongly significant positive effect on occupancy (at 1% significant 
level) but has a weakly significant negative effect on discharge rate (at 10% 
significant level) and strongly negative effect on health service quality (at 1% 
significant level). The positive relationship between hospital size and 
occupancy rate indicates that larger hospitals exhibit higher occupancy rate. 
In terms of discharge  rate, the results suggest that larger hospitals have 
lower discharge rate. It stands to reason that larger hospitals may perform 
poorly as shown in the higher occupancy rate and lower discharge rate. In 
other words, smaller hospitals on the other hand could be said to be better 
performing in terms of occupancy  rate,  discharge  rate  and health service 
quality. The provision of better health service quality by smaller hospitals and 
the associated higher discharge rate may be due to the relatively smaller 
number of patients they have to deal with. Therefore, they may be in the 
position to provide individualized care resulting in higher discharge and 
better performance. The results on the effect of hospital size on performance 
are in tandem with the position of Alexander and Lee (2006) that  smaller 
hospitals tend to have smaller boards, which are said to be more effective and 
efficient in their decision-making and strategic planning and this eventually 
leads to better performance of these hospitals. 
 
Hospital age is found to have a statistically and strongly significant negative 
effect on efficiency (at 5% significant level) and a strongly significant positive 
influence on health service quality (at 1% significant level). This means older 
hospitals exhibit lower expenses to statistical beds ratio (i.e.,  higher 
efficiency). The better performance with respect to efficiency on the part of 
older hospitals could be attributed to the fact that older hospitals may be 
experienced and well resourced. Therefore, based on the learning curve they 
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 may be capable of operating at lower costs or they may be more efficient than 
their younger counterparts. The positive relationship between age and service 
quality show that older hospitals provide better health service quality. The 
provision of better health service delivery among older hospitals may be 
attributed to the fact that older hospitals tend to have better health facilities 
and experienced physicians and health workers who are able to render health 
services taking into consideration all the dimensions of quality service. It 
could also be inferred that older hospitals are able to translate the high level 
of efficiency to better service delivery to their patients. This finding confirms 
the  results of Kimberly and Evanisko (1981)  that,  age is significantly 
associated with the level of hospital technological innovation and this has the 
tendency of increasing performance.  
 
With respect to location, the results of this study indicate that location has 
statistically and weakly significant positive effects on occupancy rate (at 10% 
significant level) and discharge  rate  (at 10% significant level),  but shows a 
statistically and strongly significant negative effect on perception of health 
service quality  (at 1% significant level). The positive effects of location on 
occupancy  rate  and discharge  rate  suggest that, hospitals located in the 
national capital (Accra) are associated with higher occupancy rate and higher 
discharge rate. The high occupancy rate may be due to the huge number of 
patients in hospitals located in Accra. Considering the high population in 
Accra, most hospitals in Accra tend to experience high attendance and full 
occupancy rate of the available beds. Also, given the high number of patients 
hospitals located in Accra have to grabble with, they may have to discharge 
these patients faster in order to give room to newly admitted patients. It also 
stands to reason that bigger hospitals are located in Accra and these tend to 
be characterized by high occupancy  rate. In the same vein, most private 
hospitals are located with the national capital and these hospitals are 
characterized by higher discharge  rate. The negative relationship between 
location and service quality indicates that hospitals located outside the 
national capital (Accra) are perceived by patients to render better quality of 
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 care compared to hospitals located in Accra. This may be due to the relatively 
small size of the population of patients outside the capital compared to the 
population of patients in the capital city. A lower patient-medical staff ratio 
facilitates individualized care, thus, the delivery of better quality healthcare.  
 
 
 
7.3  Hospital Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and 
Performance 
This section discusses the results on the effects of hospital board 
characteristics and ownership structure on the performance of hospitals. The 
results as shown on Table 7.2 indicate that board size has a weakly 
significant negative relationship with service quality (at 10% significant level), 
but has a strongly significant positive effect on occupancy (at 5% significant 
level). The negative effect of board size on service quality and positive effect 
on occupancy  rate  suggests that larger boards are weakly  associated with 
lower service quality and this may be due to the difficulty in reaching a 
consensus at board meetings in order to provide better quality of care. This 
may eventually lead to higher occupancy at the hospital. On the other hand, 
hospitals with smaller boards tend to take decisions to improve or provide 
better quality of health service. This might be due to the fact that smaller 
boards have the ability to easily reach a consensus during strategic planning 
and critical decision-making process. This is necessary in ensuring that the 
hospital renders good quality of care to its patients. Hence, the smaller the 
board size, the higher patients’ perception about the hospital’s provision of 
better health service. With respect to the effect of board size on occupancy, 
the results suggest that smaller boards bring about lower occupancy. Since 
smaller boards are associated with better service delivery, this also translates 
into lower length of time patients will be on admission, thus lower occupancy. 
The findings in terms of board size support  hypothesis (H
2a) and are 
consistent with the position of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who argue that large 
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 boards tend to reduce effectiveness thereby making it easier for the CEO to 
control. On the other hand, smaller boards are generally said to be more 
effective than larger boards. The findings are also in tandem with the findings 
of previous empirical works (see Bader, 1991; Gu et al., 2010). For instance, 
Bader (1991) intimated that small number of governing boards within a health 
system would ensure that boards focus more on their role within the system. 
Gu et al. (2010) also found that higher performing hospitals tended to have 
smaller boards.  
 
The regression results reveal a statistically and weakly significant positive 
relationship between board composition and discharge  rate  (significant  at 
10% level),  but a strongly  significant  negative relationship between board 
composition and efficiency  (at 1% significant level). This indicates that 
hospitals with greater proportion of outside board members exhibit higher 
discharge and lower expenses to statistical beds ratio. The extant literature 
suggests that the independence of the board is enhanced with greater 
percentage of outside or external members. It is expected that independent 
boards can bring their experience to bear on the operations of the hospital in 
guiding hospital management to be cost efficient as shown in the findings of 
this study. Therefore, hospital boards with greater percentage of outside 
board members tend to have effective internal control systems that translate 
into cost efficiency. The high level of efficiency brought to bear by outside 
board members may translate into better healthcare for patients and 
therefore lead to high discharge rate. The findings with respect to the effect 
of board composition are in tandem with the hypothesis (H
3a) that board 
composition is related to higher performance. Also, the results generally 
agree with the findings of Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Brickley et al. (1994). 
 
Medical staff representation on the board shows a  strongly  significant 
negative effect on  occupancy  rate  (at 1% significant level) but signals a 
strongly significant positive effect on efficiency (at 1% significant level). The 
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 results show that,  greater representation of medical staff on the hospital 
board bring about lower occupancy. In other words, hospital boards with a 
high proportion of medical staff tend to entertain low occupancy rate. The 
results also suggest that greater percentage of medical staff on the hospital 
board is associated with higher expenses to statistical beds ratio. This means 
that hospitals with greater representation of medical staff on the board 
appear to operate at higher cost in their provision of healthcare services. This 
finding partially supports the alternate hypothesis (H
4b)  that medical staff 
representation lowers hospital performance. 
 
Board leadership structure reveals weakly  significant negative relationships 
with discharge  rate  (at  10%  significant  level),  strongly  significant  negative 
relationship with efficiency (at 1% significant level), and strongly significant 
negative relationship with service quality (at 1% significant level). This means 
that, hospital boards, which  have the CEO also serving as the board 
chairperson, have lower discharge rate, lower expense ratio and lower health 
service quality. It is observed that, in terms of efficiency, hospitals with CEO 
duality perform better as shown in having  lower ratio of expenses to 
statistical beds. This finding appears to supports  the  alternate  hypothesis 
(H
5b). However, with respect to discharge rate and health service quality, the 
findings of this study seem to give preference for a board typology, in which 
the positions of the CEO and board chair are decoupled. This indicates that, 
hospitals, which have the roles of the CEO and the board chair performed by 
two different individuals, tend to exhibit higher level of discharge rate and 
are also perceived to provide better health service quality. In other words, 
decoupling the roles of CEO and board chair leads to better performance in 
terms of discharge  rate  and health service quality. The existing literature 
suggests that, where the CEO also acts as board chairman, leadership faces 
conflict of interest, thus giving preference for the system where the CEO’s 
role is separated from that of the board chairperson (Brickley et al., 1997). 
Therefore, it is expected that separating the roles of the CEO and that of the 
board chair strengthen the effectiveness of the hospital board to be able to 
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 deliver better quality of healthcare. This position is consistent with the  
hypothesis (H
5a). The findings on board leadership structure on discharge rate 
and health service quality are consistent with the stakeholder theory which 
suggests that duality seriously impedes the overall stakeholder orientation of 
board members, therefore, separating the functions of the CEO and board 
chair may be viewed as enhancing the board’s monitoring and control ability, 
and improve director’s information processing capacities (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998).  
 
Board diversity is defined as the proportion of females represented on the 
hospital board. The findings of this study reveal that board diversity has 
strongly  significant positive relationships  with  discharge  rate  (at  5% 
significant  level)  and service quality  (at  1%  significant  level). These results 
suggest that hospitals with higher female representation on their board 
experience higher discharge rate and better health service quality, consistent 
with (H
6a). Hospital boards with female representation tend to ensure the 
delivery of better quality of care, resulting in higher level of discharge. This 
could be explained by the fact that women are more intuitive and may bring 
up interesting dimensions to board discussions, and thereby improving the 
overall decision-making in ensuring better quality of care.  
 
The findings of this study also show that frequency of board meetings 
strongly and  significantly lead to better performance using occupancy, 
discharge and service quality indicators.  Frequency of board meetings is 
found to negatively affect occupancy (at 1% significant level), but positively 
influence discharge (at 5% significant level) and health service quality (at 1% 
significant level). The results with respect to the frequency of board meetings 
indicate that hospital boards that meet frequently are able to improve their 
service quality delivery  resulting in lower occupancy and higher discharge. 
This could be explained by the fact that regular board meetings affords the 
hospital board the opportunity to review and compare the hospital’s present 
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 medical practices with current and emerging practices. Such regular reviews 
are important in making the necessary changes to improve the delivery of 
healthcare. The finding on the effect of frequency of board meetings on 
perception of health service quality is consistent with hypothesis (H
7a). 
Holding frequent board meetings enables board members to be better 
informed in order to contribute to meeting the resource needs of the hospital 
so as to improve on the performance of the hospital. 
 
Consistent with the results on the effect of the presence of hospital board on 
performance as shown on Table 7.1, mission-based and private hospitals 
exhibit lower occupancy rate compared to public hospitals. Again, compared 
to public hospitals, private hospitals  show higher discharge  rate.  The 
regression  results as shown on Table 7.2 indicate that mission-based 
hospitals  also  tend to provide better health service quality and this may 
explain the lower occupancy rate they exhibit. Private hospitals are also found 
to be cost efficient compared to public hospitals.  
 
The control variables generally show signs consistent with the findings on the 
effects of the presence of hospital board and ownership structure on the 
performance of hospitals. In addition, the results as indicated in Table 7.2 
reveal  that hospital age is strongly  associated with lower occupancy and 
higher discharge.  It was observed from the results of the first model,  as 
shown in Table 7.1,  that older hospitals are more experienced and are 
capable of providing better health service quality. Therefore, it is expected 
that the delivery of better health service quality will result in lower occupancy 
rate and higher discharge rate.  
 
Table 7.2:  Effects of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structure on 
Performance  
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 Variable  Occupancy  Discharge  Efficiency  Service 
Quality 
VIF 
Board size   0.0150 
(2.19)** 
0.0005 
(0.53) 
0.0179  
(0.31) 
-0.0231 
(-1.96)* 
2.03     
Board composition  -0.2286 
(-0.88) 
0.0315 
(1.91)* 
-2.6085 
(-2.77)***    
0.1927 
(0.94) 
1.50     
Medical staff on board  -1.0471 
(-3.83)*** 
0.0082 
(0.45) 
3.5320 
(3.43)***    
-0.1837 
(-0.87) 
1.70     
Board leadership 
structure  
0.2005 
(1.19) 
-0.0213 
(-1.73)* 
-3.6635 
(-5.31)***    
-0.4531 
(-3.64)*** 
2.10     
Board diversity  0.1367 
(0.36) 
0.0546 
(2.17)** 
-0.9685 
(-0.45)    
0.5442 
(2.07)*** 
1.52     
Frequency of board 
meetings 
-0.3519 
(-3.43)*** 
0.0153 
(2.00)** 
0.3507 
(0.83)    
0.4555 
(6.11)*** 
1.32     
Ownership structure:           
   Not-for-profit hospitals  -0.4885 
(-2.63)*** 
0014 
(0.15) 
0.9695 
(1.62)    
0.2883 
(2.29)** 
1.84     
   For-profit hospitals  -0.9941 
(-4.69)*** 
0.0278 
(2.21)** 
-3.1794  
(-2.80)***  
0.1227 
(0.88) 
2.66     
Hospital size   0.5456 
(7.97)*** 
-0.0098 
(-2.47)** 
0.1446 
(0.39)   
-0.2030 
(-3.32)*** 
2.04     
Hospital age    -0.010  0.0004  -0.0093   0.0007  2.01     
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 (-2.87)***  (1.98)**  (-0.73)    (0.26) 
Location  0.0779 
(0.55) 
0.0156 
(1.68)* 
-0.5426 
(-0.80)   
-0.5673 
(-5.36)*** 
1.46     
Constant  0.9747 
(2.14)** 
1.0129 
(30.03)*** 
9.6597 
(4.33)***    
5.3022 
(15.51)*** 
 
R-squared  0.2707  0.2702  0.2807  0.2737   
F-stat  8.27  6.60  4.51  8.70   
Prob> F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   
Obs  91  91  91  91   
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
mean significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively. Board size 
is defined as the number of board members. Board composition is defined as the 
proportion of outside board members on the board. Board participation by medical 
staff is the proportion of medical staff on the board. Board leadership structure is a 
dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board chair and 0 if otherwise. Board diversity is defined 
as the proportion of females on the board. Frequency of board meetings is the 
number of board meetings in the year. Hospital ownership structure is defined as a 
categorical variable = 1 if public hospital (reference point), 2 if not-for-profit hospital 
and 3 if for-profit hospital. Hospital size is defined as the number of hospital beds. 
Hospital age is defined as the number of years the hospital has been in existence. 
Location is a dummy variable = 1 if the hospital is located in the national capital and 
0 if it is located outside the national capital.  
 
7.4  Interaction Effects of Board Characteristics and Ownership 
Structure on Performance  
This section discusses the results on the interaction effects of board 
characteristics and ownership structure on the performance of hospitals. The 
results on the interaction between board characteristics and ownership 
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 structure on hospital performance as indicated on Table 7.3 reveal interesting 
findings. Mission-based hospitals with larger board size exhibit  strongly 
significant associations with  lower occupancy  rate, higher discharge  rate, 
improved level of efficiency, and better service quality than public hospitals 
with smaller boards. Private hospitals with larger boards also exhibit strongly 
significant relationship with better service quality than public hospitals with 
smaller boards. In addition, they show strongly significant lower occupancy 
rate  than their public counterparts with smaller boards. The interaction of 
private hospitals and board size is however insignificant in explaining the 
level of efficiency.  
The interaction of board composition and ownership reveal that both mission-
based and private hospitals with greater percentage of outside  directors’ 
record  strongly significant higher discharge  rate, are more efficient and 
demonstrate better service quality than public hospitals that have greater 
proportion of inside board members. In the case of mission-based hospitals, 
the results show that those with higher proportion of external board 
membership record lower  occupancy  rate  than public hospitals with many 
inside board members.  Board composition was however not significant in 
determining the efficiency of private hospitals. 
 
It is observed that mission-based hospitals with greater representation of 
medical staff on their  hospital boards  are strongly significant in 
demonstrating lower occupancy rate, higher discharge rate, better efficiency, 
and provide good quality health service than public hospitals that have fewer 
medical staff on their board. In terms of private hospitals, the results reveal 
hat, those with greater percentage of medical staff representation on the 
hospital board exhibit strongly significant associations with all performance 
measures. For instance, private hospitals provide better health service quality 
than public hospitals with fewer medical staff representation on the board. 
However, the private hospitals with high medical staff board participation 
have higher occupancy rate, lower discharge rate and are less efficient than 
public hospitals with lower medical staff board participation.  
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The results indicate that boards of mission-based hospitals that have the CEO 
as the board chair are strongly significant in explaining performance. They 
show higher occupancy rate, are less efficient and compromises the quality of 
services provided, compared with boards of public hospitals that have 
separate people playing the roles of board chair and CEO. Boards of private 
hospitals with same person serving as CEO and board chair have significantly 
strong association with higher occupancy  rate  and  provide poor service 
quality compared to their public hospital board counterparts with the CEO 
being different from the board chair.  
 
More female representation on the boards of mission-based hospitals are 
strongly significant in determining  lower occupancy rate, higher discharge 
rate, and better quality of services, compared to public hospitals with less 
female representation on their board. Private hospitals with more female 
representation only significant in the provision of better quality of services 
than public hospitals with less female representation on their board. 
 
Frequent board meetings in both private and mission based hospitals has 
been observed to have significantly strong associations with lower occupancy, 
higher discharge and better service quality, compared to public hospitals with 
less frequency of board meetings. Additionally, frequent board meetings in 
mission-based hospitals demonstrate improved efficiency better than boards 
of public hospitals with less frequency of board meetings.  
 
Table 7.3: Interaction Effects of Board Characteristics and Ownership 
Structure on Performance  
Variable  Occupancy  Discharge  Efficiency  Service  VIF 
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 Quality 
Board size   0.0169 
(0.81) 
0.0021 
(1.55) 
-0.3020 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.0367 
(-3.23)** 
2.03     
Board composition  0.0597 
(0.12) 
0.1448 
(4.16)*** 
-13.1696 
(-5.67)*** 
-0.5551 
(-1.61) 
1.50     
Medical staff on board  -2.1221 
(-3.78)*** 
0.0864 
(3.45)*** 
-4.9005 
(-2.59)** 
-1.8683 
(-5.65)*** 
1.70     
Board leadership structure   0.1930 
(0.60) 
-0.0304 
(-1.72)* 
-4.5682 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.6315 
(-3.23)*** 
2.10     
Board diversity  1.4663 
(1.67) 
0.1012 
(2.85)*** 
-1.2529 
(-0.39) 
0.7199 
(1.72)* 
1.52     
Frequency of board meetings  -0.5239 
(-1.73)* 
0.0779 
(5.52)*** 
5.3469 
(4.62)*** 
0.7315 
(4.48)*** 
1.32     
Ownership structure:           
   Not-for-profit hospitals  -6.1448 
(-5.15)*** 
0.1464 
(3.14)*** 
-23.2309 
(-3.72)*** 
4.0985 
(6.90)*** 
1.84     
   For-profit hospitals  -0.4383 
(-1.77)* 
0.0638 
(0.78) 
-5.6808 
(-1.72)*** 
1.6643 
(3.12)*** 
2.66     
Board size*Not-for-profit  -0.6874 
(-6.72)*** 
0.0099 
(2.94)*** 
-1.1105 
(-3.22)*** 
0.1980 
(5.77)*** 
 
Board size*For-profit  -0.7748 
(-2.33)** 
0.0261 
(1.69)* 
-0.2056 
(-0.48) 
0.0906 
(2.67)*** 
 
Board comp*Not-for-profit  -5.3294 
(-4.05)*** 
0.1424 
(3.87)*** 
-22.5492 
(-7.20)*** 
1.0530 
(2.02)** 
 
Board comp*For-profit  -0.6561  0.5671  -15.29  0.9849   
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 (-1.06)  (1.70)*  (-3.92)***  (1.90)* 
Medical board*Not-for-profit  -16.0359 
(-6.96)*** 
0.2796 
(2.79)** 
-64.8558 
(-4.64)*** 
5.1855 
(5.13)*** 
 
Medical board*For-profit  0.8149 
(3.48)*** 
-0.7095 
(-1.68)* 
11.0599 
(3.36)*** 
   2.8801 
(7.02)*** 
 
Board leadership 
structure*Not-for-profit 
11.6768 
(5.82)*** 
0.088 
(0.22) 
23.8022 
(4.92)*** 
-1.3039 
(-3.71)*** 
 
Board leadership 
structure*For-profit 
0.4193 
(2.28)** 
-0.2683 
(-1.83)* 
1.8362 
(1.74)* 
-1.7906 
(-7.03)*** 
 
Board diversity*Not-for-profit  -28.4542 
(-6.46)*** 
0.1374 
(1.78)* 
-3.8759 
(-0.86) 
1.4572 
(2.10)** 
 
Board diversity*For-profit  -0.8939 
(-0.93) 
0.0286 
(0.19) 
3.9256 
(0.61) 
1.6597 
(3.11)*** 
 
Frequency*Not-for-profit  -1.4344 
(-3.12)*** 
0.0721 
(4.01)*** 
-10.6205 
(-5.64)*** 
0.7610 
(3.54)*** 
 
Frequency*For-profit  -0.0998 
(-3.10)*** 
0.3840 
(1.88)* 
-4.1209 
(-2.01)** 
0.4288 
(2.48)** 
 
Hospital size  1.1129 
(12.24)*** 
-0.0187 
(-2.76)*** 
0.7833 
(1.91)* 
-0.2681 
(-4.58)*** 
2.04     
Hospital age  -0.0276 
(-6.34)** 
0.0096 
(1.66)* 
-0.0456 
(-2.59)** 
-0.0040 
(-1.46) 
2.01     
Location  -0.1126 
(-0.73) 
0.0096 
(0.66) 
1.0290 
(1.49) 
-0.4196 
(-3.79)*** 
1.46     
Constant  2.3104 
(3.39)*** 
0.9582 
(20.22)*** 
12.4935 
(5.27)*** 
6.8567 
(15.88)*** 
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 R-squared  0.5437  0.5525  0.6034  0.5745   
F-stat  10.88  8.21     7.61  14.21   
Prob> F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   
Obs  91  91  91  91   
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
mean significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively. Board size 
is defined as the number of board members. Board composition is defined as the 
proportion of outside board members on the board. Board participation by medical 
staff is the proportion of medical staff on the board. Board leadership structure is a 
dummy = 1 if the CEO is the board chair and 0 if otherwise. Board diversity is defined 
as the proportion of females on the board. Frequency of board meetings is the log of 
number of board meetings in the year. Hospital ownership structure is defined as a 
categorical variable = 1 if public hospital (reference point), 2 if not-for-profit hospital 
and 3 if for-profit hospital. Hospital size is defined as the log of number of hospital 
beds. Hospital age is defined as the number of years the hospital has been in 
existence. Location is a dummy variable = 1 if the hospital is located in the national 
capital and 0 if it is located outside the national capital.  
 
 
7.5  Empirical Implications 
The other objectives of this study were to examine the effects of the presence 
of hospital board and ownership structure on hospital performance, and also 
evaluate the effects of healthcare board characteristics and hospital 
ownership structure on performance. The findings of this study have shown 
that the presence of a hospital board is necessary in improving the 
performance of the hospital. Healthcare governing boards are said to be a 
crucial element of the overall healthcare governance system. They are 
accountable for the overall performance of their healthcare organizations and 
also contribute in shaping the hospital or health facility they represent and 
ultimately impacting the healthcare system in general. Lister (2006) explains 
that the board has an important role to play in establishing policies and 
guidelines that will assist in driving the quality transformation process. In the 
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 view of Kroch et al. (2006), hospital boards have the ultimate responsibility of 
ensuring improvement in the quality of healthcare provided by the hospital. 
Therefore, hospitals that adopt a governance system by having a board in 
place will exhibit better performance and deliver better service quality to their 
patients compared to their counterparts, which have no hospital board 
structure. 
 
Although stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory suggest the 
need for large board size to enhance performance, the findings of this study 
reveal that smaller boards rather exhibit better performance. Smaller boards 
avoid the prolonged boardroom discussion and the difficulty in reaching a 
consensus associated with large boards. Smaller boards are able to take 
quicker decisions in delivering better service to their patients and therefore, 
enhance performance. In that sense, smaller boards are more effective than 
larger boards. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards tend to 
reduce effectiveness, thereby making it easier for the CEO to control. Recent 
thinking is leaning more towards smaller boards. The argument in favour of 
smaller board size is supported by previous empirical studies. For instance, 
Bader (1991) indicated that, small number of governing boards within a 
health system would ensure that boards focus more on their role within the 
system. Gu et al.  (2010) also found that smaller boards exhibit higher 
performance. It however appears that, more effective boards are smaller and 
similar in terms of general performance  outcomes only, but these do not 
consider institutional as well as stakeholder characteristics, which are very 
central to governance (see Andrews, 2010). However, this assertion does not 
apply in the interaction effect of mission and private hospitals where larger 
board size was rather strongly significantly associated with lower occupancy 
rates and provision of better service quality. This giving credence to previous 
studies that suggest larger boards have wider range of expertise and 
connections to resources that are useful in driving performance of 
organisations (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). The interaction effect on 
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 board size is explained by both the stakeholders and resource dependency 
theories. 
 
Board composition is explained by managerialism theory, which proposes 
that inside directors are in a better position than outside directors to motivate 
managers in order to enhance performance. This is because inside 
management members have better insights about the operation of the 
hospital and therefore are in a better position to drive performance. However, 
the findings indicate that greater proportion of outside directors is associated 
with enhanced performance in terms of efficiency. Having a higher proportion 
of outside directors on the board increases the independence of the board. It 
is argued that independent boards can bring their experience to bear on the 
operations of the hospitals by guiding hospital management to implement 
effective internal control systems, which ultimately improves efficiency and 
performance. Previous empirical studies by Byrd and Hickman (1992) and 
Brickley et al. (1994) support the position that boards composed of greater 
number of outside or external board members bring about enhanced hospital 
performance. The findings with respect to board composition rather give 
credence to the resource dependency theory.  
 
In the case of hospitals, the resource dependency theory proposes that 
having outside members such as outside physicians on the hospital board 
helps to improve the operations of the hospital, thus enhance performance. 
This supports the results of Molinari et al. (1995) who found that hospitals 
with medical staff and outside physician board participation perform better 
than boards with medical insider board participation and no outside 
physicians. The findings with respect to the effect of board composition also 
support the resource dependency theory, which advocates for having greater 
proportion of outside board members. The presence of external board 
members assists the hospital to protect itself against external environment 
and attract more resources, which subsequently increases performance. In the 
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 hospitals, outsider members, such as outside physician board members help 
to keep hospital boards informed regarding developments in patient care and 
practices. The resource dependence theory emphasizes that external 
directors enhance the ability of a firm to protect itself against the external 
environment, reduce uncertainty, or co-opt resources that increase the firm’s 
ability to raise funds or increase its status and recognition (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Middleton (1987) also argues  that a board 
composed of influential members from the organization’s external 
environment performs a boundary-spanning function that absorbs 
uncertainty, reduces operational dependencies, exchanges information, 
represents the organization to external stakeholders, and enhances overall 
performance. The findings of this study have shown that hospitals with 
greater representation of medical staff on the board exhibit lower level of 
occupancy but operate at higher cost in their provision of healthcare services. 
The finding with respect to the effect of medical staff representation on the 
board partially support the managerialism theory and resource dependency 
theory.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that hospitals with CEO duality perform 
better in terms of efficiency contrary to theoretical prediction. However, with 
respect to discharge rate and health service quality, the findings of this study 
appear to suggest a board typology, in which the positions of the CEO and 
board chair are decoupled. The results reveal that separating the roles of CEO 
and board chair leads to better performance in terms of discharge rate and 
health service quality. The findings on board leadership structure on 
discharge rate and health service quality are consistent with the stakeholder 
theory which suggests that duality seriously impedes the overall stakeholder 
orientation of board members, therefore, separating the functions of the CEO 
and board chair may be viewed as enhancing the board’s monitoring and 
control ability, and improve director’s information processing capacities 
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). It also strengthens the effectiveness of the 
hospital board to be able to deliver better quality of healthcare.  
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Gender diversity is also found to explain higher discharge  rate  and better 
service quality. This may imply that women are more intuitive and may bring 
up interesting dimensions to board discussions, and thereby improving the 
overall decision-making in ensuring better quality of care leading to higher 
discharge rate. Board diversity is based on the resource dependency theory. 
Diversity on the hospital board is important in order to increase effectiveness 
and competitiveness. The literature suggests hospital boards tend to recruit 
the most talented, dedicated, and accomplished people, and increasingly 
those people tend to be women with different perspectives, experiences, 
social network relationships, and problem solving approaches. The finding 
with respect to gender diversity supports the stakeholder and resource 
dependency theories. 
 
The findings of this study also show that frequency of board meetings 
significantly lead to lower occupancy, and better service quality. The results 
with respect to the frequency of board meetings show that hospital boards 
that meet frequently are able to improve their service quality delivery, 
resulting in lower occupancy rate. Holding frequent board meetings ensures 
that the board receives relevant information on the hospital to enable it to 
make useful decisions that will enhance performance. This finding could be 
explained within the context of the resource dependency theory in the sense 
that, by having relevant information on regular basis, board members are in a 
better position to make  meaningful contributions to the operations of the 
hospital and also assist in providing relevant resources to the hospital leading 
to improved hospital performance. 
 
The  findings of the study indicate that private hospitals record better 
performance than public hospitals, consistent with results of previous studies 
(see Barros, 2003; Weng et al., 2011). The extant literature suggests that for-
profit or private hospitals have an objective function of maximizing profit. 
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 Rajshkha et al. (1991) suggest that private or for-profit hospitals are wholly 
responsible for organizational performance in a competitive environment 
hence, they adopt or extend new medical technology proactively. In the view 
of Hart (1995),  the managers of private hospitals unlike their public 
counterpart are able to implement initiatives and innovations to improve 
efficiency and service quality (Hart, 1995). For-profit organizations are also 
said to be the most market-oriented providers and would have higher 
incentives to introduce new services and technologies that attract more 
consumers (Banaszak-Holl et al., 1996). However, public providers lack clear 
control rights to implement changes, thus limiting incentives for innovations. 
The findings of this study also show that mission-based hospital exhibit 
better performance than public hospitals. 
 
In terms of the interaction effects, the results reveal that mission-based 
hospitals with larger board size exhibit lower occupancy  rate, higher 
discharge  rate, improved level of efficiency and better service quality than 
public hospitals with smaller boards. Private hospitals with larger boards also 
exhibit lower occupancy rate, higher discharge rate, and better service quality 
than public hospitals with smaller boards. Both mission-based and private 
hospitals with greater percentage of outside directors record higher 
discharge, and demonstrate better service quality than public hospitals that 
have greater proportion of inside board members. In addition, mission-based 
hospitals with higher proportion of external board membership record lower 
occupancy  rate  than public hospitals with many inside board members. 
Boards of mission-based hospitals with greater representation of medical staff 
demonstrate lower occupancy, higher discharge, are more efficient and 
provide better quality health service than public hospitals that have fewer 
medical staff on their board. Boards of private hospitals with greater 
percentage of medical staff instead  exhibit higher occupancy  rate, lower 
discharge rate, lower efficiency and but provide better health service quality 
than public hospitals with fewer medical staff representation on the board.  
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 The results of the interaction effects also indicate that mission-based 
hospitals that have the CEO as the board chair show higher occupancy rate, 
are less efficient and provide poor quality of services compared with boards 
of public hospitals that have decoupled roles of CEO and board chair. Boards 
of private hospitals with same person serving as CEO and board chair have 
higher occupancy, and provide poor service quality compared to public 
hospital with the CEO being different from the board chair. Mission-based 
hospitals with more female representation on the boards show lower 
occupancy rate, and better quality of services compared to public hospitals 
with less female representation on their board. Private hospitals with more 
female representation equally provide better quality of services than public 
hospitals with less female representation on their board. Both private and 
mission-based hospitals that hold frequent board meetings exhibit lower 
occupancy rate, higher discharge rate, and better service quality, compared to 
public hospitals that hold less frequent of board meetings. In addition, 
mission-based hospitals that hold frequent board meetings are more efficient 
than boards of public hospitals that hold less frequent board meetings.  
 
7.6  Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the effects of the presence of hospital board and 
ownership structure on hospital performance. It then evaluated the effects of 
healthcare board characteristics and hospital ownership structure on their 
performance  and  also examined the interaction effects of hospital board 
characteristics and ownership on performance. Multiple regression models 
were used in the study. The regression results revealed that, hospitals that 
have a governing board in place have higher occupancy but they are 
perceived to deliver better health service quality compared to hospitals 
without a governing board. This could be attributed to the fact that governing 
boards properly perform their supervisory and regulatory roles thereby 
ensuring that the hospitals deliver good quality care. Hospital boards are 
necessary in taking decisions that would improve the quality of services 
provided by the hospitals.  
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With respect to the effect of board characteristics, smaller boards were found 
to be associated with better health service quality and lower occupancy rate, 
suggesting that hospitals with smaller boards tend to take decisions to 
improve or provide better quality of health service and this can be translated 
into lower occupancy. Hospitals with greater proportion of outside board 
members exhibit lower expenses because these independent board members 
tend to make suggestions that assist hospital management to be cost 
efficient. The results also showed that hospitals with greater representation 
of medical staff on the board exhibit lower level occupancy but operate at 
higher cost in their provision of healthcare services. Hospitals with CEO 
duality perform better in terms of efficiency rates. However, with respect to 
discharge rate and health service quality, the findings of this study suggest 
that hospital performance enhances when the positions of the CEO and board 
chair are decoupled. Hospitals with higher female representation on their 
board ensure the delivery of better quality of healthcare, resulting in higher 
level of discharge rate. Frequency of board meetings is associated with lower 
occupancy, higher discharge and improved health service quality. 
 
In terms of the effects of ownership structure, the results of this study 
revealed that both  mission-based and private hospitals perform better in 
terms of occupancy, discharge, efficiency and health service quality. Mission-
based and private hospitals generally tend to provide prompt and appropriate 
treatment compared to public hospitals. Providing better quality of healthcare 
to patients by mission-based and private hospitals, result in lower occupancy 
rate and higher rate of discharge. Public hospitals on the other hand are often 
confronted with very high number of patients and therefore have high 
occupancy rate and low discharge rate and low service quality.  
 
The results of the interaction effects revealed that mission-based hospitals 
with larger board size exhibit lower occupancy rate, higher discharge rate, 
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 improved level of efficiency and better service quality than public hospitals 
with smaller boards. Private hospitals with larger boards also exhibit lower 
occupancy rate, and better service quality than public hospitals with smaller 
boards. Both mission-based and private hospitals with greater percentage of 
outside directors record higher discharge  rate, and demonstrate better 
service quality than public hospitals that have greater proportion of inside 
board members. In addition, mission-based hospitals with higher proportion 
of external board membership record lower occupancy  rate  and  are more 
efficient than public hospitals with many inside board members. Boards of 
mission-based hospitals with greater representation of medical staff 
demonstrate lower occupancy rate, higher discharge rate, are more efficient 
and provide better quality health service than public hospitals that have fewer 
medical staff on their board. Boards of private hospitals with greater 
percentage of medical staff exhibit higher occupancy rate, lower discharge 
rate, lower efficiency and provide better health service quality than public 
hospitals with fewer medical staff representation on the board.  
 
The findings of the interaction effects also revealed that mission-based 
hospitals that have the CEO as the board chair show higher occupancy rate, 
are less efficient and provide poor quality of services compared with boards 
of public hospitals that have decoupled roles of CEO and board chair. Boards 
of private hospitals with same person serving as CEO and board chair have 
higher occupancy rate, and provide poor service quality compared to public 
hospital with the CEO being different from the board chair. Mission-based 
hospitals with more female representation on the boards show lower 
occupancy, and better quality of services compared to public hospitals with 
less female representation on their board. Private hospitals with more female 
representation equally provide better quality of services than public hospitals 
with less female representation on their board. Both private and mission-
based hospitals that hold frequent board meetings exhibit lower occupancy 
rate, higher discharge  rate  and better service quality, compared to public 
hospitals that hold less frequent of board meetings. In addition, mission-
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 based hospitals that hold frequent board meetings are more efficient than 
boards of public hospitals that hold less frequent board meetings.  
 
The results also revealed that larger hospitals perform poorly as shown in the 
higher occupancy rate and lower discharge rate. Older hospitals were found 
to be efficient. Older hospitals operating at lower costs may be explained by 
the learning curve and this can be translated into the provision of better 
service delivery to their patients. With respect to location, the results indicate 
that hospitals located in the national capital (Accra) are associated are 
associated with poor service quality, while those located outside the national 
capital are perceived by patients to render better quality of care Hospitals 
located outside Accra may be perceived to provide better service because of 
the relatively smaller number patients they have to attend to. A lower patient-
medical staff ratio facilitates individualized care, thus, the delivery of better 
quality healthcare.  
 
It is important to note however that, governance characteristics, ownership 
type and the control variable might very well be determined by the 
performance of hospitals. For instance, some hospitals could be taken over by 
other owners depending on their performance, and governance structures 
might also be changed relative to prevailing performance measures of the 
hospital. Thus, issues of endogeneity are expected in this instance. However, 
this study used non-randomly selected data in  examining correlational 
associations between variables and not causal links (Menaldo, 2011). 
 
The next chapter provides a summary of the study. It also concludes the 
study by drawing relevant implications for policy formulation based on the 
findings of the study. It also shows the limitations of the study and identifies 
areas for further research.                              
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Chapter 8 
Summary, Conclusion and Policy 
Implications 
 
8.1  Summary  
Healthcare governance or hospital governance is referred to as the process of 
steering the overall functioning and effective performance of a hospital, by 
defining the hospital’s mission, setting its objectives, supporting and 
monitoring their realization at the operational level (Flynn, 2002). The axis of 
hospital’s governing board is constituted by professional team of executive 
managers and the purpose of the hospital governance is to enable a more 
integrated approach of supporting and supervising all hospital activities, 
including clinical performance (Eeckloo et al. 2004).  The effectiveness of the 
healthcare governance system in enhancing the performance of the hospital 
depends on how the hospital board is structured. The existing literature 
suggests that the structure of the hospital board is looked at in terms of 
board size, board composition, medical staff participation, board leadership 
structure board diversity, and frequency of meetings and these have 
implications for the hospital. 
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 This study examined the effects of healthcare governing boards and 
ownership structure on the performance of hospitals from the perspective of 
an African country, Ghana considering that previous studies have examined 
the issue focusing on developed countries. The specific objectives of the 
study were to: i) examine the characteristics of hospital boards in Ghana; ii) 
ascertain whether or not the presence of a  hospital board affects its 
performance; iii) evaluate the effect of hospital board characteristics on the 
performance of hospitals; iv) examine the effect of hospital ownership 
structure on hospital performance, and v) investigate the interaction effects of 
hospital board characteristics and ownership on performance. 
 
In the second chapter, the principles of good hospital governance were also 
discussed and these were identified to include knowing what governance is, 
achievement of strategic  ends,  board-CEO  relationship,  unity of direction, 
unity of command,  unity of accountability/responsibility,  ownership  needs, 
self-improvement, and understanding the cost of governance. It is expected 
that when hospitals adhere to these principles of good governance they are 
likely to experience better performance. The chapter also reviewed literature 
on hospital ownership and governance models. The major ownership types 
include for-profit, non-profit, and public ownership. The ownership type of 
the hospital obviously has implications for the form of governance system 
adopted by the hospital. The literature review chapter also discussed the 
importance of hospital boards and the role they play in healthcare quality. 
The essence of hospital governance is to ensure a more integrated approach 
of supporting and supervising all hospital activities including clinical 
performance. Governing boards are recognized as being an important target 
for intervention for policymakers hoping to improve care in hospitals. High-
performing and low-performing hospitals are said to be differentiated by the 
level of board activities. The chapter then considered the literature on the 
effects of board characteristics including, board size, board composition, 
board participation by medical staff, board leadership structure, board 
diversity, and frequency of board meetings on hospital performance. The 
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 literature also discussed the effect of ownership structure on hospital 
performance. 
 
The healthcare system in Ghana was discussed in the third chapter of the 
study. It provided a review of the history of the healthcare system, the 
structure and governance of the healthcare system and healthcare financing 
and resource utilization. The chapter then discussed targeted health 
programmes, health infrastructure, indigenous healthcare system, health 
sector reforms, and health information technology. The structure of the 
healthcare system in Ghana and for that matter in any country would have 
implications for the type of governance structures adopted by healthcare 
institutions. Therefore, understanding the healthcare system is also important 
in explaining the hospital governance structures. In Ghana, teaching hospitals 
are required under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Law 
1996 (Act 525) to have  a board. However, in the case of the other public 
hospitals, they are not required under Act 525 to have a board. Therefore, 
public hospitals with a board might be following an existing practice prior to 
the passing of Act 525 or might be responding to administrative directives 
from their regional health directorate to have a board in place. The private 
hospitals are also not required by any Act to have a board. The formation of a 
hospital boards is thus at the discretion of the respective private hospitals. In 
the case of the mission-based hospitals, some of the churches for instance 
have a dedicated board overseeing a group of their hospitals in a particular 
district.  
 
The  fourth  chapter discussed the various governance theories, including 
agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, managerialism theory, 
stakeholder theory, and resource dependency theory. The theoretical basis of 
this study on healthcare governance can conveniently be covered under the 
managerialism theory, the stakeholder theory and the resource dependency 
theory. The fourth chapter also discussed how the hypotheses of this study 
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 were formulated based on existing literature and the theoretical underpinning 
of the study. 
 
To carry out this investigation, a survey strategy and questionnaires for 
gathering and analyzing data was employed. Three main regression models 
were estimated in examining the effects of healthcare governance and 
ownership on hospital performance. In the first model, the study focused on 
both hospitals with a hospital governing board and those without a board. 
The idea is to ascertain whether or not the existence or presence of hospital 
board, ownership structure and control factors affect performance of the 
hospitals. A dummy variable was  introduced to define whether or not a 
particular hospital has a board in place. In the second model, the study 
limited the sample to hospitals in Ghana with board structures by 
determining how hospital board characteristics and ownership structure 
affect  hospital performance. Hospital board characteristics include, board 
size, board composition, board participation by medical staff, board 
leadership structure, board diversity,  and  frequency of board meetings. 
Measures of performance include occupancy rate, discharge rate, efficiency, 
and health service quality. In the third model, hospital board characteristics 
are interacted with ownership variables to ascertain the effects on hospital 
performance.   
 
The analysis and discussion on the results first presented  the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in this study. The descriptive statistics of the 
performance measures (dependent variables) showed that, over half of the 
hospital beds are occupied daily and on the average the hospitals discharge a 
very high percentage of inpatients. The overall mean score of health service 
quality suggests that the health service quality ratings of Ghanaian hospitals 
are just above the average. The descriptive statistics also showed the mean 
values of the dependent variables across the three sample groups. Public 
hospitals have the highest occupancy rate, followed by mission hospitals, and 
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 private hospitals. Private hospitals exhibit the highest discharge  rate, 
followed by mission hospitals, and public hospitals. Mission-based hospitals 
and private hospitals appear to perform better than public hospitals in terms 
of occupancy rate and discharge rate. Mission-based hospitals are the most 
efficient in terms of the management of expenses, followed by private 
hospitals and lastly public hospitals. However, in terms of patients’ 
perception of health service quality, private hospitals record the highest 
score, followed by mission-based hospitals and lastly, public hospitals. The 
mean scores of both mission-based and private hospitals are above the 
overall mean, suggesting that mission and private hospitals are perceived to 
provide better health service quality than the average hospital. 
In examining the characteristics of hospital board governance, the results of 
this study showed that, more than half of all the hospitals sampled have 
hospital board structures in place. With respect to hospital with a board, the 
mean board size falls below the general recommendation. Board composition, 
medical staff representation, board leadership structure, board diversity, and 
frequency of board meetings generally fall within the general 
recommendations. In terms of the of hospital board governance across the 
forms of hospitals, the results indicated that half of the public hospitals have 
a hospital board in place. All the mission-based hospitals have a board and 
majority of the private hospitals have a hospital board in place. Public and 
mission-based hospitals have an average board size, which falls within the 
range recommended in literature, while private hospitals have a board size 
below the recommended range. Mission-based hospitals have the highest 
proportion of outside board members represented on the board, followed by 
private hospitals. Board composition of both mission-based and private 
hospitals is consistent with best practice, which suggests that, the board 
should be composed of majority outside board members. However, public 
hospitals have the lowest proportion of outside board members, which does 
not comply with best practice. In terms of board participation of medical 
staff, the results indicate that all the hospital forms have medical staff 
represented on their board. Private hospitals have the highest percentage of 
medical staff on the board, followed by public hospitals. Mission-based 
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 hospitals report the lowest percentage of medical staff on their board. The 
results show that, majority of mission-based and public hospitals maintain a 
board typology, where the CEO’s position is separate from that of the board 
chair consistent with best practice. The board leadership structure of most 
private hospitals does not comply with best practice. All the hospital forms 
have female representation on their board in compliance with best practice. 
Private hospitals have the highest female representation on the board 
followed by mission-based hospitals. Public hospitals maintain the lowest 
female representation on the board. Apart from mission-based hospitals, the 
other two forms of hospital generally hold the required number of meetings 
as recommended.  
The regression results on the effects of the presence of governing board, 
ownership structure as well as control variables on the performance of 
hospitals in Ghana revealed that, hospitals that have a governing board in 
place have higher occupancy but they are perceived to deliver better health 
service quality compared to hospitals without a governing board. This could 
be attributed to the fact that governing boards properly perform their 
supervisory and regulatory roles thereby ensuring that the hospitals deliver 
good quality care. Hospital boards are necessary in taking decisions that 
would improve the quality of services provided by the hospitals. Both mission-
based and private hospitals perform better in terms of occupancy and 
discharge  rates  because they tend to provide prompt and appropriate 
treatment. They also provide better quality of healthcare to their patients 
compared to their public counterparts. Public hospitals on the other hand 
tend to deal with very high number of patients and therefore have high 
occupancy rate and low discharge rate and low service quality. 
 
With regards to the effect of board characteristics on performance, smaller 
boards were found to be associated with better health service quality and 
lower occupancy rate, suggesting that hospitals with smaller boards tend to 
take decisions to improve or provide better quality of health service and this 
can be translated into lower occupancy rate. Hospitals with greater proportion 
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 of outside board members exhibit lower expenses because these outside 
board members tend to assist hospital management with suggestion on how 
to be cost efficient. The results also showed that hospitals with greater 
representation of medical staff on the board tend to entertain lower level of 
occupancy  rate  but  operate at higher cost in their provision of healthcare 
services. Hospitals with CEO duality perform better in terms of efficiency. 
However, with respect to discharge  rate  and health service quality, the 
findings of this study suggest that hospital performance is enhanced when 
the positions of the CEO and board chair are decoupled. Hospitals with higher 
female representation on their board ensure the delivery of better quality of 
healthcare, resulting in higher level of discharge. Frequency of board 
meetings result in improved health service quality. Consistent with the results 
on the effect of the presence of hospital board on performance, mission-
based and private hospitals exhibited lower occupancy  rate  compared to 
public hospitals. Again, private hospital compared to public hospitals showed 
higher discharge rate.  
 
The findings of the study indicate that interacting board characteristics with 
ownership structure have significant effects on hospital performance. The 
results generally suggest that both mission-based and private hospitals with 
effective board governance tend to exhibit better performance than public 
hospitals. 
 
8.2  Contributions of the Study 
The findings of this study make interesting contributions. This study applies 
the governance theories beyond the corporate world in a developing country 
context by focusing specifically on the health sector. This study sought to 
increase our standing on how healthcare governance and ownership structure 
affect the performance of hospitals. The view held in this paper is that the 
presence of hospital boards is important in the functioning of hospitals. 
Majority of the hospitals, thus, recognized the relevance of hospital board by 
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 having one in place. Hospital boards are said to constitute an important 
element of healthcare governance and they play a very significant role in the 
healthcare delivery system. Bader (1993) and Alexander et al. (2009) suggest 
that the hospital board is a central factor in healthcare governance as they 
hold the legal responsibility for establishing objectives, and reviewing 
management’s performance to ensure that the health facility is well run. The 
hospital board is also said to have the ultimate accountability in terms of how 
the hospital functions. The effectiveness of the hospital boards depends on 
how they are structured in terms of size, composition, medical staff 
representation, board leadership structure, gender diversity, and frequency of 
meetings. 
The findings of this study make a case for having smaller boards. Smaller 
boards tend to have more focused boardroom discussion and easily reach a 
consensus. They are able to take quicker decisions in delivering better service 
to their patients and therefore,  enhance performance. This  means  smaller 
boards are more effective than larger boards. This position is supported by 
the extant literature (see Bader, 199; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Gu et al., 
2010). Bader (1991) suggest that, small number of governing boards within a 
health system would ensure that boards focus more on their role within the 
system. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards tend to reduce 
effectiveness, and thereby making it easier for the CEO to control. Gu et al. 
(2010) also found that, smaller boards tend to record higher performance.   
 
This study established that board composition is related to enhanced hospital 
performance. The reasoning here is that having greater number of outside 
board members increases the independence of the board. The independence 
of the board is necessary in implementing effective internal control systems, 
which ultimately improves efficiency and performance. The finding supports 
the resource dependency theory considering that outside board members 
bring some expertise to the work of the board leading to improved hospital 
performance. This finding with respect to board composition is also in 
tandem with prior empirical studies by Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Brickley 
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 et al. (1994) who found that boards composed of greater number of outside 
or external board members bring about enhanced hospital performance. It is 
also supported by the position of Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), and 
Gautam and Goodstein (1996) that, outside directors are necessary to 
adequately monitor top management's performance. Also, in the opinion of 
Dalton  et al.  (1999), the independence of directors is an essential 
requirement for board effectiveness. Clearly, board composition enhances 
board monitoring and effectiveness, which could lead to improved 
performance. 
 
The position held in this is that greater representation of medical staff on the 
hospital board lead to lower occupancy rate but higher operating cost in the 
provision of healthcare services. This finding  partially supports  the 
managerialism theory and resource dependency theory.  
 
This study postulates the need for decoupling the roles of the CEO and board 
chair. This position is consistent with the extant literature, which also makes 
a case for a board typology, where the position of the CEO is separated from 
that of the board chair. It is evident from the findings of this study that such 
a board typology brings about better performance in terms of higher 
discharge and better service quality. The position held in this study is also 
supported by the stakeholder theory which suggests that, duality seriously 
impedes the overall stakeholder orientation of board members, therefore, 
separating the functions of the CEO and board chair may be viewed as 
enhancing the board’s monitoring and control ability, and improve director’s 
information processing capacities (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). 
 
The findings of this study give credence to the importance of female 
representation on hospital boards. Gender diversity is related to improved 
hospital performance and this is based on the resource dependency theory. 
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 Females bring interesting perceptive to boardroom discussion and this has 
the tendency of improving the quality of service delivery and performance. 
Bilimoria (2000) argue that having women on boards is desirable business 
practice because it is likely to improve the reputation on the firm, the 
strategic direction (by better understanding women’s issues that may impact 
on such direction) and to contribute positively to the firm’s female 
employees.  Siciliano (1996) suggests that, boards with increased gender 
diversity are more likely to enjoy high levels of social agency mission 
achievement.  Elstad and Ladegard (2010) also argue that the higher the 
proportion of females on the board, the  greater the level of perceived 
influence, perceived social interaction outside the boardroom, and to some 
degree, perceived information sharing. This finding with respect to gender 
diversity contributes to previous empirical studies, which also found that 
higher representation of females on boards lead to better performance (see 
Burke, 1997; Singh et al., 2001; Carter et al., 2003). 
 
It is also established in this study that frequency of board meetings results in 
improved health service quality. The frequency of board meetings may be 
explained within the context of the resource dependency theory. Holding 
frequent board meetings ensures that the board receives relevant information 
on the hospital to enable it make useful decisions that will enhance 
performance. Also, holding frequent board meetings could be a way of 
ensuring that the board members are well informed to make meaningful 
contributions in addressing the resource needs of the hospital. 
 
The study points to the fact that mission-based and private hospitals exhibit 
better performance than public hospitals. These hospitals provide prompt 
and appropriate treatment, and also provide better quality of healthcare. This 
position contributes to the property rights theory, which suggests that the 
managers of private hospitals unlike their public counterpart are able to 
implement initiatives and innovations to improve efficiency and service 
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 quality (Hart, 1995). Hospitals in developing countries exhibit different 
ownership structure from hospitals in developed countries. The study 
contributes to the extant literature by examining how different ownership 
structures influence the performance of hospitals. In examining the combined 
effect of hospital board characteristics and ownership structure, it was 
observed that interacting hospital board characteristics with ownership 
structure significantly influence the performance of hospitals in Ghana. The 
results of this study have shown that mission-based hospitals and that of 
private hospitals with well-structured  board characteristics record better 
performance. This finding signals the fact that effective board structure and 
ownership structure are both important in influencing hospital performance.  
 
This study also contributes to the body of knowledge as a pioneering work to 
ascertain how governance affect hospital performance considering various 
ownership forms. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first 
study that ascertains whether or not the presence of a hospital board affects 
performance. In first equation, a model is estimated where a dummy variable 
is introduced with the value of one where the hospital has a board in place, 
and zero if otherwise. The dummy variable is used to define the presence of a 
hospital board. The model also captures the effects of the ownership 
structure (which is defined by a categorical variable) and the control variables 
on hospital performance. In the third equation, a model is estimated by 
interacting hospital board characteristics with ownership structure to 
ascertain their combined effect on  performance. Another important 
contribution to the methodology is that performance is looked at from the 
point of view of both the health service providers and patients. Prior studies 
defined hospital performance from only the hospitals’ point of view. In this 
study, apart from including hospitals’ measures of performance (i.e., 
occupancy  rate, discharge  rate, and efficiency), the study includes  health 
service quality as a performance measure from the patients’ point of view. 
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 8.3  Limitations of the Study 
This study focused on how the governance structures of public, mission-
based and private hospitals influence their performance. However, some 
limitations were identified with respect to the study. 
 
Healthcare governance or hospital governance is regarded as a shared 
process of top-level organizational leadership, policymaking and decision-
making of the board, CEO, senior management and clinical leaders. But this 
current study focused on an aspect of healthcare governance. This study 
specifically focuses on the importance of hospital boards by ascertaining 
whether or not the presence of hospital board influences hospital 
performance. The study also looked at how hospital board characteristics 
affect performance. The study could have included a more comprehensive 
measure of healthcare governance and quality of management.  
 
Also, this study used structural measures to examine the effect of hospital 
governing boards on performance. However, structural measures do not 
capture the quality of governing board participation in the strategic 
management of the hospital. One of the hospital board characteristics is 
gender diversity. The extant literature defines board diversity to include age, 
ethnicity, gender, education, occupation, and religion. The study limited 
board diversity to only gender board diversity for lack of data. In this study, 
measures of performance include occupancy rate, discharge rate, efficiency, 
and service quality. It would have been useful to include other measures of 
performance.  
 
The governance characteristics, ownership type and the control variables 
might very well be determined by the performance of hospitals, indicating a 
reverse causality in the determination of performance. For instance, some 
hospitals could be taken over by other owners depending on their 
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 performance, and governance structures might also be changed relative to 
prevailing performance measures of the hospital. Thus, issues of endogeneity 
are to be expected in the estimation models used in this study. The 
methodology employed in this study does not include measures like the use 
of an appropriate instrumental variable to control for endogeneity.  
 
Considering the changes in policy directions by the different political parties 
in Ghana, a longitudinal study into examining the healthcare governance in 
Ghana over a period could reveal some interesting trends in changes in 
structures relative to the different change in national politics/governance. 
This study is however a cross sectional one limited by changes in governance 
trends over time. 
 
Adequate understanding of the mechanisms of governance in the healthcare 
sector could have been conducted with an in-depth study (e.g. case study) of 
a few specified hospital types, instead of the general approach to large 
sample size captured in this study. 
 
However, the researcher believes that these limitations do not affect the 
findings of the research. The thesis provides interesting findings on the 
healthcare governance, ownership structure and the performance of hospitals 
in a developing country context. 
 
8.4  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The governance and effectiveness of the healthcare sector is very important 
due to its impact on human well-being  and the size of this sector  of the 
economy. All serious governments and healthcare boards must know how to 
improve the governance of the  sector. The findings of this study have 
revealed that, the performance of hospitals is influenced by the presence of 
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 hospital board. The study has also shown that, depending on how the boards 
are structured in terms of their characteristics, these tend to have significant 
effects on the performance of the hospitals. Clearly, the results of this study 
have provided some useful insights into the importance of healthcare 
governance boards and ownership structure in influencing the performance of 
hospitals. The findings of this study, therefore, have important implications 
for improving healthcare governance, management and the performance of 
hospitals. The findings would be relevant for policy makers, hospital boards 
and management. 
 
First, it has been established that hospitals that have a governing board in 
place perform better in terms of delivering quality healthcare. The presence 
of hospital boards is important as they take decisions that improve the quality 
of health services provided by the hospitals. It is, therefore, recommended 
that hospitals that do not have a board in place should consider composing a 
well-functioning board. It would also be useful for government through the 
Ministry of Health to consider giving a legal backing mandating all hospitals 
to have a governing board in place if the complex challenges of the health 
sector are to be dealt with critically. Hospitals boards need to be empowered 
to discharge their responsibilities with authority. For instance, the board 
should be able to execute their full authority on hiring and firing CEOs and 
senior management of hospitals based on their performance. 
 
Second, it is argued that having a hospital board in place is not sufficient. It is 
also necessary to structure the board in such a way that it is effective in 
ensuring better healthcare delivery and enhanced performance. The findings 
of this study have shown that, the structure of the hospital boards in terms of 
their characteristics is important in influencing performance. This current 
study supports the recent call for smaller boards as it was observed that 
smaller boards bring about better health service quality and lower occupancy 
rate.  This signals the fact that hospitals with smaller boards encourage 
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 activities that lead to the provision of better quality of health service. 
Hospitals need to employ a smaller board as opposed to a bigger board, 
which often turns out to be ineffective. 
 
One key policy recommendation is the need to have a hospital board made up 
of majority independent directors. The board should be composed of majority 
of outsiders. Having a governing board with majority of outsiders has been 
shown to be important in improving the performance of hospitals. It is 
established in this study that independent board members are often in the 
position to guide hospital management on how to be cost efficient.  
 
This study argues for the need to have a good number of medical staff on the 
hospital board. In order to improve on the quality of healthcare of a nation, 
doctors and other healthcare professionals should be involved more in the 
governance and management of the health services.  Higher proportion of 
medical staff on the hospital board has been found to lead to better 
performance in terms of high level of discharge.  
 
Although the findings of this study suggest that CEO duality results in better 
performance in terms of efficiency, the essence of decoupling the roles of the 
CEO and board chairs is eminent in this study,  as shown by the high 
discharge  rate  and better service quality. Hospitals need to recognize the 
need to have the functions of the CEO and board chair performed by two 
separate individuals. This ensures that the CEO does not have his/her way by 
pushing their personal agenda at board meetings. Such a two-tier board 
typology has the advantage of preventing opportunistic actions by the CEO 
and management.  
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 The important role of female representation on hospitals boards is 
recognized by the findings of this study. Another policy recommendation is 
the need to have a good number of females on the hospital board. Females 
on hospitals hospital boards bring about interesting perspectives to 
boardroom discussion, which result in the delivery of better quality of 
healthcare with a subsequent effect on higher level of discharge.  
 
The findings of this study have confirmed the notion that frequency of board 
meetings leads in improved performance. This study therefore recommends 
the need to hold frequent meetings at least once per quarter. Holding 
frequent board meetings provides the opportunity to receive relevant 
information that enables board members make important decisions that lead 
to the provision of better health service quality. Holding frequent board 
meetings is also important in ensuring frequent monitoring and this enables 
board members to contribute meaningfully to addressing the resource needs 
of the hospital.  
Another important policy recommendation is with respect to the need for 
public hospitals to be prompt in the provision of healthcare services as in the 
case of mission-based and private hospitals. The findings of this study 
revealed that mission-based and private hospitals exhibit better performance 
in areas of occupancy and discharge  rates  because they tend to provide 
prompt and appropriate treatment. The performance of mission-based and 
private hospitals may be attributed to better reward systems. Therefore, it 
would be useful to institute a reward system that incentivizes better 
performing public hospitals. This is one way of motivating low performing 
ones to follow suit. The high patient-doctor ratios in public hospitals as well 
as the overcrowding in the hospital wards could be minimized by providing 
adequate resources (facilities and health personnel) to enable the provision of 
quality-individualized care in public hospitals. 
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 There is the need for better policies and measures to be put in place through 
the Ministry of Health to improve on the quality of healthcare delivery, in 
order to boost donor and public confidence and trust in the health system. 
 
In addition to ensuring a well-structured governance system at the hospital 
level, there is also the need to put in place a proper governance structure at 
the level of the national healthcare system. This is an important move in 
ensuring an effective and efficient healthcare delivery system. An effective 
governance system at that level would be useful in strengthening and 
streamlining the activities of the traditional healthcare system to supplement 
the healthcare rendered by the currently dominating rather strained orthodox 
healthcare system.  
 
This study would also be useful with respect to curriculum design in the area 
of healthcare governance. Academic programmes on corporate  governance 
abound. However, the researcher is yet to find one on Healthcare Governance, 
especially in Africa. Such an academic programme would be useful in 
providing the necessary training in improving skills and expertise of hospital 
board members and management to participate in boardroom discussions 
and decision-making. 
 
8.5  Directions for Further Research  
The findings of this study bring to the fore some issues for future research. It 
would be useful to include other elements of healthcare governance, such as 
the role of top management, the quality of management, and clinical leaders 
in hospital governance  and how that affects performance.  This is because 
findings of this study alludes to the fact that having governance structures in 
place by itself does not determine good performance, thus investigating the 
quality and competence of management in implementing policy directives 
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 from the governing board would give a better understanding of healthcare 
governance. 
 
The criteria used in appointing board members is equally crucial in evaluating 
board performance. Therefore, a study into the mode of appointment and 
measurement of board performance would be appropriate in a future study. 
 
A study into how governing  boards  perform  their  role  in terms of the 
appointment of hospital executives would be useful. Investigating the actual 
authority of the board in this regard and how this influences the monitoring 
of hospital management would further deepen the appreciation of healthcare 
governance issues in a developing country.  
 
This study considered structural measures of hospital boards. It would also 
be useful for future studies to consider process measures of board activity. 
These may include the number of board-initiated proposals that are 
introduced and adopted, hours spent on the development or evaluation of 
strategic plans for higher performance, and the importance of board minutes.  
 
Another important area for future study is examining the reverse causality. 
This study examined how hospital performance is influenced by governance 
characteristics and ownership structure. In addition to this, a future study 
could include how board governance and ownership structure are determined 
by hospital performance. 
 
A qualitative interview-based study into finding out more about why some 
board characteristics like medical staff and  female representation on boards 
significantly influence performance of mission hospitals and  not private 
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 hospitals. Thus, a case study of each of the ownership types or two or more 
of the same ownership form with different performance levels could be 
studied to find out what is really driving these variations. 
 
Future studies may consider expanding board and gender diversity to include 
other measures, such as age, educational and other backgrounds of board 
members. 
 
Another important area that could be considered in future studies is the 
inclusion of other measures of performance beyond the four measures used 
in this current study. For instance, this study did not look at performance in 
terms of profitability. A study on how the governance structures of private 
hospitals affect their profitability would be useful. 
 
A comparative study of healthcare governance of Ghana with that of another 
African country would be worth investigating. It would be an interesting study 
comparing the different political and economic environments of African 
countries and how these impact on healthcare governance. 
 
Future studies could also consider the level of satisfaction of employees of 
these hospitals as a measure of service quality.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire to Hospitals 
Facility name   
Region   
Date of survey   
 
People interviewed 
280 
  
General Information 
1.  Name of hospital ………………………….  
 
2.  When was the hospital established? …………. 
 
3.  What is the number of your of employees?................... 
 
4.  What is the form of your business’s ownership? 
[   ] public           [   ] private         [   ] mission-based 
 
5.  Is the hospital for-profit or non-profit?............................................ 
 
6.  Where are you located?............................................ 
 
Name  Position  Department  Phone number 
 
Email address 
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 7.  What was the revenue (IGF) for five years 
[2005]……………….. 
[2006]………………..         
[2007]………………..         
[2008]……………….. 
[2009]……………….. 
[2010]……………….. 
         
8.  What is the educational background of the CEO/Medical Director 
[   ] First degree                                          
[   ] Postgraduate degree                                          
[   ] Other, please specify …………….                                          
 
9.  What is the professional training of the CEO/ Medical Director? 
      (Please you can tick more than one) 
[   ] Medicine                                           
[   ] Health service administration                                                
[   ] Human Resources        
[   ] Other, please specify…………                                          
 
10.  Do you have a Hospital Administrator?  
[   ] Yes                             [   ] No                                           
 
11.  What is the educational background of the Hospital Administrator?  
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 [   ] First degree                                          
[   ] Postgraduate degree                                          
[   ] Other, please specify …………….                                          
 
12.  What is the size of the management team?............................ 
 
13.  How many of those in management have degree or professional 
qualification?………….. 
 
Hospital Governance Issues 
14.  Do you have a working board of directors? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
15.  If NO, why? ................................................................................... 
 
16.  How many board members do you have (excluding the board 
secretary?.................................................... 
 
17.  How many of the board members are outsiders or do not work in the 
hospital?..........  
 
18.  How many of the board members are females?................................... 
 
283 
  
19.  How many of the board members are medical staff of this 
hospital?................................ 
 
20.  How many of the board members are medical professionals from 
outside?................................... 
 
21.  How many of the board members are relatives of the 
CEO/owner?................................... 
 
22.  How many of the board members are friends of the 
CEO/owner?......................................... 
 
23.  How many directors  have a degree or professional qualification? 
………………………………. 
24.  How many directors have a law degree? ……………….. 
 
25.  Is the CEO/medical director also the chairman of the board? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
26.  How many board meetings do you hold in a year? 
[   ] None        
[   ] One                                       
[   ] Two                                         
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 [   ] Three                                         
[   ] Four  
[   ] other, please specify ……………….. 
                                         
27.  Are board meetings based on prepared agendas? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
28.  Are minutes taken at board meetings? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
29.  Are agendas driven by and aligned with the annual board goals and 
work plan? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
30.  Are agendas and previous minutes sent to members ahead of board 
meetings?  
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
31.  If Yes, for how long do members have to study agendas and previous 
minutes before the next meeting?................................................... 
 
32.  What is the level of involvement of the outside directors?  
[   ] Highly involved                                                
[   ] Involved                        
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 [   ] Some involvement   
[   ] Hardly involved   
[   ] Not involved   
33.  How are board members appointed or 
selected?.............................................. 
 
34.  Who appoints the board members? ……………….. 
[   ] Government    [   ] CEO/medical director     [   ] Other, please 
specify………… 
 
35.  Where are the outside directors found?  
[   ] Family members                                                
[   ] Friends of a director             
[   ] Business friend suggested    
[   ] Introduction from the Ministry of Health    
[   ] Introduction from external auditor 
[   ] Family member suggested     
[   ] From other hospitals     
[   ] Introduction from Solicitor  
[   ] Local links   
[   ] Other, please specify …………………………..   
 
36.  What is the term of office of directors? 
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 [   ] 2 years and renewable for another …………… years 
[   ] 3 years and renewable for another …………… years 
[   ] 4 years and renewable for another …………… years 
[   ] No limit to term 
[   ] Other, please specify…………..…………….. 
 
37.  How is board remuneration set? 
[   ] No remuneration 
[   ] Set annual fee 
[   ] Per meeting fee 
[   ] Travel and other reimbursement  
[   ] Other, please specify ………………….. 
38.  Is there a policy on evaluating the performance of the board? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
 
39.  How is the evaluation done and how often is it 
done?.......................................  
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
40.  Is there a policy on evaluating the performance of the CEO? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
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41.  How is the evaluation done and how often is it 
done?.......................................  
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
42.  Do you have a policy on succession planning? 
[   ] Yes          [   ] No 
   
43.  Do you have an internal audit department? 
[   ] Yes                         [   ] No                        
 
44.  Do you have an audit committee? 
[   ] Yes                         [   ] No                        
 
45.  Which sub-committees of the board do you have? 
[   ] Audit subcommittee                                                
[   ] Finance                        
[   ] Compensation/Remuneration 
[   ] Technical 
[   ] Others, please specify…………………….. 
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 46.   
                                           
 
 
 
 
1   2   3   4         5   
Building organization reputation  [  ]  [  ]  [  ]   [  ]      [  ]   
  Strategic planning process   [  ]  [  ]  [  ]   [  ]      [  ] 
  Take care of access to resources  [  ]   [  ]   [  ]   [  ]      [  ] 
Finance expertise      [  ]   [  ]   [  ]   [  ]      [  ] 
Legal expertise      [  ]   [  ]   [  ]   [  ]      [  ] 
Operational expertise    [  ]   [  ]  [  ]   [  ]      [  ] 
  Recruitment        [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Help with growth problems  [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Providing advise      [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Networking         [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Determining salary      [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Evaluating management    [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
  Directing succession problems  [  ]   [  ]      [  ]  [  ]      [  ] 
 
On a scale of 1 – 5 Rank the contribution of the outside 
board 
1. Not important  
5. Very important  
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 47.  What do you think are the problems to effective governance of the 
hospital? 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
48.  How many beds does this hospital have currently? ………………. 
 
49.  How many beds did this hospital have in: 
[2005]……………….. 
[2006]………………..         
[2007]………………..         
[2008]……………….. 
[2009]………………..      
[2010]………………..         
    
50.  On the average, what is the occupancy rate (how many inpatients in the 
hospital per bed)  
Daily?………………..                               Monthly?……………….. 
51.  How many inpatients did you have in: 
[2005]……………….. 
[2006]………………..         
[2007]………………..         
[2008]……………….. 
[2009]………………..         
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 [2010]………………..         
 
52.  How many inpatients were discharged in: 
[2005]……………….. 
[2006]………………..         
[2007]………………..         
[2008]……………….. 
[2009]………………..         
[2010]………………..         
 
53.  What were your total expenses for the last five years? 
[2005]……………….. 
[2006]………………..         
[2007]………………..         
[2008]……………….. 
[2009]………………..         
[2010]………………..         
 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire to Patients 
 
Service Quality Issues 
Facility name 
 
 
Region 
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 Date of survey 
 
 
 
The following set of statements relate to your feelings about the 
hospital/clinic you have attended.   For each statement, please show the 
extent to which you believe the hospital/clinic has the feature described by 
the statement.  Once again, circling a 1 means that you strongly disagree that 
the hospital/clinic you have attended has this feature and circling a 7 means 
that you strongly agree.  You may circle any of the numbers in the middle 
that show how strong your feelings are.   There are no rights or wrong 
answers  -  all we are interested in is a number that best shows your 
perceptions about the hospital/clinic which has treated you. 
  
      Strongly                                        Strongly         
      Disagree                                           Agree 
1.   The hospital/clinic has modern- looking equipment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
2. The physical facilities in the hospital/clinic are visually appealing.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.   Personnel in the hospital/clinic are neat in appearance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
4.   Materials associated with the service (such as pamphlets or statements) 
are 
      visually appealing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
292 
   
5.   When the hospital/clinic promises to do something by a certain time it 
does  
      so. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
6.   When you have a problem, the hospitals /clinic shows a sincere interest in 
      solving it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
7.   The hospital/clinic gets things right the first time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
8.   The hospital/clinic provides its services at the time it promises to do so.  
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
9.   The hospital/clinic insists on error-free records. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
10.  The personnel in the hospital/clinic tell you exactly when services will be  
       performed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.  Personnel in the hospital/clinic give you prompt service.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
12.   Personnel in the hospital/clinic are always willing to help 
you. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
13.  Personnel in the hospital/clinic are never be too busy to respond to your 
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        requests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
14. The behaviour of personnel in the hospital/clinic instils confidence in you. 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
15.  You feel safe in your dealings with the hospital/clinic. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
16.  Personnel in the hospital/clinic are consistently courteous with   
       you. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
17. Personnel in the hospital/clinic have the knowledge to answer your  
      questions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
18.  The hospital/clinic gives you individual attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
19.  The hospital/clinic has operating hours convenient to all its patients. 
       1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
20.  The hospital/clinic has personnel who give you personal attention. 
       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
21.  The hospital/clinic has your best interests at heart. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 22.  The personnel of the hospital/clinic understand your specific needs. 
       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Thank you for the time you have spent in completing this questionnaire.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: List of Sampled Hospitals 
 
No.  Name of Hospital  Ownership 
Type 
Location  Region 
1  Akropong Government Hospital  Public  Akropong    Ashanti 
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 2  Aboraa Hospital  private  Accra  Greater Accra 
3  Achimota Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
4  Agogba Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
5  Airport Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
6  Akim Oda Hospital  Public  Oda  Eastern  
7  Al-Ayar Clinic   Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
8  Alpha Medical Centre  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
9  Asamankese Govt. Hospital  Public  Aasamankese  Eastern  
10  Akuse Government Hospital  Public  Akuse  Eastern  
11  Atua Government Hospital  Public 
Odumase-
Krobo  Eastern  
12  Aviation Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
13  Barnor Hospital  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
14  Bawku Presby Hospital  Public  Bawku  Upper East 
15  Bechem Hospital  Public  Bechem   Brong Ahafo 
16  Begoro Hospital  Public  Begoro   Eastern 
17  Bengali Hospital  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
18  Bennette Memorial Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
19  Biney Clinic   Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
20  Bolgatanga Hospital  Public  Bolatanga  Upper East 
21  Cacao Clinic  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
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 22  Cantoments Hospital  Private  Cantoments  Greater Accra 
23  Caiquo Hospital  Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
24  Calvary Clinic  Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
25  Calvary Cross Clinic  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
26  Cathedral Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
27  Central Regional Hospital  Public  cape coast  Central 
28  Cocoa Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
29  Dangme East Hospital  Public  Ada  Greater Accra 
30  Dangme West District Hospital  Public  Dodowa  Greater Accra 
31  Dansoman Central Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
32  Dansoman Clinic  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
33  DAR- BEM Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
34  Del International Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
35  Deseret Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
36  Dunkwa Government Hospital   Public  Dunkwa   Central 
37  Eden Family Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
38  Effia-Nkwanta Regional Hospital  Public  Secondi  Western 
39  Fair Lady Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
40  Ga South Municipal Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
41  Gak Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
42  Ghana Police Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
297 
 43  Ghana Ports & Harbour   Public  Tarkoradi  Western 
44  Greenhand Clinic  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
45  Government Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
46  Holy Cross Clinic  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
47  Holy Family Hospital  Private  Nkawkaw  Eastern  
48  Holy Family Hospital – Nkawkaw  Mission  Nkawkaw  Eastern  
49  Holy Family Hospital – Berekum  Mission  Berekum  Brong Ahafo 
50  Holy Height Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
51  Holy Cross Clinic  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
52  Holy Trinity Hospital   Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
53  Joana Clinic Ltd  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
54  Johpat Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
55  Karikari Brobbey Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
56  Kasoa Hospital Complex  Private  Kasoa  Central 
57  Kyebi Government Hospital  Public  Kibi  Eastern  
58  Kintampo Municipal Hospital  Public  Kintampo  Brong Ahafo 
59  KNUST Hospital  Public  Kumasi  Ashanti 
60  Koforidua Regional  Public  Koforidua  Eastern 
61  Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
62  Kumawu Health Centre  Public  Kumawu  Ashanti 
63  Kwahu Government Hospital  Public  Kwahu  Eastern  
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 64  La Hospital  Public  La  Greater Accra 
65  Lagoon Clinic  Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
66  Lake Side Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
67  Mab Medicare Centre  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
68  Manna Mission Hospital  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
69  Mercy Clinic   Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
70  Meridian Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
71  Mery Lucy Hospital  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
72  37 Military Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
73  Military Hospital  Public  Tamale  Greater Accra 
74  Mission Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
75  P M L  Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
76  Narh-Bita Hospital  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
77  Neptune Medical Centre  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
78  New Edubiase Hospital  Public  New Edubiase   Ashanti 
79  New Tafo Government Hospital  Public  New Tafo  Eastern 
80  Nightingale Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
81  North Ridge Clinic  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
82  Notre Dame Clinic  Mission  Adeiso  Eastern  
83  Nsawam Hospital  Public  Nsawam  Eastern  
84  Nsawam Govt Hospital  Public  Nsawam  Eastern  
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 85  Nyarho Medical Centre  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
86  Oda Government Hospital  Public  Oda  Eastern  
87  Owusu Memorial Hospital  Public  Sunyani  Brong Ahafo 
88  Pantang Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
89  Port Medical centre  Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
90  Presby Hospital, Donkorkrom  Mission  Donkorkrom  Eastern 
91 
Princess Marie Children’s 
Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
92  PURC  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
93  Queens Medical Center  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
94  Koforidua Regional Hospital   Public  Koforidua  Eastern  
95  Ridge Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
96  Sakumono Hospital  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
97  Second Bridge Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
98  Sinel Hospital  Private  Tema  Greater Accra 
99  Sogakope District Hospital  Public  Sogakope  Volta 
100  St Jude Hospital  Mission  Obuasi  Ashanti 
101  St. Anthony's Hospital  Mission  Ketu  Volta  
102  St. Dominic Hospital   Mission  Akwatia  Greater Accra 
103  St. Florence Clinic  Mission  Tema  Greater Accra 
104  St. Joseph Hospital  Mission  Koforidua  Eastern  
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 105  St. Martin’s De Pores  Mission  Eikwe  Western 
106  St. Patrick's Hospital  Private  Kpando  Volta 
107  Saltpond Government Hospital  Public  Saltpond  Central 
108  Suhum Government Hospital  Public  Suhum  Eastern  
109  Swan Clinic  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
110  Swedru Municipal Hospital  Public  Swedru  Central 
111  Tamale Regional Hospital  Public  Tamale  Northern 
112  Tamale Teaching Hospital  Public  Tamale  Northern 
113  Tarkoradi Hospital  Public  Tarkoradi  Western 
114  Tarkwa Municipal Hospital  Public  Tarkwa  Western 
115  Tema General Hospital  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
116 
Tetteh Quarshie Memorial 
Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
117  The Community Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
118  The Rock Hospital   Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
119  Trust Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
120  UEW Clinic  Public  Winneba  Central 
121  University of Ghana Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
122  University Hospital  Public  Cape Coast  Central 
123  Upper West Regional Hospital  Public  Wa  Upper West 
124  Valco Clinic  Public  Tema  Greater Accra 
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 125  Valley View Hospital  Mission  Accra  Greater Accra 
126  Vicom Hospital  Private  Accra  Greater Accra 
127  Volta Regional Hospital  Public  Ho  Volta 
128  VRA Hospital  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
129  War Memorial Hospital  Public  Navrongo  Upper East 
130  Weija Leprosarium  Public  Accra  Greater Accra 
131  Winneba Hospital  Public  Winneba  Greater Accra 
132  Wisdom  Hospital  Private  Dichemso  Ashanti 
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